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CHAPTER I 
RETURNING THE PERSON TO CURRICULUM: 
FOUR CURRICULUM THINKERS IN RELATION TO MARTIN BUBER 
A. Purpose 
This study will analyze four contemporary curriculum thinkers in 
relation to the educational views of Martin Buber. The reconceptualist 
theorists are James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and 
William Pinar. These four persons are commonly concerned with how 
knowledge is communicated in education. While they offer different 
points of view, they all address the problem of rational discourse, the 
spoken metaphor, aesthetics, and intuition as ways of implementing com-
munication through the curriculum. 
The specific purpose of this study is to examine the unique per-
sonal perspective Martin Buber brings to curriculum criticism and to 
link this perspective with the above four reconceptualists. 
This study also will investigate the possibility of dialogue as a 
means of discovering more about ourselves in relationship to our larger 
worlds. The dialogue facilitates encounters among one another and 
heightens anticipation of discovery within nature. 
Dialogue in education implies the possibility of the experience 
of transcendence. It is one facet of consciousness which is nurtured by 
human experience, but refers to a limitless passing beyond any material 
condition or conception. Most importantly, within the act of dialogue 
1 
two persons learn to mutually enlarge and refine the scope of their 
inquiry into new sources of knowledge. The capacity to reach towards 
another human being is evidence of a degree of transcendence. Certain 
types of curricular discourse focus on dialogue as a means of freeing 
the cognitive and affective faculties. While those who reconceptualize 
the curriculum hesitate to speak of cause and effect, they put value on 
self-knowledge that surfaces somewhere in the process. For Buber, how-
ever, all worthwhile learning is in relationship. "Self-knowledge" is 
misleading, and even is an obstacle. 
2 
Knowledge comes from a variety of sources. We have seen, for 
example, that though society builds schools, it still educates the young 
through family, ritual, or training. As society becomes more complex, 
however, schools become increasingly important. As the frontiers of 
knowledge and learning expand, the young are motivated to obtain more 
formal education through the schools. The curriculum of this institu-
tion provides a framework for organizing the skills and rituals that the 
society wants to renew and pass on to the future generations. 
This study will also examine some of the critiques of traditional 
notions of schooling in light of reconceptualization and Martin Buber. 
The traditional curriculum theoreticians talk a great deal about the 
problems of returning the person to curriculum, that is, of making the 
education of all students more humane. However, a good deal of this 
well-intentioned, principled talk is ill conceived. Educators are still 
unduly influenced by the behavioral, scientific and technological modes 
of inquiry. These modes of thought and action are not always conducive 
3 
for humane relationships between learner and teacher. They reflect a 
means-ends rationale that calls for manipulation of variables designed 
to arrive at a desired end. A cause and effect interaction is assumed, 
which is the antithesis of the curricular priorities of the reconcep-
tualists. The reconceptualists approach curriculum as an act of criti-
cal self-reflection on personal and social issues in relation to partic-
ular social content being investigated. This study will locate the 
resources for implementing a more fully human, personal educational 
process. 
B. The Significance of This Study 
This study shows the ways in which Martin Buber's philosophy 
coincides with some of the contentions of the reconceptualists; differ-
ences are also shown; to the author's best knowledge, no other study has 
shown this relationship. The study will attempt to show the liabilities 
of theorizing based on empirical and behavioral models. Moreover, re-
conceptualization claims to be able to show the diminishing returns of 
technology applied to make education, specifically learning, 
"efficient." 
Proposals for changed conceptions do not take place in a vacuum 
or on an ad hoc basis. Those who are reconceptualizing the field of 
curriculum proceed with a historical perspective. There is an on-going 
inquiry into the theories and practices that characterize earlier gener-
ations of curricular specialists. For example, reconceptualists point 
out that Ralph Tyler proposed a rationale for theorizing over thirty 
years ago. His rationale consisted of certain inputs and outputs; 
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curriculum resulted from rational deliberation about means and ends. 
current theorists are not unaware of Tyler's search for values, or 
advice sought from subject matter professionals. But with this in mind, 
reconceptualists suggest that Tyler's concern for the full person is re-
stricted by certain narrow focuses: Tyler does not adequately show an 
appreciation of the fact that the students and teacher approach the cur-
riculum with biases and idiosyncracies. These are also important "in-
puts'' that the Tyler rationale does not adequately consider, but should. 
The whole student is a fully feeling creature, not an abstraction. It 
is a "real" person one encounters in a classroom. 
The significant contributions of reconceptual theorists go beyond 
historical critique. They offer what William Pinar has called a "post-
critical" response. It is based on a variety of social and intellectual 
traditions: phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and 
Eastern philosophies such as Zen. 
These traditions do not contain panaceas; curriculum theorists 
cannot simply be scholars of these disciplines but must be scholars in 
the use of the traditions as well. The traditions are sources and sen-
sitizers; they provide us with intellectual, psychological, and spiri-
tual stimulation--"grist for the mill." These traditions, spiritual and 
intellectual, provoke a new basis for ideas and sensations of our very 
own. We investigate them in order to re-think and re-feel our assump-
tions about the political, economic, and social milieu we inhabit. The 
real significance of the four curricularists and Martin Buber is that 
they help us to articulate frustration with behavioral or scientifi.c 
patterns of learning; they then offer a person-centered approach to 
learning as opposed to a subject-centered approach. 
What distinguishes this research is the breadth and depth of 
reconceptualist inquiry in relation to Martin Buber. Having critically 
examined historical precedents in curriculum writing, one recognizes a 
variety of as yet untapped energies: psychological, spiritual, aes-
thetic, and intellectual. As human beings we function most fully when 
we accept that the sources of our being are rooted in two worlds: the 
objective world of what is seen and heard, tasted, felt, and the spir-
itualist, intuitive world of the unseen. Through language we communi-
cate to one another these objective and intuitive worlds. 
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This study provides new insights into the limitations, successes 
and possibilities of language for curricular discourse. The reconcep-
tualists alert us to the fact that modes of communication, in this case 
language, reflect basic interests that humans share. The empirical and 
behavioral models geared to means and ends have certainly affected our 
schools. Now, however, the reconceptualists and Buber suggest a pursuit 
of knowledge nurtured from a variety of interests. The aesthetic and 
ethical are two basic human interests that get little explicit consider-
ation through our present curricula. But this condition is liable to 
change once we squarely face the falsely assumed dichotomy between the 
objective and the spiritual elements of human existence. This study 
seeks to locate and describe the possibility of unity between the objec-
tive and spiritual worlds. 
6 
c. Terminology and Delimitations 
This study focuses on four curricular theorists, from among those 
identified with reconceptualization. The selection was based on sim-
ilarities and interrelationships with regard to ideology, social-
political concern, aesthetic and personal modes of communication. The 
study develops a comprehensive critical and descriptive analysis of 
their major works. Their views will be compared and contrasted with 
Buber's contentions about education through dialogue. An imaginary sym-
posium has been "convened" in which these five persons address them-
selves to two major issues in curriculum: The role of subject matter 
content and process as alternative foci for the curriculum. Also, what 
function does the teacher serve? What is the nature of student-teacher 
relationships? 
This research is not geared to providing any readymade, field-
tested curricula. Rather one is called upon to re-think personal 
values, interests, and tacit knowledge. The theorist provides the edu-
cator with the sources by which an evaluation can be made. 
The work of the four theorists who provoke us to rethink values 
and strategies does not allow facile labeling. Educators have not 
agreed upon an all-inclusive definition of reconceptualization. Gen-
erally the term refers to a variety of non-behavioral, non-empirical 
critiques and suggestions for new curricular directions which are highly 
personalized; the student functions as an emotional and spiritual as 
well as intellectual creature. 
Martin Buber's formulation of the dialogical principle substan-
tiates and expands some of these critiques and new directions. His 
7 
philosophy recognizes and articulates the polarity of our world and 
seeks to make connections. The core of his philosophical stance is a 
search for unity: between two persons, between a person and nature, and 
between a person (as matter and spirit) and Spirit. (This is defined as 
the process leading to !-Thou.) It is this search for unity which will 
be explored in the writings of the four curricularists. 
CHAPTER II 
Part I: MODELS AND CRITIQUES 
Introduction 
This chapter is subdivided into three parts. It begins as an 
historical overview of the curriculum field. A critical analysis will 
then describe the state of much of the field today. Because so much of 
curriculum is rationally and technologically oriented, emphasis is given 
to traditional notions of science and its applications. The third sec-
tion is devoted to a newer group of theorists, identified as reconcep-
tualists, for whom traditional social science paradigms are inappropri-
ate for an expanded person-centered model of curriculum theorizing. The 
last part of the chapter will cite some of their perspectives and points 
of departure as an introduction to the work of four representative 
writers. 
Much of what will be said about the early foundations and figures 
of the field applies to the contemporary scene. Mazza's doctoral 
research substantiates that "scientific curriculum-making initiated a 
technological model for the curriculum field that has become the domi-
nant tradition throughout its roughly sixty year history, despite the 
i f h h i 1 .. 1 ex stence o ot er approac es to curr cu urn. Schubert's historical 
1 Karen A. Mazza, Reconceptual Inquiry as an Alternative Mode of 
Curriculum Theory and Practice: A Critical St~y-cEd.D. dissertation-,-
State University of New York at Cortland, 1980), p. 1. 
8 
9 
treatment of curriculum for the last eighty years also concurs that 
recipe-orientations were the norm "• •• despite admonitions by such 
writers as Bode, Rugg, and Hopkins to engage in serious and complex dis-
course about assumptions that undergird alternative positions on major 
1 i .. 2 curricu um quest ons. 
The small minority who opt for a reconceptualization of the field 
grew up in these earlier traditions. Their observations, then, are 
based on both historical and ideological consideration of the status 
quo. A separate presentation of four curriculum theorists will provide 
a necessary link between the main emphases of the contemporary field and 
the contributions of Martin Buber. 
A. Some Historical Antecedents and Directions 
in Knowledge Organization 
American social and intellectual tradition is rooted in chal-
lenges to the status quo, increased movement of the common person up the 
social ladder with more open educational opportunity than was available 
in Europe. The scientific advances of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century were soon joined to the cause of social improvement. 
One of the great pre-Civil War leaders of public schooling, Horace Mann, 
had nurtured and propagated the ideal of the school as an instrument of 
universal progress. Cremin has stated: "Mann understood well the rela-
tionship between freedom, self government, and universal education. 
2 William Henry Schubert, Curriculum Books: The First Eighty Years 
(Lanham, Md.: University Press, 1980), p. 329. 
Like Jefferson he believed that freedom could rest secure only as free 
men had the knowledge to make intelligent decisions."3 
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Efforts to scientifically organize and systematize knowledge were 
boosted by Darwin's explorations and biological classifications. His 
work in the sciences had direct implications for the fields of sociology 
and education. Evolution theorized how the species came to be; new data 
allowed the researcher to hypothesize in which directions it ought to 
travel in order to develop its talents, thus surviving and advancing. 
Herbert Spencer, who published his theory of evolution before 
Darwin, felt that the survival of the species hinged on the proper syn-
thesis of knowledge around key social processes. Spencer scientifically 
organized his structure around a series of activities ranging from self-
4 preservation to those engaged in as part of leisure. 
Classical liberals like Darwin and Spencer and progressives like 
Mann utilized and advanced the methods of empirical science. For 
example, in 1892 a muckraking journalist, pediatrician Joseph Rice, 
wrote about the disorganized public school system, professionally mis-
5 
managed and politically tainted. The ignorance of new scientific 
methodologies on the part of the professional educator convinced Rice to 
expand his journalistic broadsides and organizational activity. Pro-
gressive education demanded clarity of purpose, substantiated by well-
articulated methods and rationally designed means for evaluation. Rugg 
3 Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation ~ the School (New York: 
Vintage, 1964), P• 9. 
4 Andreas M. Kazamias, Herbert Spencer on Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1966), p. 126. 
11 
goes on to document how empirically oriented studies of time efficiency, 
standardization of subjects, and formal discipline--as opposed to vivid 
understanding--dominated curriculum work in the latter part of the nine-
6 teenth century. 
One outcome of the joining of new scientific methodologies and 
progressive social concerns was the formation of educational commissions 
to rationally organize the schools. The National Education Association 
appointed committees to derive principles that would guide and structure 
secondary and elementary education. Their efforts certainly shaped the 
slope of curricular work for decades with a means-ends orientation. 
Kliebard finds a landmark in publication of the NEA's Seven Car-
7 dinal Principles 2£ Secondary Education. The seven principles were 
geared to identifying the social requirements of American youth, the 
basic skills, activities, and conditions of life for progress in the 
American democratic milieu. Harris had originally spoken of education 
8 
as a process of elevating the neophyte member into the species; Dewey 
later restated this need, in the context of a pronounced faith in demo-
cratic ideals for creating the proper environment: . . • there is the 
necessity that the immature members be not merely physically preserved 
6Harold Rugg, "Three Decades of Mental Discipline: Curriculum 
Making Via National Committees, " in The Foundations and Techniques of 
Curriculum Construction, ed. Guy Montrose Whipple, Twenty-Sixth Yearbook 
of National Society for the Study of Education (Bloomington, Ill.: Pub-
lic School Publishing Co., 1926), pp. 33-55. 
7Herbert M. Kliebard, "Persistent Issues in Curricular Theoriz-
ing," in Curricular Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1975~p. 39. 
8
william T. Harris, Psychologic Foundations of Education (New 
York: Appleton, 1898), p. viii. 
12 
in adequate numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, pur-
poses, information, skill and practices of the mature members ••• edu-
cation and education alone spans the gap."9 
Franklin Bobbit theorized about curriculum as a series of vari-
ables made up of ends and means. It is likely that his perspective 
developed from the original Latin meaning of the word curriculum, a race 
10 
course or race. In other words, it was a setting, a place of events 
which must be experienced in a certain order to provide a foundation for 
functioning in adult life. He suggested the analogy of a process whose 
starting and finishing points were unequivocably delineated. 
act • 
William Kilpatrick spoke of ''purposeful activity: the complete 
11 
•• a mind-set-to-an-end [which] implies consciousness besides." 
Here was a thorough implementation of the ideal of selective readiness 
through a project method. Experts outside the school were consulted to 
determine the most fitting exercises based on a thorough analysis of 
society's needs. 
Kilpatrick was one of a group of progressive educators who joined 
together at Teachers College of Columbia University to pursue education 
and social justice. The work of other progressives like George Counts, 
John Childs, John Dewey and Harold Rugg reflected America's growing 
9 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1926); 
P• 62 • 
10 Franklin Bobbit, The Curriculum (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1918). 
11 William H. Kirkpatrick, Foundations of Method (New York: Arno 
Press, 1971; New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 200-201. 
13 
infatuation with scientific methodologies and provided meaningful quali-
fications in the name of humane purpose. 
Rugg followed Dewey in articulating education's reforming task of 
reconstructing experience. However, Dewey opted for a more open-ended 
approach: "The criterion for all educational and public endeavor was 
growth; it has no end beyond itself. ·• 12 
Rugg took issue with what he deemed to be the excessive open-
endedness of Dewey's approach. The latter's instrumentalism lacked a 
cohesive framework. Rugg identified crucial problems, organizing aca-
demic materials into thoroughly integrated courses, rather than separate 
subjects. One observer has commented on his approach, saying, "Rugg's 
method seems an eminently sensible one for achieving his desired objec-
tives, namely to alert students to the fact that all is not well in the 
social order and to start them thinking critically about possible 
i .,13 mprovements. 
George Counts also advocated active intervention in the educa-
tional process in order to redress social inequities within the larger 
society. Goals were vague, haphazardly set, individually oriented. A 
more systematic set of inputs by knowledgeable authorities was required. 
He became very frustrated with "• •• social platitudes coined in the 
14 days of agrarian culture • • • " and agitated for a centralized, 
12 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 62 
13 Peter F. Carbone, Jr., The Social and Economic Thought of 
Harold Rugg (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 146. 
14 GeorgeS. Counts, The American~~ Culture (New York: Day, 
1930), p. 172. 
14 
active implementation of some of these ideals, for instance, democracy 
and worthy citizenship. Indoctrination of rugged individualism, for 
example, would not suffice. American society had to be reformed • 
• • • a society which is dominated less by the thought of individual 
advancement and more by certain far-reaching purposes and plans for 
social construction might find a firmer and more steadfast mentality 
desirable. • • • Americans ••• are becoming completely victimized 
and molded by the mechanics of industrialism.lS 
Education had to be purposeful, which implied a substantial guid-
ance from informed, technically and humanely concerned persons. The 
school, however, was but one of a variety of influential institutions 
for helping to reconstruct a new society based on social welfare. A 
certain amount of ideological imposition would be expected in implement-
ing this new role for the school. Social science techniques would 
render the techniques for ascertaining the best solutions to problems 
besetting a depression era America. Science afforded a rationally based 
means of living within rather than at the mercy of the forces of nature 
and society. 
Whitehead, while acknowledging the creative impulse of the young, 
argued that organized thought determines organized action. "Logic, 
properly used, does not shackle thought. It gives freedom, and above 
all, boldness."16 Science, moreover, provides the necessary framework 
and method of inquiry for linking our logical thought and ordinary 
everyday sensibilities. Knowledge improves experience as the result of 
interaction between person and environment. According to Whitehead, 
15Ibid., p. 188. 
16Alfred N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays 
(New York: Macmillan, 1929), p:-f7g:----
15 
ignorance is bondage to that environment. Knowledge has practical util-
ity, and via scientifically based experimentalism, will assure and 
insure opportunity to make the most constructive choices. 
The dominant educational philosophy of the 1930s owed much to 
Dewey, though others such as John Childs, gave ample expression, too. 
Childs based much of his theory on American pragmatism, and the ability 
to identify reasonable humane alternatives in any given situation. 
"Even the principles and the 'laws' of science are subject to this con-
tinuing test, for ultimate authority rests not with particular findings 
• • • but rather with the empirical and cooperative procedures by which 
meanings are formulated, clarified and tested."17 
As a result of the Great Depression Childs' critical approach had 
sufficient opportunity to be developed in a plan called the Eight Year 
Study. The principles of problem solving were to be implemented in a 
coordinated fashion by all teachers in a school, while a total of thirty 
secondary schools experimentally redesigned their curricula. College 
entrance for those participating was to be directly related to the proj-
ect. Detailed coordinated planning and evaluation had determined that 
"the curriculum is now seen as the total experience with which the 
h 1 d 1 i d i 1 .. 18 sc oo ea s n e ucat ng young peop e. 
The Eight Year Study was perhaps the most prominent national project 
of the post-World War I era. As the sponsoring agency, the Progressive 
17 John L. Childs, American Pragmatism and Education (New York: 
Holt, 1956), P• 284. 
18H. H. Giles, S. P. McCutchen, and A. N. Zechiel, Exploring the 
Curriculum (New York: Harper, 1942), p. 293. 
16 
Education Association felt that an experimental basis for the curriculum 
could only be effected through cooperation between the university and 
secondary school. The PEA received the consent of thirty high schools 
and over three hundred colleges to experiment with a variety of curricu-
lar options with regard to content and organization of material. The 
stated purpose was to enable greater awareness for understanding the 
social and scientific aspects of the world into which secondary students 
were graduating. In an attempt to stimulate self-direction and bring 
youth's concerns closer to real life, a variety of approaches were 
experimentally devised. There were, for example, core curricula--a 
broad fields organization of subjects. The study set a precedent not 
only for institutionalized reforms but also for their scientific system-
atic evaluations. 
During World War II the needs of student and society were inves-
tigated and listed as a basis for curriculum reform in Education for All 
19 American Youth. The needs were based on purposes that included prac-
tical knowledge of the economic system. This led to efficient work, 
health improvement, realizing the significance of the family, good use 
of leisure time, and aesthetic, rational, and ethical appreciations. 
Additionally, the report of the Harvard Committee on the Objectives of a 
20 General Education in a Free Society, chaired by James Conant, 
19 Educational Policies Commission, Education for All American 
Youth (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association,-r944), 
PP• 225-226. 
20 Harvard University, Committee on the Objectives of a General 
Education in a Free Society, General Education in a Free Society 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945)~ pp. ix-x. 
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advocated extensive exposure to great themes in the humanities through a 
comprehensive interdependent curriculum. Conant hoped that the renewed 
search for relevance (for society and youth) would not result in mere 
training as opposed to education. Competence, termed "back to basics" 
in the 1980s, needed qualification: for what purpose? One response 
might be: the fully functioning, affectively and cognitively motivated 
student is the foremost reason for a school's existence. Moreover, 
Conant's recommendation for the comprehensive high school strengthened 
the contentions of those who argued for a greater democratizing function 
of secondary education. 
There were a number of attempts to help the teacher systemati-
cally guide such a comprehensive education. Selecting and organizing 
objectives and content, identification of activity and means of evalua-
tion reflect the prominent technological bias of the society in the late 
1940s and today. Tyler's syllabus provided an underlying philosophy for 
21 his rationale, organized around four key questions. He asked about 
the purposes of the school, the experiences needed to assure their 
attainment, their appropriate organization, and means of evaluation for 
verifying the degree of systematic interaction. The attempt to intro-
duce rational, logical sequence to order the educational process 
reflected the efforts of earlier progressive thinking. By making such 
basic but profound all-encompassing inquiries, Tyler hoped to account 
for all the variables involved in developing a systematic relevant cur-
riculum. Taba assumes a certain logical order, too, in which decisions 
21 Ralph Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 1. 
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are made; she proceeds with her own seven steps "to make sure that all 
relevant considerations are brought to bear on these decisions."22 The 
system--involving diagnosis of needs, setting forth of ensuing objec-
tives, content, experiences, and evaluations--is highly rational and 
purposefully comprehensive. Learning could be structured once one knew 
the reasons for which certain knowledge was to be pursued. 
It was clear that as the country approached and passed into the 
era of Sputnik, more structured models for knowledge organization and 
curriculum design appeared at all levels from primary to college. In-
quiry discovery methods, equated with induction, spurred new interest in 
disciplinarity. Separate bodies of knowledge could be integrated by 
unifying reconceptions, though Schwab offered one caveat: "there are no 
data from which to conclude decisively that eventually all the disci-
li ill b h ld b .. 23 p nes w ecome or s ou ecome one. 
The era was inundated with new proposals for science and mathe-
matics educational reform. Empirical and logical, these disciplines 
could provide the model for all learning areas. Youngsters would in-
quire into the structures of their subjects, as if they were scientists, 
uncovering and discovering new relationships between variables. The 
challenge to America's pride as the intellectual scientific giant was 
now met with a reemphasis on technical skills. Brun~r, a renowned psy-
chologist, led a seminar on curriculum at Woods Hole which was dominated 
22 Hilda Taba, Curriculum Development (New York: Harcourt Brace & 
World, 1962), p. 12. 
23Joseph Schwab, "The Structure of the Disciplines: Meaning and 
Significance," in Curriculum and Evaluation, eds. Arno A. Bellack and 
Herbert M. Kliebard (Berkeley~al.: McCutchan, 1977), p. 192. 
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by mathematics and science people. Bruner, in offering a "spiraling 
curriculum," suggested that each subject had a structure, the inner 
workings of which could be grasped by rational inquiry and experimen-
tation. Such knowledge would facilitate a general transfer of new 
information, thereby increasing in a "spiraling" fashion the level of a 
24 
student's comprehension. 
B. Behavioral Objectives and Evaluation 
Not only was there a structure to each subject or discipline, but 
the learning process itself could also be similarly analyzed. Bloom 
systematized levels of performance in a taxonomy of intended behav-
25 iors. He also recognized that the actual performance of a task at a 
later period in one's life may differ from observed skills at the end of 
a learning period. Moreover, one key ingredient is his expressed neu-
trality in designing this taxonomy. According to Bloom, "It is outside 
the scope of the task we set ourselves to properly treat the matter of 
determining the appropriate value to be placed on the different degrees 
of achievement of the objectives of instruction."26 Bloom's cognitive 
taxonomy, consisting of a six-step hierarchy ranging from knowledge to 
evaluation, is paralleled by a five-point classification of affective 
processes, ranging from receiving to value characterization. 
24 Jerome Bruner, The Process of Education (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press:-1960). 
25Benjamin Bloom, "Summary of Taxonomy," A Taxonomy of Educa-
tional Objectives. Handbook I: The Cognitive Domain (New York: McKay, 
1956), pp. 200-207. ---
26Ibid., P• 13. 
Mauritz Johnson argued that the essence of curriculum is recog-
nizable objectives. The curriculum prescribes that instruction should 
27 
result in attainable learning products. It is concerned with ends, 
that which shall be learned. 
In recent years educators have seriously expanded behaviorally 
20 
oriented curriculum writing in the context of back-to-basics. Ornstein 
has cited Gallup Polls of Phi Delta Kappa from 1975 to 1979 that sub-
28 
stantiate the high priority the public gives to this concept. 
Nevertheless, the term "basics" in and of itself tells little 
since there are basics that far outreach a simplistic recounting of the 
three R's. Ben Brodinsky does find from his observation that testing, 
accountability, and minimal competencies are increasingly associated 
with the basics. However, selecting a representative sample of widely-
held responses to the "basics question,'' Brodinsky uncovers a myth about 
"basics." "Back to basics? Look, we're moving forward to basics. 
We're broadening our basics to teach children to think, analyze prob-
lems, make wise decisions, develop confidence in themselves. As for the 
three R's, why return when we've never left them?"29 
The leading representatives of the behavioral objectives movement 
are agreed that in and of themselves, such target-setting is no panacea. 
As with any technique or philosophy, success depends on underlying 
27 Mauritz Johnson, Jr., "Definitions and Models in Curriculum," 
Educational Theory 17:2 (April 1967): 130. 
28Allan Ornstein, "Curriculum Contrasts: A Historical View," Phi 
Delta Kappan 63 (1981-82): in print. 
29Ben Brodinsky, "Back to the Basics: The Movement and Its Mean-
ing," Phi Delta Kappan 58:7 (March 1977): 523. 
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influencing motivations. For example, Baker and Popham even speak about 
the need to "'humanize' the use of instructional objectives" by directly 
30 involving students in a needs assessment approach. 
Plowman accepts the need for accuracy in judgment, difficult to 
obtain without behavioral guidelines, but he also argues that affective 
31 
concern rates equally high attention. Comparing the ability to be 
trustworthy and to add six five-digit numbers, he says, 
Under most circumstances it would seem more important to be honest 
and reliable, a goal which becomes more meaningful when translated 
into observable and measurable functions. This translation is neces-
sary if objectives are to be of diagnostic, prescriptive, and evalu-
ative value in directing and assessing learning.32 
Payne, too, makes it clear that the most sophisticated objective 
setting and evaluation measures may not really reveal the fullest range 
33 34 
of interests or values. Moreover, major behaviorists such as Mager 
and Kibler35 are concerned with attitudinal value attainments which can 
be observed by inference. Though the exactitude of cognitive and psy-
chomotor measurement is missing in this affective domain, knowledge is 
30 Eva L. Baker and w. James Popham, Expanding Dimensions of 
Instructional Objectives (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,-r973), 
PP• 15-17. 
31Paul Plowman, Behavioral Objectives (Chicago: Science Research 
Associates, 1971), p. xxiii. 
32Ibid., p. xxvii. 
33 David A. Payne, The Specification and Measurement of Learning 
Outcomes (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell, 1968),-p: 197. --
34Robert F. Mager, Preparing Instructional Objectives, 2nd ed. 
(Belmont, Cal.: Fearon, 1975), pp. 102-104. 
35Robert J. Kibler, Larry L. Barker, and David T. Miles, 
Behavioral Objectives and Instruction (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970), 
PP• 55-66. 
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assimilated and utilized in ways noted other than by physical or mechan-
ical performances. Making ethical choices does imply the capability to 
judge actions based on reflected experiences or applied cognitive knowl-
edge. Krathwohl admits the difficulty of framing objectives and pro-
ceeding with evaluation based on the same behavioral categorization of 
cognitive learning. It seems best to him to account for the affective 
phenomenon via the "processes of internalization •• 
elements in common with the term socialization."36 
It has many 
The setting of objectives requires the design of evaluational 
methods. Measurement technique is traced to Robert Thorndike, who early 
in the 1900s convinced educators that human change could efficiently and 
effectively be measured and evaluated. Moreover, there was a political 
pride in national excellence. Following World War II the public 
demanded an upgrading of all skills and deepening knowledge on all 
fronts so that youth could more efficiently compete in the modern world. 
The Harvard Report reflected this national priority. Curriculum diver-
sity had to be balanced by interdependent studies to strengthen the 
forces for unity, a dominant national goal. 
The evaluation of the nation's schools in the post-World War II 
era had stimulated greater concern for technology in an increasingly 
interdependent world. The public became more sensitized to the issue of 
evaluation in the wake of large expenditures of federal aid to 
36David R. Krathwohl, "The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: 
Uses of Cognitive and Affective Domains," in Educational Evaluation: 
Theory and Practice, eds. Blaine R. Worthen and James R. Sanders 
(Worthington, Oh.: Jones, 1973), p. 258, reprinted from Defining 
Educational Objectives, ed. c. M. Lindvall (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1964). 
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education. The launching of Sputnik in 1957 brought about the National 
Defense Education Act and the establishment of the National Science 
Foundation--geared to the acceleration of scientific and technical cur-
riculum development. The large expenditures involved in this new educa-
tional competition with the Russians demanded precise evaluation of the 
programs to see the extent massive reform was realized. Evaluation 
became an industry within an industry. Educational progress had to be 
tracked. It was believed that only through systematic evaluation would 
worthwhile changes be effected in curriculum. Objective investigation 
provided the ideal means. 
Cronbach speaks of the ideal evaluation of proficiency that goes 
beyond selected outcomes of a certain curricular focus. Moreover, rat-
37 ings ought to be made throughout the course sequence. Stake expands 
Cronbach's distinctions, emphasizing formal objective categories of 
measurement and explaining the differences between contingency (the 
relationships among variables such as antecedents, transactions, and 
outcomes) and consequence (the degree to which the intended antecedents, 
transactions, and outcomes come to pass). Informal subjective measures 
do not adequately provide for the priorities of Stake--rational judg-
38 
ments and descriptions. 
Stufflebeam has attempted to provide a total evaluation model. 
He bases his argument on distinct types of decision-making settings, 
37Lee J. Cronbach, "Course Improvement Through Evaluation," 
Teachers College Record 64:8 (May 1963): 672-683. 
38Robert E. Stake, "The Countenance of Educational Evaluation," 
Teachers College Record 68:7 (April 1967): 523-540. 
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39 processes and types of evaluation. Stufflebeam's contribution is 
quite useful for the practitioner in that there is cyclical feedback. 
Continuous information is provided the decision maker. 
These various evaluation strategies are integrally involved with 
the taxonomies of learning objectives. The ability to construct syste-
matic designs such as Bloom's taxonomy implies that knowledge can be 
organized around structures logically and rationally identified. From 
its inception the curriculum field has attempted to clarify the nature 
and organization of knowledge of cultural inheritance. It has focused 
on the relationship between that knowledge and ways of knowing. Scien-
tific discovery has been integral to a vast array of changes in the 
field of curriculum. Bronowski suggests why: 
The purpose of science is to describe the world in an orderly scheme 
or language which will help us look ahead. • • • The order is what 
we find to work, conveniently and instructively. It is not something 
we stipulate; it is not something we can dogmatize about. It is what 
we find; it is what we find useful.40 
Evaluation as a sub-field of curriculum has developed out of a 
need for exact measurement. Nevertheless, the issue of ascertaining the 
results of certain ways of inquiry is not completely resolved in favor 
of logical positivistic models. As this study will show in an analysis 
of The State of the Field, there are also strong humanistic considera-
tions to creating a course of study and its method of evaluation. There 
39Daniel L. Stufflebeam, "Educational Evaluation and Decision 
Making," in Phi Delta Kappa, National Study Committee on Evaluation, 
Daniel L. Stufflebeam, chairman, Educational Evaluation and Decision 
Making (Itasca, Ill.: Peacock, 1971). 
40 J. Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science (New York: Random 
House, 1951), pp. 10-11-.--
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is more discussion about the place of inspiration, personal knowing, and 
transcendence in curriculum. 
Science is a multi-faceted phenomenon. One must keep this in 
mind in designing any evaluational measure. "'We are a scientific 
civilization,' declared Jacob Bronowski. 'That means a civilization in 
which knowledge and its integrity are crucial. Science is only a Latin 
d f k 1 d Kn 1 d i d ti ' .. 41 wor or now e ge. ow e ge s our es ny. 
Part II: THE STATE OF THE FIELD 
Introduction 
The historical inquiry into the scope of the curriculum field 
since the turn of the twentieth century should provide a satisfactory 
perspective for viewing the present day scene. A logical positivistic 
scientific rationale had prescribed the dominant approach to curriculum 
then and persists to this day. The first part of this analysis of the 
state of the field will focus on contemporary critiques of a situation 
already knolvn to exist. It is basically a reiteration of the theme 
already noted and personalities already cited although from a sharpened 
point of view. 
This dominant tradition, nevertheless, is confronted by rejuve-
nated concern for the student-as-person, a chief participant in curricu-
lum making. The reconceptualists have based their challenge of a vari-
ety of intellectual, psychological, and spiritual traditions. They have 
sought to expand the bounds of scientific theory related to knowing. 
41
carl Sagan, The Dragons of Eden (New York: Ballantine, 1977), 
P• 248. 
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Following a brief delineation of the contemporary field, the 
study will proceed with some notions about the expanded boundaries of 
science. Based on this one key rationale of the newer theorists, the 
inquiry will lead into a formal introduction to reconceptualization of 
curriculum studies. 
A. The Scientfic-Technocratic Orientation 
In attempting to counter the argument that the curriculum field 
has been nonhistorical, Kliebard has attempted to give us necessary 
orientation for the present. 
The production model and the utilitarian criterion applied to all 
school subjects over the past half century will constitute our fun-
damental frame of reference. The coming of modern technology, rather 
than freeing us from the earlier formulations, has served instead 
only to reinforce or restrict them further. The task of the next 
fifty years in the curriculum field is essentially one of developing 
alternatives.42 
Authorities use various yardsticks for measuring the scope and 
depth of the field. What all seem to have in common is that the vast 
majority of curriculum workers have a utilitarian bias reinforced ex-
plicitly or implicitly by technical orientation. This focus will be 
evident in the analyses of the field by two noted theorists. 
Macdonald suggests three recognizable groups performing curricu-
lum work today: 1) those for whom theory prescribes and guides; 
2) those for whom it serves to empirically validate identifiable 
42 Kliebard, "Persistent Issues in Curricular Theorizing, •• 
PP• 48-49. 
43 
variables; and 3) those for whom it serves as criticism. 
William Pinar delineates the field in another fashion: 
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1) traditionalists, [who] have tended to be concerned about prin-
ciples guiding curriculum; ••• 2) conceptual-empiricists argue that 
their research functions to serve school practitioners. By creating 
a science of curriculum, the traditional aspiration of the field can 
be realized ••• ; 3) reconceptualists [according to Macdonald] 
"look upon their task of theorizing as a creative intellectual 
endeavor • • • a more plarful, free floating process is called for 
by the state of the art.•4q 
1. The Traditional Field of Curriculum 
Macdonald and Pinar are apparently in agreement that the foremost 
function of theory in the curriculum field today is to provide a 
rational framework for determining goals, means, and ends. In this case 
it refers to the day to day learning going on in a school. Pinar's 
designation of "traditionalists" will henceforth be used; he cites sev-
eral for us: Taba; the Tanners; Saylor and Alexander; McNeil; Zais; 
45 Smith, Stanley, and Shores; Stratemeyer; and Doll. 
43James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," in Curriculum Theoriz-
ing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutchan, 1975), PP• 5-13. 
44 William Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field," Educational 
Researcher 7:8 (September 1978): 5-7. 
45 Ibid., p. 11; J. Galen Saylor and William M. Alexander, Plan-
ning Curriculum for Schools (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1974); 
John D. McNeil, curriculum: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1977); Robert Zais, Curriculum: Principles and Foundations (New 
York: Crowell, 1976); B. Othanel Smith, William a.-stanley, and 
J. Harlan Shores, Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, rev. ed. (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1957); Florence B. Stratemeyer, ··Develop-
ing a Curriculum for Modern Living," in Approaches in Curriculum, ed. 
Ronald T. Hyman, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Ronald 
C. Doll, Curriculum Improvement: Decision-Making~ Process (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1964). 
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The traditionalists have really not been theoretical in the tech-
nical sense of the word. Those such as Tyler have exemplified the 
outside-expert syndrome. While research is not foreign to their prepa-
ration, their major task is providing a framework or theme helping to 
unite disparate elements that the practitioners try to organize. The 
traditionalists' work could either be knowledge- or process-oriented. 
The practical utilitarian bent today can be explained by the pro-
gressive origins of the field. We recall an earlier inquiry by Kliebard 
that revealed "a drive toward a supremely functional curriculum largely 
46 
oriented toward socially useful knowledge and skills." Basically this 
has been the ameliorative function of curriculum. While investigations 
and surveys such as the Eight Year Study were implemented under the 
guise of scientific objectivity, much traditionalist effort was weighted 
to a conscious liberal change in the social order. The influx of large 
numbers of immigrants had necessitated massive alterations in the ways 
academic and economic priorities were set and evaluations carried out in 
America's schools. Concern for the immigrant student has been replaced 
today by concern for the new immigrant to the cities, the disadvantaged 
and bilingual students. Tyler's rational deliberation was extended by 
Goodlad and Richter, though values for them are more than mere screens 
47 
as they are for Tyler; they are initial points of departure in 
46Kliebard, "Persistent Issues," P• 42. 
47John Goodlad and Maurice Richter, The Development of a Concep-
tual System for Dealing with Problems of Curriculum and Instruction, 
Cooperative Research Project No. 454, ED 010 064 (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966). 
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determining to what extent society, learner, and subject matter are 
sources of curriculum. 
The Tyler Rationale hinges on its delineation of objectives. But 
here evaluation links up ends and means in a rather mechanical fashion; 
according to Kliebard the manipulation of learning opportunities to 
reach certain end experiences may not show full appreciation for a stu-
48 dent's human capability. 
Designs, on the other hand, clearly have the purpose to guide or 
prescribe certain optimally perceived values. Such an approach ought to 
more fully develop this human valuing capability. Whether dealing with 
subject matter, social phenomena, or people, the designs selected will 
reflect the problems of practical decision-making in the school and 
49 
society at large. Ornstein's recent survey of the field has identi-
fied various value approaches according to one of two categories: empha-
50 
sis on subject or emphasis on student. Designs are value statements 
which have appeared in a variety of forms throughout the history of the 
curriculum movement. Today, however, only the subject design is promi-
nent, the core, fusion, correlation, and broad fields forms having 
become passe. 
The logical sequencing of knowledge in the general subject cur-
riculum was not deemed an adequate approach in a sophisticated world. 
48 Herbert M. Kliebard, "The Tyler Rationale," School Review 78:2 
(February 1970): 259-72. 
49 Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory,'' p. 12. 
50 A. Ornstein, "Curriculum Contrasts,'' in print. 
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51 More synthesis among areas of knowledge was demanded. The correla-
tion, fusion and broad fields approaches of the 1930s and 1940s 
reflected the specialized viewpoints on knowledge and knowing. But 
sophisticated curriculum conceptualizations did not necessarily meet the 
criteria of relevance. The core curriculum was, however, geared to 
social and personal relevance. Two variations emerged from the Progres-
sive era--the open core and the closed or preplanned core. As a currie-
ulum which stressed common learnings and specific problem solvings, the 
core--especially the open variety--gave a great deal of latitude to stu-
dent initiative and personal concern. But the increased emphasis on 
disciplinarity and the decline of the Progressive influence upon currie-
u1um in the 1950s minimized the prerogatives gained by open-minded 
inquiry to personal-social problems. Nevertheless, the spirit of the 
core has had its impact on humanistic education and its development at 
least in one area--that of reconceptualism. 
In humanistic education the accent is on affect and valuation. 
Here educators have made a serious attempt at a comprehensive vision of 
a unity of knowledge and personal knowing. Having traced the origins of 
humanistic education, Patterson finds a classical definition, set two 
hundred years ago, applicable to our setting 
(1) The purpose of education is to develop the potentials--all the 
potentials--of man as a whole; (2) the essential method for achieving 
this is the providing of good human relationships between the teacher 
and student--or as Pestalozzi put it, a love relationship.52 
51 Daniel Tanner and Laurel Tanner, Curriculum Development (New 
York: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 517-19. 
52 Cecil H. Patterson, Humanistic Education (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 44. 
Becker and Pritzkau have developed separate humanistic models 
drawn from a discipline's orientation. 53 Scientific questions are 
related to social issues as human beings attempt to survive in a tech-
31 
nological environment. Moral and theological discourse help relate per-
sonal inquiries into the meaning of life. 
Weinstein and Fantini have attempted to integrate a variety of 
knowledge sources under the rubric of humanistic inquiry. They present 
a curricular model based on three tiers. The first is an information 
and skills retrieval base (social studies, language, disciplines--it is 
cognitively oriented); second, the personal discovery base; and third, 
the group-personal interaction tier. 
We regard cognition and affect as complementary, not contradictory 
forces. They have not played balanced roles in education because 
affect has received such meager recognition, experimentation and 
practice. • • • Affect can serve not only to revivify elements of the 
old subject matter but also, and primarily, to open vistas for new 
subject matter.54 
What is there to expect from humanistic designs of the future? 
Pratt distinguishes needs from events or interests as the major com-
ponent for the curriculum designer. Based on Maslow's taxonomy (physio-
logical need, need for safety, social needs, need for esteem, need for 
self-actualization), Pratt suggests, "The basic principle of curriculum 
53 Ernst Becker, Beyond Alienation (New York: Braziller, 1967); 
Philo T. Pritzkau, On Education for the Authentic (Scranton, Pa.: Inter-
national Textbook, 1970). ------
54 Gerald Weinstein and Mario D. Fantini, eds., "Affect and 
Learning," in Toward Humanistic Education: A Curriculum of Affect, A 
Ford Foundation Report, Foreword by Edward J. Meade, Jr.-rNew York: 
Praeger, 1970), p. 32. 
development remains: all valid curricula help people~~ their 
significant needs; all other curricula~!. waste of time." 55 
The traditionalist realm is wide ranging, seemingly without any 
but the broadest common designations. Pinar examines the work of many 
traditionalists, including Tyler, Saylor, Alexander, and the Tanners, 
32 
along with humanistic educators and finds, "What they do share is an in-
terest in working with school people, with revising the curriculum of 
schools. Their writing tends to be journalistic, necessarily so, in 
order to be readily accessible to a constituency seeking quick answers 
i 1 bl "56 to pract ca pro ems. 
It is debatable whether or not humanists and other traditional-
ists are seeking "quick" answers. What can be said is that they provide 
practitioners with a variety of suggestions for cognitively and affec-
tively maximizing student inquiry techniques. Traditionalists are 
directly interested in students and teachers. 
2. The Scientific Field of Curriculum 
Macdonald introduces " ••• a second camp of ofttime younger (and 
far fewer) theorizers [who are] committed to a more conventional concept 
of scientific theory •••• primarily conceptual in nature, [whereby] 
55 David A. Pratt, Curriculum (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovano-
vich, 1980), p. 62 (emphasis in original). 
56
william Pinar, "Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies," 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational 
Research Association, New York, New York, April 1977, pp. 2-3, 
ED 141 929. 
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research would be utilized for empirical validation of curriculum vari-
ables and relationships, • ,.57 
George Beauchamp has been identified as a functioning conceptual-
58 
empiricist. The curriculum field, as far as he is concerned, is based 
in the university in whatever departments address themselves to curricu-
lum issues. In his view there seems little qualitative difference be-
tween trained curriculum workers from a traditionalist orientation and 
the psychometricians who are invited to make technical analyses of cer-
tain data. While he argues for more clearly defined notions of who 
plans and develops curriculufl, his bias is certainly with trained social 
scientists. Following this inclination, Pinar criticizes conceptual 
empiricists whose increasingly refined methodologies and sustained 
'cumulative' research would like to "bring about a science of human 
b h i ,.59 e av or. 
Social science and technological applications of empirical re-
search have provided models found to be quite efficient by some theo-
rists. Briggs' approach sounds as if it were derived from a very effec-
tive engineering component. While he speaks of a neutral or value free 
instructional systems design, the language employed seems clearly to be 
biased: "[A] 'system' in the present context, is an integrated plan of 
operation of all components (sub-systems) of a system, designed to solve 
57Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," P• 6. 
58 Janet Miller, "Curriculum Theory: A Recent His tory, •• Journal of 
Curriculum Theorizing 1:1 (Winter 1979): 29. 
59Pinar, "Notes on Curricular Field," p. 6. 
a problem or meet a need •••• [O]bjectives, methods, and evaluations 
should be designed to be mutually supportive ... 60 
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There is a tacit understanding on the part of most curricularists 
today that guidance and controlled planning fits the current needs of 
the field. Although curriculum may have come into being as a self-
conscious endeavor with Bobbit's The Curriculum, the field has been en-
amored of the technical theorizing. As Beauchamp has observed, the 
field has adapted and adopted from other sources. "When scholars have 
lacked experience in theory development in a field of endeavor, it has 
been customary for them to look to the patterns set by those who have 
been successful and to use those patterns as paradigms for beginning 
,.61 
efforts. 
Saylor and Alexander have tacitly acceeded to the technical pat-
tern setting of which Beauchamp speaks. While they present an overview 
of many theories, past and present, their suggestions for a "good" cur-
riculum plan reveal a technical bias. There are preset comprehensive 
goals, learning opportunities that range from lesser to greater, depen-
dent to independent. A plan like this seems to reveal a rather closed 
process. Feedback is invited from students; the community is to be 
brought in on the decision-making process; and individualized flexibil-
ity is possible. Nevertheless, a plan, as a blueprint, is rather well 
delineated, controlling and determining outcomes. Saylor and Alexander 
60Leslie J. Briggs, "Introduction," in Instructional Design, ed. 
Leslie J. Briggs (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Educational Technology, 1977), 
P• 6. 
61 George Beauchamp, Curriculum Theory, 2nd ed., (Wilmette, Ill.: 
Kagg, 1968), p. 9. 
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summarize their approach to planning in terms of ends and means, in the 
62 flow of activities or procedures from beginning to end. 
Pratt has assimilated a technological orientation that also 
reflects a commitment to idealism. He strongly believes that er-gineer-
ing design skills can be applied by humane, enlightened educators to 
maximize learning. He suggests, "Increased effectiveness is likely to 
be a result of the cumulation of a repertoire of principles and strate-
gies that constitute an applied science or technology of education ... 63 
Posner and Rudnitsky have prepared a text which gives practical 
expression to this notion of curriculum based upon applied science and a 
64 technology of education. They integrated the selection of intended 
learning results with educational goals. The authors constructed a 
blueprint that linearly takes the student from the course planner's 
values (in terms of learner, society, and subject matter) to actual 
learning outcomes. Their approach is basically a matter of means, 
systematically analyzed with regard to original aims, that will result 
in specific outcomes. 
By the latter part of the 1970s, Pratt and Posner and Rudnitsky 
notwithstanding, most curricularists seemed less imbued with emulating 
technological models. There was still much effort at generating more 
sophisticated statistical methodologies, but more expansive views were 
62 Saylor and Alexander, Planning Curriculum for Schools, 
PP• 44-45. 
63 Pratt, Curriculum, p. 450. 
64 George J. Posner and Alan N. Rudnitsky, Course Design (New 
York: Longman, 1978). 
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adopted. Schubert reports that curricular books "tended to be more sit-
uational, analytic, and interpretive than behaviorist. They tended more 
toward the conceptual and/or prescriptive than empirical and experimen-
65 tal, although some embraced both." 
The evaluation subfield, itself research oriented, contributed 
more than strict empirical guidelines. Some evaluators had grown in the 
humanistic influences but still appreciated systems; they were also fa-
miliar with intuitive, personalist dimensions of curriculum that needed 
to be studied. Schubert cites Eisner and Hamilton--among others--as 
exemplifying this expanded, deepened use of science, technology, and the 
arts. "They offer modes of illumination of curricular phenomena that go 
beyond the numbers game by examining methods that are natural-
istic, literary, and artistic; thus providing ••• qualitative 
1 i ,66 eva uat on. 
The scientific orientation, however, can provide more than simply 
technological expertise. Science is only a method to help clarify 
thinking, to facilitate practical applications drawn from a variety of 
data sources. The most effective designs in curriculum will be drawn 
from the social and pure sciences and from administrative and human 
values. Pratt, a designer with a real appreciation for scientific 
applications, however, points to a larger task for technology: 
Technology is value free; it can determine the speed with which we 
move but cannot determine the path we take. While good will without 
technique is powerless, technique without good will is sinister. 
65 Schubert, Curriculum Books, p. 257. 
66
rbid., pp. 259-60 (emphasis in original). 
curriculum design uses technology but must be guided by a vision of 
humanity and its future.67 
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Walker offers a similar view. He does not seem to be an orthodox 
social scientist. But he does accept some degree of the faith in apply-
ing research technique to curriculum problems. He disdains "the image 
of the technician at the control panel directing the whole operation." 68 
Nevertheless, the place of logical positivistic science is assured in 
some measure, he contends, when its ideals are integrated in a compre-
hensive fashion: "To reject the possibility is to close off a vital ave-
nue of understanding for all educators." 69 
The resultant knowledge from positivistic inquiry can help build 
a curriculum based on clarity, precision, order--or so the argument 
goes. We learn from one who has been identified with the conceptual-
empirical school that there is uncertainty everywhere. Posner and 
Strike admit, "We have very little information, based on hard data, 
regarding the consequences of alternative content sequences and will 
need a good deal more research before we are able to satisfactorily 
h h ld b d ,.70 suggest ow content s ou e sequence • 
Under the circumstances one might begin to shy away from curricu-
lar recommendations based on positivistic scientific findings. We have 
67 Pratt, Curriculum, PP• 450-51. 
68 Walker, "Curricular Realities,'' p. 299. 
69 Decker Walker, "Straining to Lift Ourselves," Curriculum Theory 
Network 5:1 (1975): 15. 
70 George J. Posner and Kenneth A. Strike, "A Categorization 
Scheme for Principles of Sequencing," Review of Educational Research 
46:4 (Fall 1976): 665. 
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known for a long time that one can prove almost anything with statist!-
cal verifications. Science may guarantee systematic data computation, 
but educators and the public must bear in mind 
••• that producing data is a human process. Like any human pro-
cess, it does not exist in isolation, nor is it controlled by for-
mulas. It affects and is affected by the context in which counting 
occurs • • • • ''How do I go about counting handicapped teachers? I 
sent out a memo to the teachers asking them to report if they wanted 
to be listed. I know that one is on the list who only has a sinus 
condition." 71 
Measurement, it would seem from the above example, is a phenome-
non that requires qualification: ~'for what purpose, to what end?" Basi-
cally curriculum theory, technically understood, must allow the fullest 
use of the best available resources: thinking, feeling, moving human 
beings. Means-ends procedures in and of themselves are likely to be 
counterproductive without a thorough evaluation of people who are 
involved in planning. The interface of imprecise or subjective elements 
with the objectively planned curriculum is more enlightening. 
Reid points out how the whole picture ought to be examined: 
• the more we insist that curriculum planning is rational and not 
political, and the more we emphasize aims at the expense of con-
straints, the more certain we make it that the end of our endeavors 
will bear little resemblance to the high hopes with which we began • 
• • • For the value laden aspects will always be there, whether we 
recognize them or not.72 
In other words, we continue to recall Bronowski's dictum: 
science is simply a Latin word for knowledge. We know with our heads we 
71 Robert Bogan, "The Soft Side of Hard Data: Educational Statis-
tics as a Human Process," Phi Delta Kappan 61:6 (February 1980): 411. 
72 William A. Reid, "The Changing Curriculum: Theory and Prac-
tice," in Case Studies in Curriculum Change, eds. William A. Reid and 
Decker Walker (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 255. 
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are homo sapiens, 'knowing persons.' But there are an infinite variety 
of ways for knowing our world. Those who would reconceptualize cur-
riculum writing argue for expanded models for inquiry. The ensuing dis-
cussion reflects an overview study of those antecedents contributing to 
reconceptualist curriculum theory. 
3. The Reconceptualization ~ the Curriculum: Some Antecedents 
Three scholars have recently studied and critiqued the anteced-
ents, ideology, and applicability of reconceptualist writing. Huber has 
focused on the intellectual roots of the American antinomian tradition 
in presenting specific theoretical arguments for heightened conscious-
73 
ness. Mazza has examined newer theoretical critiques of the tradi-
tionalist literature to observe how alternative intellectual, political, 
psychological, aesthetic, and ethical frames of reference affect reflec-
74 tions about and discourse on the curriculum. Finally, Schubert has 
provided a chronological listing as well as an interpretive and contex-
tual analysis of the texts that have appeared in the curriculum field. 
His inquiry and summary analysis of reconceptual developments in the 
75 latter part of the 1970s has been particularly helpful. 
The present study views reconceptualist roots in three areas. 
These theorists (1) are skeptical about the dominant social science or 
logical positivist manner of knowing or verification of knowledge--they 
are open to a variety of inquiry methods; (2) share a belief with the 
73 Huber, Renewal of Curriculum Theory. 
74 Mazza, Reconceptual Inquiry. 
75
schubert, Curriculum Books, pp. 259-60. 
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humanists in holistic ways of knowing--their larger perspective is fur-
nished by third force psychologists such as }~slow and Rogers; and (3) 
focus on the phenomenon of inner-consciousness, centering on intuitive, 
mystical, religious ways of knowing. These three areas are examined 
below. 
a. Skepticism About Current States of Knowing 
Science assists us to describe the world and guides our delibera-
tiona over how to act in it. We devise a variety of conceptual systems 
to make sense of the data that our intellects and emotions assimilate. 
Roszak observes, "The scientific mind begins in the spirit of the Car-
tesian zero, with the doubling away of all inherited knowledge in favor 
of an entirely new method of knowing. • A man is a scientist not be-
cause of what he sees, but because of how he sees it."76 
Data that come from any of the senses are liable to continual 
critique, conceptualization, refinemenf, and possibly inclusion into 
reconceptualizations. One advanced method of conceptualization is 
termed paradigms. According to Kuhn they are universally recognized 
scientific achievements that for a time delineate broad problems and 
77 
solutions to a community of practitioners. 
Kuhn claims that economically, technologically advanced societies 
perpetuate a certain paradigm for knowing. But as any paradigm, it is 
only temporally viable and may shift as new knowledge and ways of 
76 Theodore Roszak, The Making~~ Counter Culture (New York: 
Anchor, 1964), p. 213. 
77 . Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of a Scientific Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. viii. 
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knowing become available. In our era, the social science paradigm has 
dominated. But there is a conflict when theorists, under the guise of 
scientific certainty and objectivity, offer the social science paradigm 
as the only way to observe and measure reality. 
Scientific significance, according to reconceptualists, is not to 
be derived from any monolithic system of inquiry. There are multiple 
ways of knowing the world and understanding ourselves. Polanyi iden-
tifies two main categories: explicit knowledge of observables, or logic; 
and tacit knowing, that is, reflected notion and intuitions. 
Tacit knowing appears to be a doing of our own, lacking the public, 
objective character of explicit knowledge. • •• tacit knowing is in 
fact the dominant principle of all knowledge, and its rejection 
would, therefoJS' automatically involve the rejection of any knowl-
edge whatever. 
In other words, Polanyi is reaffirming the personal and immediate 
involvement of the individual in any act of cognition. Since by current 
biological and metaphysical standards, human beings are finite crea-
tures, their involvement in knowing is subject to error. Certainty can 
never be obtained since knowing is always mediated by subjective screen-
ings of meaning or interpretation. Neither "right" nor "wrong'" in the 
conventional sense, Polanyi's approach sets the stage for widening the 
discussion about what and how one knows. 
b. Humanistic Education, Values, and Third Force Psychology 
Humanistic educational designs have been discussed earlier. At 
this point we reiterate and detail a bit more of how the goal of a 
78Michael Polanyi, "Understanding Ourselves," in The Nature..£!. 
Human Consciousness, ed. Robert Ornstein (San Francisco: Freeman, 1968), 
P• 24. 
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dynamic, holistic personal process fits into the reconceptualist cri-
tique. To begin with, one can find that humanistic psychology has been 
a response to the kind of harsh world described by Patterson, •• ••• 
individualization and depersonalization had become apparent in society, 
as a trend supported and fostered by the applications of behaviorism. 
f i h d h 1 i i "79 The newer ocus • • • s upon t e person an is tota exper enc ng. 
The totally experiencing person is that creature possessing 
cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor capabilities--all of which are, 
ideally, integrated in a fully functional manner. The process of inte-
grating the cognitive and affective means of inquiring into the environ-
ment is termed "confluent." The major task for confluent curricular 
specialists, like Brown, is to provide opportunities for choice among 
80 intellectual, intuitive, esthetic ways of knowing and valuing. 
There is great difficulty in developing values in a world of 
"future shock" where matters occur so quickly that the knowledge systems 
and learning techniques of one generation are obsolete in the next. 
Assuming that we base knowledgeable, ethical choices on learned and 
reflected experience, it is increasingly difficult to choose at all be-
cause of the multitude of experiences life provides. Toffler, a decade 
ago, detailed how our high technological society suffers, 
79
cecil H. Patterson, "Insights about Persons: Psychological 
Foundations of Humanistic and Affective Education," in Feeling, 
Valuing, and the Art of Growing, eds. Louise M. Berman and Jessie A. 
Roderick,-r977 Yearbook of the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision 
and Curriculum Development, 1977), p. 152. 
80 George I. Brown, Human Teaching for Human Learning (New York: 
Viking, 1971). 
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metaphorically, from a peculiar ailment called progeria--death from old 
age before one's time. His book, Future Shock, described how these 
societies experience super-normal rates of change--for which they are 
81 
unprepared. 
Today, the reconceptualists argue, it is of very little benefit 
to speak of instilled or inculcated values as if there is a means-end, 
input-output system. While choices can be coerced or controlled in 
order to obtain certain rewards within school, family, or peer circles, 
free valuing cannot. It is a process which, when functioning well, is 
based firmly on personal appraisals. Self-questioning and the legiti-
macy of conflict in making decisions are part of the approach developed 
by Raths and others. They have devised a series of strategies, not as a 
panacea for the problem of choosing in a world of accelerated change, 
but as a means for facilitating self-clarification • 
• if children--or adults, for that matter--are to develop values, 
they must develop them out of personal choices • • • [which] must 
involve alternatives which (1) include ones that are prized by the 
chooser; (2) have meaning to the chooser, as when the consequences of 
each are clearly understood; and (3) are freely available for 
selection. 82 
Confluency and personal value clarification in humanistic educa-
tion are derived from what Maslow identifies as "third force'" psychol-
83 
ogy. In response to the insufficiency of behavioral or Freudian 
approaches, the third force psychologist argues that there is little 
81Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam, 1971). 
82Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values and 
Teaching, 2nd ed. (Columbus, Oh.: Merrill, 1978), p. 33. 
83 Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology~ Being (Princeton, N.J.: 
Van Nostrand, 1962), p. vi. 
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gained from focusing on unconscious motives or mechanistic processes as 
a way of deriving meaning. Achievements in personal growth may still 
only be momentary; over a period of time, however, as psychic and physi-
cal deficiencies are satisfied and defenses strengthened, there are 
occasions of insight, awe, and mystery which he designated as peak expe-
riences. The task of the instructor or facilitator and the student is 
to locate these moments through the full range of cognitively and affec-
tively based knowing. The peak experiences which may occur are part of 
self-actualization, or becoming fully human. It is "the development of 
the fullest height that the human species can stand up to or that the 
particular individual can come to. In a less technical way, it is help-
ing the person to become the best he is able to become."84 
There is a certain amount of risk taking that goes along with 
this process. The third force movement asserts that each person has a 
great deal of potential autonomy; the actualization of it may bring an 
awareness bearing joy or pain of discovery. But that is the full act of 
growth; to reiterate, holism--that is, self-integration and assimilation 
of all possible means--is the ideal. "The plea of the humanist for edu-
cation is not that we give up behavioral approaches, but that we realis-
tically recognize their assets and liabilities, and therefore use them 
in proper balance with the humanistic aspects of the problem." 85 
84 Abraham Maslow, The Farthest Reaches of Human Nature (New York: 
Penguin, 1977), p. 162. 
85Arthur w. Combs, Educational Accountability (Washington, D.C.: 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1972), p. 39. 
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Educators cannot--in advance--automatically determine goals and 
objectives, however well researched the "needs" of the student are--and 
assure lasting personal meaning. No method or perspective will guaran-
tee this, but the humanistic applications of third force psychology pro-
vide the greatest possibility. Rogers shares some useful insight from 
the counseling field that shows the necessity for flexibility and open-
ness: "One cannot teach another • • The most one person can do to 
further it [knowledge of feeling and emotion] in another is to create 
certain conditions which make this kind of learning possible. It cannot 
be compelled."86 
In this regard critics of more scientific and traditionally 
oriented curricula have noted a disproportionate emphasis on "compel-
ling," extrinsically prescribed goals. True human responses to the 
search for meaningfullness of life and for purpose are not determined by 
authorities outside the student. The school may demand behavioral 
responses. Ultimately, however, it is the student-as-person who will 
ascribe and appropriate significance to any act of learning. The 
teacher facilitates rather than inculcates. Morris states the task 
well: 
The teacher's role would be to quicken the child's awareness of his 
own consciousness as pure intentionality, to start him out on the 
project of defining his own meaning in the world and hence of creat-
ing meanings in the world •••• The point is that he [the child] is 
the author of them [the meanings] ••• even if they happen to coin-
cide with other people's.87 
86 Carl Rogers, On Becoming ~ Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1961), PP• 204-5. 
87
van Cleve Morris, "Is There a Metaphysics of Education?", 
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Curriculum writing in this vein is personalist and subjective, 
existentialist, whatever the cognitive needs are determined to be. 
American existentialists have supported a Third Force movement in speak-
88 ing of the human being as having an essential self, an intrinsic self. 
Through the free choices that are one makes, one continually "uncovers" 
or self-actualizes. Choices are nurtured through innerness or con-
sciousness. These data are equally important to the reconceptualists. 
c. Innerness, Intuition, and Mystical Knowing 
There is another aspect of a holistic mode of knowing. Its ori-
gin and expression is in what Jaynes calls consciousness. It is the 
phenomena of the mind perceiving a sense world of objects and then 
reflecting upon itself. "It operates by way of analogy, by way of con-
structing an analogue 'I' that can observe that space and move metaphor-
ically in it.•89 
Certain educational theorists appreciate these contentions as 
they try to design new opportunities for knowledge inquiring. The re-
conceptualists, advocating multiple ways of knowing, draw on the re-
search from psychologies of consciousness; Robert Ornstein is an 
example. 
Education consists predominantly of "readin', 'ritin', and 'rithme-
tic," and we are taught precious little about our emotions, our 
bodies, our intuitive capabilities. A strict emphasis on verbal 
intellectual knowledge has screened out much of what is or could be 
88Abraham H. Maslow, "Some Educational Implications of Humanistic 
Psychologies," Harvard Educational Review 38:4 (1968): 685-96. 
89Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of 
the Bicameral Mind (BostDn: Houghto~Mifflin, 1977),-p.~. 
legitimate • • • the existence of "nonordinary realities" is not 
studied because they do not fit into the dominant paradigm."90 
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The reconceptualizing curricularists are opposed to a predominant 
reliance on verbal intellectual knowledge. They extend new possibili-
ties of perceiving and understanding the world in their views of the 
student-as-a-total person. Each creature possesses a variety of facul-
ties for perceiving, rationalizing, and feeling. 
According to earliest physiological research, these multiple ways 
of knowing can be subsumed under two main rubrics. Hippocrates recog-
nized the dual nature of the human brain. The "active" left brain is 
responsible for analysis and logic and verbal skills; the right hemi-
sphere, passively functioning, is related to spatial, aesthetic, physi-
cal dimensions of knowing. Deikman evaluates the balance between these 
two modes of consciousness in terms of our personal and communal 
welfare. 
The action mode has ruled our individual lives and national policies, 
and the I-It relationship that has provided the base for technical 
mastery is now the primary obstacle to saving our race • • • • The 
receptive mode • • • the !-Thou relationship--exists and it may be 
needed to provide the experimental base for the values and the world 
view now needed so desperately by our society as a whole.91 
Receptivity is heightened by a number of techniques, one of which 
is Transcendental Meditation. Phenix can speak about "Transcendence and 
the Curriculum" as a disciplined way of secularly reviving our intuitive 
90Robert E. Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness (New York: 
Penguin, 1972), p. 26. 
91 Arthur J. Deikman, "Bimodal Consciousness," in The Nature of 
Human Consciousness, ed. Robert Ornstein (New York: Viking, 1974),--
PP• 85-86. 
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92 
reflections in a unified fashion. Furthermore, the art of transcen-
dental meditation can enable one to inquire deeply into as yet unknown 
energy sources. Curricularists who take this spiritual introspection 
seriously, believe that new ways of knowing the self and the outer world 
will contribute to one's total growth. 
The emphasis on innerness has come about as a reaction to the 
perceived inordinate focus on outerness. What is out-there can be 
sensed; there is certainty, or at least we think so, though Roszak has 
contended that there is at best a myth of objective consciousness. He 
is denigrating the near-exclusive reliance on this manner of knowing. 
In an attempt to refine perception, interpersonal relationships may also 
be altered for the good. In other words, there is a strong ethical com-
ponent in this source of reconceptualization. Knowledge potential is as 
broad and deep as the highly rational, highly idiosyncratic nature of 
the particular human being in question. There is more to knowledge and 
knowing than empirically or even logically verifiable propositions. 
Roszak suggests a shift in emphasis. "The only way we shall ever recap-
ture the sort of knowledge Lao-Tzu referred to in his dictum 'those who 
know do not speak' is by subordinating the question 'how shall we know?' 
to the more existentially vital question 'how shall we live?'" 93 
Sometimes adults shape their world out of an intellectual sophis-
tication, mistaking maturity and teclmical expertise for the fullest 
possible knowing. While mental ability and certain experiences do 
92Philip H. Phenix, "Transcendence and the Curriculum, •• Teachers 
College Record 73:2 (December 1971): 271-83. 
93 Roszak, Making of ~ Counter Culture, p. 233. 
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provide practical tools for managing in the world, other latent capabil-
ities are equally important. Intuition, in particular, is one other 
source for knowing, a manner of inquiry into the natural and social 
order. But intuition is not nearly as prized as rational empirical 
knowing. Intuition lacks a certain objectivity valued in Western soci-
ety. But it is, nevertheless, real, vividly nurtured by imaginative 
perspectives. The reconceptualists certainly do not ignore the need for 
engineers, doctors, and lawyers to rationally preplan certain technical 
course of action; however, they would give at least equal attention to 
the spontaneous, intuitive, imaginative realm of thought. There is a 
freshness in this approach often characteristically seen in the lives of 
children. Samples observed, "It led Robert Oppenheimer to remark, 'I 
could solve my most complex problems in physics if I had not given up 
the ways of thinking common to children at play." 94 
We live in a quandry over the need to organize our experience 
according to preplanned routines and to simply "experience •• with the 
minimum of structure. The conflict is readily acknowledged in the cur-
riculum field, where effectiveness and efficiency are often stressed in 
behavioral terms. Reconceptual theorists are forcefully challenging 
this notion. 
Part III: CRITICAL RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE CURRICULUM 
Schubert credits Schwab with initiating what came to be an unusu-
95 
ally insightful way of talking about curriculum; and his approach was 
94 Robert Samples, The Metamorphic Mind (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1979), p. 83. --- ----
95 Schubert, Curriculum Books, P• 241. 
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later built upon, expanded, and complemented by the reconceptualists. 
schwab addressed himself to the practical in contradistinction to the 
theoretic orientation characteristic of the social sciences. Schubert 
summarizes: 
The method of inquiry of the theoretic paradigm is induction, assum-
ing the possibility of objectivity and the virtual absence of a 
Heisenbergian uncertainty principle. On the contrary the practical 
assumptions hold that illuminating insight stems from interaction 
with problematic areas rather than induction upon them •••• [The 
method] acknowledges the need to see an interdependence of causal 
factors that are not generalizable but are necessary knowledge for 
promoting an end of decision and action that rectifies specific 
problems.96 
Curriculum in this sense is seen less as an imposed plan and more 
as the occurrence of certain interactions. The key factors in this 
interaction process are the material content of a lesson; the identities 
of those studying and teaching; the bureaucratic, technical, and pedago-
gic decisions that affect knowledge inquiry and sharing; and the per-
sonal exchanges of all those situated within the physical milieu. 
Within that milieu, opportunities for reconceptualization occur. 
Benham recently has offered a restatement of the phenomena involved. 
Reconceptualization, then, aims at altering one's conceptualizations, 
quite literally; one's ways of looking at things, at life: at one-
self, which involves consciousness and leads to the existentialist 
position; or at the forms of social organization, which involves 
political action and leads to the structuralist position • • • or a 
combination of the two.97 
Expanded notions of inner consciousness, humanistic and existen-
tialist ideas (cited above) have provided reconceptualization with 
96Ibid. 
97 Barbara J. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970's: The 
Reconceptualist Movement," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 3:1 (Winter 
1981): 164. 
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certain foci. Bernstein also provides insights that have helped the re-
conceptualists to formulate their views. 
The most important feature in the restructuring of social and politi-
cal theory has been the reassertion of the necessity and legitimacy 
of the critical function of theory. • • • We are coming to realize 
that human rationality cannot be limited to technical and instrumen-
tal reasons_ ••• (there is] practical discourse in which human 
beings try not simply to manipulate and control one another, but to 
understand one another ~enuinely and work together toward practical 
--not technical--ends.9 
The critic here cannot be content with pointing out the super-
ficial structural problems of an institution such as the school or the 
way in which people interact or fail to interact as individuals. Criti-
cism, to accomplish its purpose, ought to go beyond speculating about 
the ideal notion of society or personhood. In other words, criticism is 
not only the mode of communication of the critic, but is also a source 
of personal transformation. The critic's task is far more than iden-
tifying the contours of the field. He must discover his own biases and 
hesitations. In short, self-knowledge emerges in the act of critic~sm. 
According to Pinar, 
Fundamental to our view is the sense that curriculum research must 
emancipate the researcher if it is to authentically offer such a pos-
sibility to others ••• (O]ur aspiration is to gain increasing 
access to that which is conditioned, allow it to surface, to be 
released or permitted to remain (in either case in consciousness), 
hence open to the conscious intentions of the individual.99 
The reconceptualists attempt to convince others that assumptions 
about the ordinary world of power, persons, and possibilities are just 
that: only assumptions. There is a world of inquiry and sources of 
98Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Politi-
cal Theory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 233. 
99 Pinar, "Notes on Curriculum Field," PP• 9-10. 
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inspiration that transcend the taken-for-granted daily milieu. Persons 
who are fully alert--aesthetically, intellectually, and spiritually--can 
locate that world, with its possibilities and limitations. Reconcep-
tualist curricular theory aims to draw one into that world through what 
Maxine Greene calls wide-awakeness. 100 
Paulo Freire established a remarkable model for reawakened, con-
scious, determined informed action. Called 'praxis,' it relates to the 
approaches advocated by the critical theorists of the 1970's. Among 
other things, he stresses the dynamic aspect of language, more from a 
political than an aesthetic point of view. He tells us that the radical 
interaction of the two dimensions of the spoken word, action and reflec-
tion, result in the act of dialogue as a human phenomenon. "Thus to 
k d i f h ld .. 101 spea a true wor s to trans orm t e wor • And yet the power of 
language is finite, especially when it comes to definition. 
Kliebard presents a picture of an uncritical, unreflective accep-
tance of the behavioral-managerial-technocratic orientation in curricu-
lum writing. The curriculum as a model of utilitarian efficiency and 
consensus is the object of change. Huebner emphasizes a concern with 
language usage in discussing these same areas; he tries to stress the 
ethical and aesthetic modes over against the technical and controlling 
100 Maxine Greene, Landscapes of Learning (New York: Teachers 
College Press, Columbia University, 1978), p. 163. 
101 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman 
Ramos (New York: Seabury, 1968), p. 75. 
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mode. Language is more than communication. It is the shape of our 
world. In fact, it is the moral means of making this world. With 
Kliebard's research at hand, Pinar suggests a rather dismal picture. 
"The ideal of education evaporates; a residue of schooling, training for 
bl i i i li i i d i .• 103 profita e ex stence n a cap ta st c econom c or er, rema ns. 
It is very difficult to offer any precise definition of reconcep-
tualization. It is process that heightens individual consciousness of 
self and society and the dynamic dialectic between the two. Pinar tells 
us what is going on rather than assigning limits or labels ~o the behav-
iors described. He points to Apple's ideology and social critique of 
hegemony, the all-encompassing domination of physical life and 
consciousness. 
The control of schools, knowledge and everyday life can be, and is, 
more subtle [than determination] for it takes in even seemingly 
inconsequential moments. The control is vested in the constitutive 
principles, codes, and especially the commonsense consciousness and 
practices underlying our lives, as well as by overt division and 
manipulation.104 
In other words, Apple is referring to the ways in which meaning 
is conveyed through the structures in society. The political, socio-
economic relationships, the sexual and racial attitudes, the means of 
material production, and the value system that pervades it are all crit-
ical to any view of curriculum. Apple has tried to highlight the 
102
nwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," 
in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan:-1975), pp. 217-36. 
103 William Pinar, "What is Reconceptualization?", Journal.£!._ Cur-
riculum Theorizing 1:1 (Winter 1979): 96-97. 
104 Michael w. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 4. 
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relationship between what he perceives to be economic and cultural domi-
nation. The school, through its mores, it bureaucracy, its intellectual 
commitments to avoid conflict, is the chief vehicle of this domination. 
What can be done? Others are not very optimistic about reform, 
however high minded, sincere, and authentic the propagators are. True, 
humanistic education offers many possibilities to those who are rela-
tively self-confident, at ease, secure. But radical attention to funda-
mental social, political, economic inequities is needed. Bateman says, 
. . . tinkering with the surface of things or treating symptoms of deep 
underlying causes will not make much difference. Integration, decen-
tralization • • • none of these liberal answers will contribute much to 
105 the pedagogy of liberation." 
Reconceptualization is ~ a liberal answer. It begins as a cri-
tique of the field. It comes from many diverse authorities; in fact, 
what seems to unite the critics most is that to which they are opposed. 
More than mere opposition, however, must occur if the kind of transfor-
mation spoken of by Freire is to occur. Pinar, therefore, presents a 
sequel to curriculum criticizing: the post-critical stage. "The heri-
tage, attacked and discredited now begins to give way to an affirmative 
106 
new conceptual order." 
105
nonald R. Bateman, "Politics of Curriculum," in Heightened 
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (Berkeley, 
Cal.: McCutchan, 1974), p. 65. 
106
william Pinar, "Postcritical Reconceptualists," in Curriculum 
Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutchan, 1975), p. 209. 
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The reconceptualization of the curriculum has incorporated intel-
lectual traditions not normally thought to be part of North American 
curriculum thought. Radical forms of social inquiry and innovative 
departures (for schools in the United States) have drawn from Marxism, 
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and existentialism. The question is one 
of obtaining meaning, of creating meaning, of interpreting the ordinary 
and seen, the unseen, and idiosyncratic in human encounter. This, too, 
is knowledge of a most important sort. These Continental intellectual 
traditions help to bring knowledge and the acts of knowing together. 
The approach rests heavily on the interpretive method. Van Manen's 
review of reconceptualist literature is instructive in this matter. 
The interpretative method belongs to a different world of science 
indeed. Phenomenology and hermeneutics ••• are more closely 
aligned to (but not the same as) philosophy and the arts than to 
strict science and statistics •••• [F]rom the point of view of 
phenomenological pedagogy, the child's potential for growth is always 
seen as open--subject to personal experiences, pursuits, choices, 
relevancies and commitments •••• They conceive of facticity only as 
the occasion~' ~ ~ the causality of, human behavior.l07 
This interpretive mood has helped bring about a renewal of cur-
riculum theory. There are a multiplicity of suppositions as to what is 
and what is not curriculum theory. Part of the problem is based on the 
various definitions and delimitations of the word "curriculum" and the 
word "theory."108 According to McCory, frustration mounts because 
scholars are in search of either ideal prescriptions or descriptions. 
107Max Van Manen, "Reconceptualist Curriculum Thought: A Review 
of Recent Literature," Curriculum Inquiry 8:4 (1978): 369. 
108 d "A f h C f C ' 1 Th " Davi L. McCory, Map o t e oncept o urr1cu um eory, 
Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 3:1 (Winter 1981): 91-102. 
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Schwab, too, is impatient with the misguided approaches to 
achieving clarity in the field. He claims that there has been a renewal 
of curriculum theory simply because the older theoretical holdings--
based upon empirical design or prescriptive norms--are not appropriate 
to discourse. Schwab's restatement of the theoretical ironically comes 
in terms of what he calls the practical and the eclectic, 
••• the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on a 
body of problems is effected among diverse theories, each relevant to 
the problems in a different way • • • • It is the discipline con-
cerned with choice and acr~~n, in contrast with theoretic, which is 
concerned with knowledge·. 
The approach is neither deductive nor inductive. It is an 
indictment against the perceived abstraction of set principles or of 
generalization. It calls for the curricularist to face real people in 
real action situations. 
Huebner echoed Schwab's announcement that the field was moribund, 
overburdened from many diverse interests. 
It [the field] did not die because it depended on theory rather than 
practice, although its sickness might have been diagnosed sooner if 
there had been greater correspondence between its rhetoric and its 
performance. It died because the increasing diversity of interest it 
tried to carry during those hundred years could no longer be held 
together by a single focus •••• Our work is identifying educational 
content and finding ways to make it available to young people.110 
Content of the curriculum is related to culture. Huebner feels 
that more precise usage of language helps clarify what part of the cul-
ture is potentially emancipating and which part is restraining. 
109 h h b " 1 " Josep Sc wa , The Practica : A Language for Curriculum, 
School Review 78:1 (November 1969): 1-2. 
110
nwayne Huebner, "The Moribund Curriculum Field: Its Wake and 
Our Work," Curriculum Inquiry 6:2 (1976): 165. 
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Much of the discourse in the curriculum field is located within 
the empirical-technological analytic tradition. Van Manen, echoing 
Schwab, disdains the emphasis on the practical that emanates from such a 
means-end orientation. Practicality, or simply getting the job done, is 
insufficient. The reconceptualization of curriculum studies stresses 
practicality not as effective control but as effective communication 
between person. Interpretive meanings are crucial. "From the perspec-
tive of hermeneutics there are no such things as stimuli, responses, or 
measurable behaviors; instead there are encounters, life-worlds, and 
meanings which invite investigations. The focus is on actions, not 
i .,111 behav ors. These actions refer to what real persons try to do, how 
they reflect, the manner in which they participate in one another's 
feelings and thoughts. There are rich experiences to be elicited if 
teacher and student feel free to share. Will the teacher be open, or 
just an impartial observer monitoring streams of consciousness flowing 
through the class? There is a method, however, that helps elucidate 
these feelings. The way is via autobiography, through a process that 
112 Pinar has conceptualized as currere. 
Schubert and Lopez relate steps taken with students in a Chicago 
barrio and those in a graduate course to create curriculum. The 
researchers' findings substantiated the concern that whatever action is 
undertaken, it should "(1) build upon students' pasts; (2) enable them 
111Max Van Manen, "Linking Ways of Knowing with Ways of Being 
Practical," Curriculum Inquiry 6:3 (Fall 1977): 214. 
112
william Pinar, "Currere: Toward Reconceptualization," in Cur-
riculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, 
Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), pp. 396-414. 
to imaginatively project futures to which they can aspire; (3) magnify 
the bewildering swarm that is their present; and (4) help students 
create a synthesis of these three great episodes of living." 113 
The full environment is there to help develop and elicit the 
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point of contact between student and student, student and teacher. The 
Schuberts experimented with a variety of means for helping students 
identify the realities in their environment, that of the children and 
of the graduate student. In the final analysis, it is the total envi-
ronment in which the reconceptualist tries to situate the curriculum. 
Renewing Curriculum Theory: A Conclusion 
Whether one works out of the personal setting or the social orbit 
of interaction, a formulated goal could be lifted from an Association 
for Supervision and Curriculum Development publication, To Nurture 
Humaneness. This book documented an increasingly growing list of 
person-centered approaches with the seemingly common thread: "'A concern 
with the learner as a human being rather than simply an organism and as 
a whole person rather than simply a disembodied intellect or a reposi-
f i i .. 114 tory o cogn t ve processes. 
Education is what a person can become individually, person-ally, 
and as a member of a community. As one comes to grips with the power of 
imagination he can personally engage in an active dialogue with 
113
william H. Schubert and Ann Lynn Schubert, "Toward Curricula 
That Are Of, By, and Therefore For Students," Journal of Curriculum 
Theorizing 3:1 (Winter 1981): 243. 
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literature, history, or science. These are no longer contents to be 
simply mastered, but sources for stimulating the total student. 
The task is now to arrive at a curriculum design that allows for 
the individual's maximum dialogue with himself, the text or the art 
form• "But most curriculum theorizing has been characterized by ab-
115 
straction severed from its concrete ground." But even while the 
reconceptualists themselves talk of heightened consciousness, Mazza 
observes that a great deal more needs to be done to sharpen the concep-
tual tools to take action. Otherwise they will not meet their chal-
116 lenge. More is needed if curriculum structures are to allow individ-
uals to become persons, that is, human beings who do not act in a de-
tached, objective way toward other human beings but are immediately 
involved with those about them. Much of the social science research has 
come to indicate a belief that 
• • • to focus on what is common means ignoring what is not. While 
in natural science such a view is evidently necessary, in the human 
life sciences it is misleading. With Kierkegaard, I acknowledge thac 
human life manifests itself in individuals. "Groups,•• for example, 
is a concept we invent for intellectual economy and c£y~enience, to 
enable us to refer to similarities among individuals. 
Pinar's philosophical orientation is consistent with the methodo-
logy he adopts in setting out the tasks that the theorist must do. It 
is a common enterprise, with an openness to the skills and talents of 
all who will join in. Keeping in mind that one is dealing with an 
115
william Pinar, "Life History and Curriculum Theorizing," 
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evolutionary phenomenon leads to an appreciation of his inaugural call 
to all concerned. 
As curricularists we must address ourselves to the historically-
established concerns of the curriculum field. We must continue to 
address ourselves to our contemporaries in the field: to traditional-
ists and conceptual empiricists. We must explicate the nature of our 
efforts, and at the same time attempt to offer our work in a way 
which will permit others--not yet on the scene--to make syntheses of 
reconceptualized curriculum and traditional and conceptual-empirical 
theory.ll8 
An ancient rabbinic source has given us a rationale for our 
efforts: "Yours is not the task to complete the work, neither, however, 
are you allowed to desist from it altogether. The day is short."119 So 
shall we make beginnings, using our forebears, yet always mindful of the 
tentativeness of their findings and ours. With this in mind, let us now 
turn to four leading reconceptualists; they are James Macdonald, Dwayne 
Huebner, Maxine Greene, and William Pinar. 
llSPinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field," P• 9. 
119
"Chapters of the Fathers," The Mishnah, trans. from the Hebrew 
with introduction and brief explanatory notes by Herbert Danby (Oxford, 
Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 449. 
CHAPTER III 
BRINGING KNOWLEDGE, KNOWING, AND KNOWER TOGETHER: 
THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF JA.l.ffiS B. MACDONALD 
Introduction 
The curriculum field originated, as we have seen above, through 
the efforts of progressive-minded educators to make schooling a relevant 
activity. The unprecedented needs of American school children in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century demanded radical departures. Edu-
cators attempted to ascertain exactly which needs had to be met and then 
organized knowledge into proper curricular frameworks. Scientific dis-
covery and skillful applications encouraged some educators to try sys-
tematically to build a new social order. The optimism that imbued 
school people then is renewed in our day. Friedenberg's credo clearly 
speaks to us: 
The highest function of education, I would maintain, is to help 
people understand the meaning of their lives and become more sen-
sitive to the meaning of other people's lives and to relate to them 
more fully. Education increases the range and complexity of rela-
tionships that make sense to us to which we can contribute and on 
which we can bring to bear competent ethical and practical 
judgment. 1 
To a large extent much of the effort to these ends has grown 
out of empirical research and technically oriented designs. The type of 
decision-making found in the Tyler Rationale and behavioral taxonomies, 
1 Edgar z. Friedenberg, Coming of Age in America (New York: 
Vintage, 1965), P• 221. 
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however, does not satisfy those who would reconceptualize the field. 
Their goal is to expand the type of curricular discourse that focuses on 
personal and social values. The student assumes the responsibility of 
being a critic and self-critic; in the larger social milieu, and as a 
partner in dialogue. 
Macdonald says that such critical study ought to focus on the 
functions that curriculum serves; for example, what are the psycholog-
ical, political, and ethical implications of the theorist's choice of 
design or of specific materials. Such choices, he argues, grow out of 
various cognitive human interests; for the purpose of understanding how 
choices are made they cannot be detached from the personally held mean-
ing structure of the theorist. The work of curricularists reflect basic 
inclinations towards social control, consensus, or personal liberation. 
These interests are manifested in curricular decisions involving inter-
personal relationships among students and teachers, selection of 
materials and the creation of educative settings. 
Macdonald's attempts to reconceptualize the act of knowing in the 
context of the curriculum reflects two major priorities: 
One has been expressed in a desire to construct intellectually satis-
fying conceptual maps of the human condition which were educationally 
meaningful and personally satisfying. The second has been expressed 
in a utopian hope that somehow people could improve the quality of 
their existence, specifically through educational processes and gen-
erally through broader social policy.2 
The reconceptualists, and James Macdonald in particular, are not 
detached observers. They contend that neither a broad study of the 
2James B. Macdonald, "Biographical Statement," in Curriculum 
Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutchan, 1975), P• 3. 
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field nor discussion of decision making is maximally valuable unless 
there is an on-going effort at personal integration with content. The 
theorist's work in this regard is a model for student activity in what-
ever course of knowledge inquiry he or she has undertaken. 
The reconceptualists are committed to expanding curriculum dis-
course to include more than technical issues such as grouping, distribu-
tion and use of materials, and accountability for fulfilling standard-
ized tasks. A larger issue requires attention. How does one achieve a 
good society; also, in what ways does a person act in such a community? 
What are the types of moral relationships that emerge within and outside 
the school? Such questions are not answerable merely by the accumula-
tion of information or an exposure to the methodologies of knowledge 
acquisition. Whitehead's insight relates to the priorities Macdonald 
has established. 
What I am anxious to impress on you is that though knowledge is one 
chief aim of inte~lectual education, there is another ingredient, 
vaguer but greater, and more dominating in its importance. The 
ancients called it "wisdom." You cannot be wise without some basis 
of knowledge; but you can easily acquire knowledge and remain bare of 
wisdom.3 
The Quality of School Life 
Critics like Macdonald argue that there is little quality in 
school life today. The search for knowledge or wisdom is hampered by 
the absence of human relationships within the structures of mass educa-
tion. The predicament of education today reflects conditions in the 
larger society that have affected our consciousness of what is normal or 
3 Alfred N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New 
York: Macmillan, 1929), P• 46-.--------
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acceptable. There is a strong inclination to problem solving based on 
technological methodologies, bureaucratic organization, and a consumer-
4 
oriented ethic. Macdonald argues that although "vision" and "tran-
scendence" have been basically ignored, they are necessary and legiti-
mate notions for the curriculum. 
Moreover, it seems that for many people the purpose of the school 
is more school, leading to credentials that alone maintain status, 
influence, power. The school's purpose, according to reconceptualists, 
should enable a broad set of human capacities to develop, leading to 
critically aware, critically functioning persons. However, traditional 
curriculum work has been geared to guiding principles, prescriptive 
actions based upon rationally derived values. Macdonald's theorizing 
attempts to grasp the relationship between what students perceive as 
happening on a day to day basis and what institutions acknowledge to be 
their essential purpose. Another way of inquiring into the quality of 
school life is to ask, 
"• •• in whose interest is the activity of the school?" [This] pre-
sents contradictions when the form and quality of work, power, and 
language create conflicts between the everyday living interests of 
those experiencing the activity, and other explicit or implicit 
external agencies imposing school activity in the service of their 
own interests.5 
Macdonald agrees that language expresses one's notion of what the 
world is or should be. It is valuative, though this function is often 
4James B. Macdonald, "The Quality of Everyday Life in School," in 
Schools in Search of Meaning, eds. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret, 
1975 Yearbook of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Develop-
ment (Washington, D.c.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum 
Development, 1975), p. 79. 
5 Ibid • , p. 88. 
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hidden by claims of alleged objectivity. In the contemporary school 
setting, linguistic communication through curriculum is frequently based 
on utilitarian needs. Students are often asked simply to describe the 
visible characteristics of their worlds in terms of clearly stated 
causes and effects. Achievement in the areas of history and social 
studies is geared to lower level cognitive processes of learning. Lan-
guage usage, however, should reflect a greater concern for aesthetic and 
6 
moral metaphors in helping the student to derive meaning. Opportuni-
ties should be expanded to allow self-critical expressions as students 
enter the curricular process as autobiographic persons. One's past and 
present--and imagined future--have a great deal to do with perceived 
personal significance of arts, humanities, or sciences. The connection 
between one's personal commitment and bodies of knowledge should be more 
clearly explicated, as a way of improving the quality of school life. 
The quality of school life, however, will not be altered simply 
by achieving a "new consciousness" of contradiction, discrepancies, or 
awareness of the school which Macdonald calls a "double agent." 7 Nei-
ther will innovative action in the absence of critical thought by the 
theorist avail. The quality of school life will improve only when 
6James B. Macdonald, "Myths About Instruction," in Curricular 
Concerns in a Revolutionary Era: Readings from Educational Leadership, 
ed. Robert:Leeper, introduction by Neil P. Atkins, (Washington, D.c.: 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971), pp. 
87-94, originally in Educational Leadership 22:8 (May 1965): 571-76; 
609-17. 
7 James B. Macdonald, "The School as a Double Agent," in Freedom, 
Bureaucracy, and Schooling, ed. Vernon F. Haubrich, 1971 Yearbook of the 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (Washington, 
D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971), 
pp. 235-46. 
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people learn to evaluate how personally held values affect and derive 
from norms in the larger society--and then to act on these new recogni-
tions. Macdonald's career provides us an important insight. He "• •• 
spent ten years in empirical research and technical development work in 
which he claims he was enamored with taxonomies [and] general systems 
theory and technical schemes such as the Tyler Rationale. • .. 8 Mac-
donald expresses the importance of bridging the gap between value per-
ception and technical action. 
Underlying continuing self-scrutiny a~d professional self-judg-
ments is his credo, "that all curriculum talk and work is value based. 
Further examination of much of our curricular talk and work often 
reveals ~ failure ~ clearly identify and relate values to work in 
.. 9 progress. 
He challenges us to be honest, morally forthright about the 
knowledge inquiry approaches we advocate. Curriculum work requires a 
strong degree of self-honesty. Macdonald urges other theorists to 
locate and clarify those values that underly their professional actions 
to bring about the "good life." He enables others to try to narrow the 
discrepancies between what one believes, what one says, and, ultimately, 
what one does. 
8Margaret Ann Huber, The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 
1970's: An Historical Study (Ph.D. dissertation, University oy-Michigan, 
1979), p-. 59. 
9James B. Macdonald, "Values Bases and Issues for Curriculum," in 
Curriculum Theory, eds. Alex Molnar and John A. Zahorik, (Washington, 
D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977), 
p. 21 (emphasis in original). 
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Knowledge and Decision-Making 
The fundamental reality upon which curriculum is built is the 
real concerns and aspirations of people. Macdonald refers to this as an 
ontological focus, which enables him to ask a crucial question: What is 
or is not learned; what can or cannot be learned; and why? The response 
is obviously not made in a vacuum but in the realm of the ordinary expe-
riences in the larger world. The political, economic, and social rela-
tionships that are identifiable outside the school are viewed as a 
framework against which the activities of the school can be appreciated: 
administration, planning, instruction, characteristics of staff and stu-
dents. The behaviors and interactions observed allow one to talk about 
curriculum in terms of rationales: the technical, scientific, political, 
10 
aesthetic, and ethical. Theorists do not create learning environments 
arbitrarily. Action ensues from knowledge inquiry based upon more than 
objectivistic empirical analytic means. Summarizing the writing of 
11 Habermas, Macdonald cites the limitation of monologic and hermeneutic 
understanding of meaning. He says, "The trouble with both modes is that 
they have divorced themselves from self-reflection; for objectivism 
deludes the knower by projecting an image of a self-subsistent world of 
10 James B. Macdonald, "The Domain of Curriculum," paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 
Chicago, Illinois, April 1974, p. 2. 
11 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy 
J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971). 
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facts structured in lawlike manner; and thus conceals the a priori con-
f h f .. 12 stitutions o t ese acts. 
Macdonald appreciates the perspective self-reflection provides 
for identifying the sources of different curricular value patterns. He 
proposes three human interests, control, consensus, and emancipation; 
13 
understanding them is derived from self-reflection. By control he 
means the decision-making orientation implicit in scientific-
rationalistic methodology. Consensus refers to a practically cognitive 
means-ends agreement about which knowledge is of most worth and which 
curricular designs should follow. Emancipation or liberation results 
from a critically cognitive orientation. 
Macdonald recommends more attention be given to the third mode, 
the emancipatory and liberational. In terms of curriculum, management 
by objectives--obtained from experts or consensually--does not begin to 
engage the full human capacities for creative, imaginative actions. On 
this point Macdonald draws from Piaget and James. The latter two argued 
that knowing, reason, and reality were known primarily in the act of 
doing. Of the two, Macdonald says, 
Neither man begins with knowledge as a primary starting point, but 
with "pure experiences" (James) or with developmentally monitored 
intellectual operations (Piaget). In each case the conclusion is 
similar--that it is in the doing that we find reality, knowledge and 
intelligence. 14 
12James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum and Human Interests," in Cur-
riculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, 
Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), P• 287. 
13Ibid., P• 289. 
14 Macdonald, "Domain of Curriculum," P• 15. 
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Making Curricular Decisions 
Paulo Freire's notion of praxis--action with reflection--provides 
Macdonald with another important basis for his decision-making methodol-
ogY· It is founded on the idea that one's intuitions, attitudes, per-
ceptions, are located in the realm of tacitly held knowledge. As indi-
cated in Figure 1, values can be elicited only be critical reflection, 
and then acted upon with more clarity. In contradistinction to the 
Goodlad and Richter models, however, or the Tyler Rationale--wherein 
values are discernible and functional in deliberation--'"the source of 
values is not accessible through logical or empirical means • • • only 
through praxis. Thus, our values remain hypothetical (in a rational 
sense), only explicitly known (through inference) by reference to our 
li .. 16 be efs and actions. 
He argues that a person forms and clarifies values from a dual 
perspective: "outer" and "inner." On the one hand people should under-
stand they will be held accountable for actions performed in the public 
sector, and on the other hand they should be aware of biases, predis-
positions, and beliefs and how these emerge in behavior. Responsibility 
means being able to respond, accountable to relate to the social uni-
verse of, institutions, technology. One responds to the world in two 
manners: outwardly in considering the outcomes, moral and otherwise, of 
our behavior; inwardly in questioning the meaning of our lives, frustra-
tions, and aspirations. One goes back and forth with what he calls a 
16James B. Macdonald and Dwight F. Clark, "A Radical Conception 
of the Role of Values in Curriculum: Praxis," paper presented at the 
Meeting of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1973, p. 2, ED 086 583. 
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dual dialectic. Macdonald is quite ready to call "self" that which is 
the mediating agency, initiating this reflecting process. 
In phenomenological terms one is asked to "bracket out," that is 
to say, to "put parentheses" around everyday common experiences, social 
happenings, or matter of fact interpersonal contacts. One can never get 
to that unconscious world in which these values are rooted; but praxis 
or the implementation of the dual dialectic may be able to free thought 
and spirit to establish a more creative aesthetic and moral rationality 
for the curriculum. The aim is to try to offset the technological mode 
of curricularizing. 
Utilizing the reflective mode, Macdonald seeks to apply this 
methodology to certain specific questions, namely: Which values do the-
orists hold, and how can they be clarified to insure the greatest degree 
of meaning for the student and teacher? He bases this application on 
the existence of the cognitive interests already discussed. In inter-
acting with various cultural and personal referrents, specific values 
begin to emerge which are transformed into appropriate designs. One 
begins being aware that from value judgments values can be inferred, 
given a certain degree of candor and honesty. This ••given" points to a 
wholeness, a propensity for openness leading to and expressive of real 
human growth. 
A New Consciousness 
Awareness of the tacit dimension is not always satisfying to the 
self-reflective critic. In fact, the knowledge that is uncovered may 
point to a basic fallibility in one's cultural and personal orientation. 
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For example, the language one uses may appear to reference deep meaning, 
as a symbolic expression of reality. But in actuality language is found 
to stifle meaning, basically because it is detached from the lived 
~orlds of real persons. 
We continually carry the tacit assumption--and communicate it to the 
to young--that meanings are in words rather than in people; that 
~ords are rather than are not the things they refer to; that abstract 
~ords are of the same order of meaning as concrete words rather than 
on a different level.l8 
A person's language ought not to be seen as a mere appendage of 
the self. Discourse is not simply geared to a technological transmis-
sion of information. Macdonald's adaptation of praxis might bring to 
conscious expression his notion of person versus individual. The two 
categories are frequently confused and used interchangeably. They are 
qualitatively different in his approach to knowledge inquiry. 
Macdonald cites Piaget, Dewey, Erickson, Bruner, and Kohlberg as 
examples of developmental social construction of reality--that have 
exempted the person from the process. 
from Locke to the present day, abstract individualism presup-
poses a picture of civil society, where members are independent cen-
ters of consciousness and possess non-context-dependent interests, 
wants, natures, purposes, needs, etc •••• Concrete individualism 
conceives of the individual as a person, an agent of choice--a source 
of (yet to be discovered) intentional purposes, capable of valuing 
(yet to be discovered) activities and involvements and capable of 
(yet to be discovered) forms of self development.l9 
18James B. Macdonald, "The School Environment as Learner 
Reality," Curriculum Theory Network n.v.:4 (Winter 1969-70): 51-52. 
19James B. Macdonald, "Looking Toward the Future in Curriculum," 
paper presented at the Meeting of the Professors of Curriculum, Associ-
ation for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Miami, Florida, 1977, 
P• 8. 
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In arguing against abstract curricularizing, Macdonald attempts 
to translate theory into "practical" deliberation and common sense 
decision-making. In other words, value inquiry requires one to note 
what is crucial in the process and what is peripheral. Equal weight is 
not given to all judgments. We are all aware, to begin with, that while 
society makes rules for itself, not all advances and norms are of the 
same import. For example, Macdonald distinguishes in a school setting 
between preference rules, e.g., hall privileges, and constitutive rules, 
e.g., forbidding cheating. Preference rules and constitutive rules are 
also found in society as a whole: military service, dress codes, pre-
marital and extramarital sex, a college education, and "basic" educa-
tion, for example. One needs to delineate differences and similarities 
in order to know what one really must do to translate value judgment 
into action. The student cannot assimilate all rules as important. 
"Relevancy" might be judged by the student on the basis of the inter-
change between preference and constitutive rules. 
Socio-drama or autobiography are two means of eliciting our 
responses: do the questions embodying curriculum design reflect pref-
erence rules or constitutive rules? The clarifying process is crucial 
if we are to really understand the values that affect our selection, 
interpretation, and organization of content and means of inquiry. "This 
kind of reflective activity also has the merit of completing the human 
response to liberation by a momentary and sometimes tentative but real 
dissolution of the subject-object distinction so prevalent and humanely 
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20 damaging in Western Civilization." In other words, this very human 
dimension of self-reflection strengthens the battle against means-ends 
curriculum work. 
~Consciousness ~ Spirit: Centering~ the Aim of Education 
Macdonald has already provided us with a transcendental develop-
mental model for curriculum. The aim of this ideology is centering, 
allowing the person to fully maximize all human capacities. This is 
done through pattern making, playing, meditative thinking, imagining, 
the aesthetic principle, physical education, and educating for 
21 perception. 
Here he is cultivating the meaning of the unseen. It is a proper 
antidote to the utilitarian, rational business-like verbal approaches to 
the traditional curriculum. Furthermore, centering is a healing ther-
apy, bridging the mind-body separation. We are biological entities with 
spriritual aspirations. Centering, as an aim of education, has a defi-
nite religious dimension according to a recent reviewer. 
Macdonald's appreciation of the potential of our religious traditions 
to provide an adequate framework for contemporary education is a 
needed corrective to the historical myopia of those religious educa-
tors who, in their search for identity, focus their attention exclu-
sively on the frameworks of a Kohlberg or the rationales of a 
Tyler.22 
20James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Consciousness and Social 
Change," Foundational Studies 5:2 (Fall 1978): 42. 
21 Macdonald, "Transcendental Developmental Education," 
PP• 109-112. 
22 Maurice L. Monette, O.M.I., "Essay Review of Curriculum: An 
Introduction to the Field, ed. James R. Gress," Religious Education-74:2 
(March-April 1979): 213. 
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The religious perspective simultaneously adds a broadening dimen-
sion to curriculum work--can anything ever be known completely--and a 
unique expansiveness. Phenix speaks of the transcendent urge as that 
which resists the urge towards any "fixed content of knowledge, beliefs 
or skills that the learner is meant to acquire. ·•23 Macdonald disdains 
the instrumental, the thing-a-fication of a life of holistic knowing. 
He does not ignore science but rather scientism. Science is part of a 
whole universe, all of which will never be known, none of which should 
ever be ignored. It is in this mood Macdonald suggests that 
The act of theorizing is an act of faith, a religious act. It is the 
expression of belief, and as William James clearly expounds in The 
Will to Believe, belief necessitates an act of the moral will based 
on faith. Curriculum theorizing is a prayerful act. It is an 
expression of the humanistic vision in life.24 
Theorizing, critical reflection, and praxis require the joint 
participation of student and teacher. An act of faith, by Macdonald's 
definition, is not carried forth in solitude. One locates that point in 
which self realization illumines--while personally relating to another 
creature. Curricular content, explicitly formulated as bodies of infor-
mation, facts and figures, may facilitate the approach of centering. He 
would agree that "hard data" situates one in the world. The teacher can 
serve as an authentic model of how a person can allow the world to talk 
through him, not for him. 
23Philip H. Phenix, "Transcendence and the Curriculum," Teacher 
College Record 73:2 (December 1971): 281. 
24James B. Macdonald, "Theory-Practice and the Hermeneutic 
Circle," paper presented at A Curriculum Theory Conference (The Airlie 
Conference), Airlie, Virginia, October 1980, p. 13. 
CHAPTER IV 
VALUE, LANGUAGE AND CURRICULUM: 
THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF DWAYNE HUEBNER 
Introduction 
Dwayne Huebner asks curricularists to consider the way they use 
language in their work. He asserts that the 1anguage used in educa-
tional endeavors reflects the various value systems to which theorists 
and practitioners lay claim. Like Macdonald, above, he believes that 
curricularists are often unconscious of the value frameworks and lan-
guage usage they implement in their work. Huebner points out how we 
confuse alleged statements of fact with value judgments; some observers 
consider this to be practicing philosophical analysis. These values and 
value judgments and interests do not exist in a vacuum but are mani-
fested in humab relationships. Huebner is very concerned that curricu-
lum both mirror and help create caring, loving, open relationships. One 
task of philosophy is to help clarify our language usages. There is a 
moral quality to being precise. In simple terms, people ought to know 
what they mean and mean what they say. Educators need to be particu-
larly sensitive to this issue of clarity in language since the cogni-
tive, affective, and physical growth of a creature is at stake. 
Open communication is hampered by the inclination to control and 
manipulate people. Huebner suggests that schools exist as political 
institutions whose major category of 'goods and services' is power. 
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power itself is neutral; however, it is often exercised by curricular-
ists, practitioners and administrators to limit creative expression and 
personal inquiries. One example is predetermined expectations for the 
student, translated into goals, objectives, and specific learning activ-
ities. This approach is characteristic of the traditionalists whose 
guiding principles for curriculum construction were based on assumptions 
about learning, the needs of society or the pupil. The real problem is 
that guidance may easily be synonymous with governance, and that is a 
political issue! 
Huebner suggests alternative ways of understanding what is cur-
riculum. Of the various value systems or rationales that structure cur-
riculum writing, Huebner identifies the aesthetic and ethical modes as 
most important. For him the educative environment is a place of more 
than physical structures, and tools of the trade--texts, professional 
apparatus, supplies. The educative environment, in its broadest sense, 
is where the means of inquiry and discovered knowledge draws out the 
student's response-ability. It is a place for trying to reconcile order 
and chaos in an aesthetic sense by personalizing the implications of 
both. By realizing how states of being exist in one's own life, it may 
be easier to deal with their conditions in the world at large. 
The attempt to find beauty and integrity in the widest range of 
forms and sources of knowledge is an aesthetic and ethical issue. It 
has a significant ethical dimension. Huebner advocates that persons in 
the educative environment seek to restore a wholeness to their lives. 
Much of the dissension that exists in the world is a result of 
incomplete attentiveness. Listening is an art form to be nurtured and 
helps transform detached individuals into relating persons. 
78 
Huebner mentions that conversation is both the content as well as 
a process that builds relationships. Within the educative environment, 
concentration makes persons aware of one another as temporal creatures. 
Conversation implies that two persons actively listen, speak less, and 
so care for one another more. For him, temporality is related to an 
appreciation of the present moment with its possibilities for such 
heightened communication. 
The traditional language of learning--goals, objectives, scope, 
sequence, and activity--are not wrong, only insufficient. Science 
affords school persons an opportunity to inquire, to test, to establish 
controlled experiments about human behavior. But there is a question of 
value that goes beyond the knowledge the scientific method can uncover. 
Value Systems and Language Usages 
Huebner continues Macdonald's argument against a perceived un-
critical acceptance of technological rationality. The need for clarity 
of predetermined goals and effective evaluation of carefully delineated 
learning activities occupies the traditionalists and conceptual empiri-
cists to a large extent. However, for the reconceptualists curriculum 
writing should be comprehended from a larger perspective. 
Huebner agrees with Macdonald that the characteristic language of 
the traditionalist literature (and all curriculum writing) reflects 
basic human interests. Through the reconceptualists' critical theoreti-
cal concern with language one can identify and articulate these 
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interests which result in the formation of special value systems. In 
short, as theorists, we reconsider options as choosing, self-reflective 
creatures. The task of the curriculum theorist 
• • • is to lay bare the structure of his being-in-the-world and to 
articulate this structure through the language and environmental 
forms that he creates • • • • [T]heorists should call attention to 
the tools used for the shaping [of the worldl in order that the world 
being shaped can be more beautiful and just. 
Huebner's early professional orientation was instrumental, in a 
negative way, in guiding him towards a so-called "uncovering" function 
' in his work. From a background in positivistic science he moved into 
teaching philosophy and religion. Alienated from a goals-objectives 
perspective in traditional educative environments, he sought alterna-
tives. Contact with varying theological and philosophical traditions 
brought him new awareness. He thus formed the basis for an expanded 
methodology for comprehending varying curriculum rationales and language 
usage. He wondered, "How could one plan educational futures via behav-
ior objectives when the mystical literature emphasized the present 
moment and the need to let the future care for itself?"2 
Huebner is concerned with the processes that mark inner change 
and transformation. But such an approach does not lead to an ego cen-
tered retreat from the affairs of the day to day world. For Huebner, 
consciousness implies a strong, social commitment. In other words, 
1 Dwayne Huebner, "The Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," in Cur-
riculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, 
Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), p. 269. 
2Dwayne Huebner, "Biographical Statement," in Curriculum 
Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutchan, 1975), p. 215. 
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"This requires awareness that the concern for the possibilities of the 
individual without equal concern for the social-political-economic con-
dition within which we all live is hollow and meaningless. •• 3 
Huebner and other reconceptualists have tried to identify the 
value systems that motivate alternative curricular efforts in the class-
room. This has heightened our awareness of the possibilities and con-
straints of the major rationales evident in curriculum writing today. 
In a recent study of reconceptualization, Mazza identified Huebner as a 
leader in this critical movement. 
The thrust of the aesthetic/philosophic critique is the concern for 
the intrinsic nature and quality of the educational experience, apart 
from its utilitarian function for the achievement of goals. The ori-
ginal outline of this critique was forged by Dwayne Huebner in his 
opposition to the centrality of the categories of objectives and 
learning in curriculum theory.4 
Huebner has a multifaceted background. His methodology has been framed 
by technical training and a predilection to humanistic education. We 
shall now examine some of the content of his theoretical position. 
He speaks of five value systems that curricularists try to iden-
tify and/or develop. He labels these as technical, political, scien-
5 tific, aesthetic, and ethical. At this point in time, while all five 
3Dwayne Huebner, "The Contradiction Between the Recreative and 
the Established," in Schools in Search~ Meaning, eds. James B. Mac-
donald and Esther Zaret, 1975 Yearbook of the Association for Super-
vision and Curriculum Development (Washington, D.C.: Association for 
Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 37. 
4 Karen A. Mazza, Reconceptual Inquiry~~ Alternative Mode of 
Curriculum Theory and Practice: A Critical Study (Ed.D. dissertation, 
State University of New York at Cortland, 1980), p. 76. 
5Dwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," in 
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), p. 223. 
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are crucial to the valuing process, the technical, political, and scien-
tific rationales are dominant. The technical orientation grows from the 
society's need to remain industrially and economically viable, thus 
hopefully assuring a guarantee for the physical welfare of its citizens. 
Of necessity there is a means-ends approach where objectives, activi-
ties, and evaluations are clearly delineated. He finds that the dis-
course systems of psychology and sociology legitimize the '"analysis of 
the individual in the present or future social order • • • in terms of 
concepts, skills, attitudes or other behavioral terms."6 
Second, he admits that political power is not unimportant in the 
curriculum enterprise. Politics is the art of influence. Yet in the 
process of acquiring needed resources for allocation, and the placement 
of professionals to carry out duties, power may become a manipulatory 
end-in-itself. 
Third, knowledge holds a great deal of power that can be elicited 
by scientific activity in the form of experimental design. Posing cer-
tain hypotheses, the theorist may discover why students react emotion-
ally or physiologically in a given set of circumstances. 
Finally, there are aesthetic and ethical value systems, helping 
us grasp what is going on in the classroom and larger society. One 
observes how both of these rationales can symbolize a search for whole-
ness, unity. They supply the moral question, "Why," in regard to the 
functioning of the first three utilitarian-like value systems. Huebner 
views the larger picture: "Indeed, the insignificance and inferior 
6Huebner, "Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," p. 269. 
quality of much teaching today may be a result of attempts to maximize 
only the technical and political and perhaps scientific values without 
adequate attention to the esthetic and ethical values." 7 
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Both rationales are concerned with the qualitative interaction of 
a person with the environment. That environment is created through 
efforts to derive meaning from symbolic representation of reality. 
People share the ability to see patterns, to express themselves in 
metaphor, and to act on the basis of that knowledge. Common to both 
rationales is an avoidance of the ends-means patterning in curriculum 
where "use" of individuals as things disrupts the natural harmony of 
life. Huebner says it thusly: "The intent throughout classroom activ-
ity is not a search for preconceived ends but a search for beauty, for 
integrity and form and the peace which accompanies them, and for truth 
as life is unveiled through the acting and speaking of the 
i i .. 8 part c pants. 
Although there are commonalities between the two rationales, each 
has its own characteristics. Art is the act of transforming chaos to 
order, the unformed to form, dissonance to harmony. Though each 
expression is grasped through the subjective perception of the artist, a 
basic truth is conveyed: one's intelligence, emotions, and spirit join 
together as meaning emerges through contact with an artifact. Whereas 
technology symbolizes humankind's domination of the world, aesthetic 
knowledge seeks for integration of the world with all one's faculties. 
7 Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," p. 228. 
8 Ibid., P• 232. 
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Science enables us to analyze constituent parts of the whole; art aids 
us to appreciate that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
The aesthetic rationale of curriculum is inextricably related to 
the ethical realm. In both instances, a tension can be felt: limit ver-
sus extension, material versus spiritual, the articulate versus the 
ineffable. Huebner suggests that in confronting an artifact or another 
creature one is immediately impressed with the particular aspects, the 
details of what the senses say is there. Nevertheless, the existing 
object or individual is there, too, as a whole, despite the imperfec-
tions in human perception. The artist, the student, the one who is 
wide-awake (in Greene's terms), senses the possibility of gradually 
making whole that which is separate and detached. As one focuses on the 
existing but elusive sense of wholeness in the object of the world, a 
parallel awareness of an inner personal unity is manifest. 
The teacher recognizes this situation well. He or she has been 
where the student now stands, and in fact continues to sense these 
apparently irreconcilable tensions. The teacher nurtures that educative 
environment in which personal awareness of these tensions is the first 
step of human maturity. In a self-reflective way the student is aided 
to realize his own potentiality through the act of wisdom. "This is the 
unique function of the teacher, the human aspect of the specific educa-
tional environment, who shares the rhythms of continuity and change, of 
necessity and freedom, with his students." 9 
9
nwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," 
in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan~975), p. 249. 
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The teacher assumes a tremendous responsibility in the presence 
of students. The ethical rationality of educational activity is nur-
tured by the teacher who accepts certain key concepts as integral to 
classroom endeavors. They are response-ability, conversation, promise, 
10 
and forgiveness. 
Imaginative expression of meaning is most significant when shared 
with another person in the act of conversation. The disciplines are one 
way we order, analyze, and synthesize the elements of the world. They 
are one vehicle of our response-ability. The knowledge that one derives 
from disciplined inquiry can be brought forth as an expression of prom-
ise between student and educator. There is joy in study, in uncovering 
meaning that builds a new future. But the power to influence, to facil-
itate, to draw out, is complemented by a weakness. The educator is not 
infallible but is subject to pride, faulty judgment, misinformation. 
The promise of new knowing is accompanied by readiness to forgive others 
and oneself for errors committed in common classroom endeavors. 
From an aesthetic and ethical perspective one proceeds with an 
idealized version of wholeness. The type of dual dialectic espoused by 
Macdonald begins to enable one to see the sources of imperfection in 
this vision. Critical methodologies inform educators and students alike 
of the distortions of human relationships and the failure of language 
usage to express promise and forgiveness. Identifying his methodology 
as dialectical, Huebner means "• •• seeing the part in terms of the 
totality, the present in terms of the past and the future, and recognize 
10Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," P• 230. 
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that contradictions are also a mode of relationship which offer as much 
understanding as the present moment as cause and effect 
relationships."11 
The methodology emerges from consciousness. It is a mode of 
knowing one's self-reflective autobiography in the context of one's 
lived in community. He makes a distinction between teachers who are 
"individuals"--those who live apart and contemplate only their own needs 
and aspirations--and teachers who are "persons"--those who see them-
selves taking part in the larger totality made up of adults and chil-
dren. Huebner advocates the ethical and aesthetic rationales in order 
that the manipulation and exploitation can be recognized for what they 
are: a blatant system of means-ends. In the ideal system persons would 
be viewed as ends in themselves. 
Language Usage 
Curricularists' use of language reflects value systems selected 
by the theorist. Huebner suggests that theorists ought to be much more 
self-conscious about their forms of discourse since language is often 
adapted uncritically from other disciplines and misused in the school. 
But the unique characteristic of the curricularist is that he is a 
human being: able to be caught in someone else's web [of language], 
able to make his own, but more significantly, able to stand back and 
11Dwayne Huebner, "Toward a Political Economy of Curriculum and 
Human Development," in Curriculum Theory, Selected papers from the 
Milwaukee Curriculum Theory Conference at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, November 1976, eds. Alex Molnar and John A. Zahorik (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 
1977), p. 106. 
behold its beauty and form, to study is structure and function, and 
to generate new web-like patterns.l2 
Huebner points out that we use (or misuse) language in a multi-
tude of ways--to describe, to explain, to control, predict, or manipu-
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13 late, rationalize, legitimize, or to seek affiliation. At the outset, 
he makes us aware that there is no single way of discoursing about cur-
ricular happenings. Curriculum specialists, teachers, administrators, 
radical critics, and students utilize language according to their imme-
diate operating contexts and motivating interests (see Macdonald). Sev-
eral examples should suffice to indicate the pitfalls of uncritical talk 
or possibilities for innovative conversation. 
We describe routines in the class, and expectations for grading, 
as well as school policy. Nevertheless, as Huebner points out, descrip-
tion is used not only for material relations or bureaucratic operations 
but also for one's fears or dreams via poetry and other literary 
sources. In other words, the theorist should be aware that students' 
needs for self-expression cannot be limited to the conventional prose of 
"short answer essay" if creative classroom activity is to be appreciated 
in the widest possible way. 
Turning to the language of affiliation, one sees how the framing 
of behavioral and cognitive objectives and evaluations reflects the cur-
ricularist's attraction to scholars and empirical scientists with whom 
they wish to be identified. 
12 Huebner, "Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," p. 252. 
13Ibid., PP• 253-257. 
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For example, as curricularists adopt and adapt language from 
other disciplines, such as psychology, there are certain limitations. 
"Learning" is a term used to cover many phenomena that can be watched, 
measured, and evaluated in a clinic, laboratory, or classroom. But 
learning in that sense is not necessarily an accurate phrase to express 
the whole experience of the person. Knowledge inquiry and self-
reflection may include a great deal more. "When ••• learning is 
pulled out of psychological discourse and used in another realm, such as 
curriculum, the scientific checks are not always brought with it. A 
word or expression current in curricular discourse may be no longer 
bl i h di .. 14 1 " i .• via e n t e parent scourse system. For examp e, Bas cs : the 
term at one time had conjured up an image of the three Rs. Today the 
three Rs may well be relevance, response-ability, and reciprocalness--
with meanings that transcend mere mechanical skills. 
Language~~ Source of Educative Environments 
Huebner reminds us how Dewey suggested the construction of an en-
vironment that would educate. For example, scientific research in 
industry and the military result in a systems approach to learning, 
while stimulus and response studies often come up with recommendations 
for the school's efficiency and effectiveness. Curricularists are asked 
by critics such as Huebner to develop language that will help shape an 
environment that goes beyond the graphic, material designs brought on by 
science and technology, however efficient. Perspectives provided by 
Third force psychology, phenomenology, and mysticism have moved 
14Ibid., p. 259. 
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theorists such as Huebner to engage the aesthetic and ethical as key 
rationales for critiquing designs. But more than rationality and tech-
nique are involved. In other words, there are more than "inputs" and 
"outcomes" involved for the theorist who speaks in terms of vision, 
transcendence, and personal meaning. 
The theorist is sensitive to creating those opportunities within 
the curriculum for ethical and aesthetic value judgments. Bureaucratic 
organization may thwart the nurturing of environments receptive to these 
rationales, but people like Huebner are optimistic that situations can 
be created which will evoke personal responses, thus shifting some of 
the traditional expectations of what education can provide. Huebner 
states that " ••• the educational question ••• 'what can and should 
young people learn,' can become 'how can knowledge be made accessible 
for use by people with diverse characteristics.'"15 
In this sense curriculum is what develops in the process of self-
reflective, critical inquiry of the sources, regardless of content. 
Making knowledge available, however, is not simply a pedagogical act. 
It is also an existential and political matter. The theorist may be 
unable to make the widest sources of knowledge available to another be-
cause he himself is not open. He is blocked in intellectual and emo-
tional development. Therefore, academic decisions about how to go about 
designing an environment for others are not clearly made. In the dis-
cussion of Freire, above, it was shown how an incapacity to reflect on 
15 Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as the Accessibility of Knowledge," 
paper presented at the Meeting of the Curriculum Theory Study Group, 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1970, p. 5. 
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the nature of our speech reduces our power to act to influence others. 
Similarly, the power to influence others is political and exemplifies 
the degree of one's ethical concerns for another. In an unreflective 
state, "• •• we justify [the] abridgement of the rights of the young by 
talk of protecting them, [but] we are perhaps more likely to do it be-
cause we want to take our adult world for granted, and not have it 
brought into question by the young."16 
Temporality 
The world is not to be taken for granted. We have already cri-
tiqued value systems and language usages, lest they not be viewed and 
used uncritically. But we have not elucidated the real underlying prob-
lem. That problem is basicaly one of time, of prescriptions of change, 
and the ability to structure or control it, first in our own lives and 
in those of others. Huebner says that this is related to temporality, 
or the existential nature of man, especially now in a rapidly changing 
age. 
We have noted how Toffler's Future Shock documented the unbe-
lievable pace of change, leaving us unprepared and detached. Goals, 
purposes, and objectives are ways of preparing the student for achieve-
ment in the future based on the best of past heritage. However, Huebner 
goes on, the ability to state the purposes of the school neglects the 
real flux world in which the student lives. Furthermore, 
16
nwayne Huebner, "Remaking Curriculum Language," in Heightened 
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory, ed. William 
Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1974), p. 52. 
90 
By their very nature, goals, objectives, and purposes become state-
ments of a desired future--a tomorrow. The present creeps in in the 
teaching. It is when the educator must deal with the student that he 
seemingly drops the concern for the past or for the future and 
focuses upon the present.l7 
Criticizing the language of learning (goals, etc.) is not simply 
a matter of changing the forms of discourse. Altered behavior is not 
the primary focus for measuring success or failure of a curriculum. 
More is entailed. Huebner introduces the notion of man as an autobio-
graphical creature, a theme more fully developed by Pinar. Behavioral 
and cognitive changes, geared to the attainment of some postulated 
future good--to count by tens, to recite the Presidents by heart, 
etc.--are rooted in a certain time and place. Temporality implies that 
life's meaning is to be grasped in much wider terms. 
A man's life cannot be described by what he is or what he does at a 
given time. His life is a complete something, capable of description 
only when the moments from beginning to end are unified by death • 
• • • Might it not be possible, then, that insights into curriculum 
planning for the individual are to be sought in the discipline of 
biography, as well as within the discipline of psychology?l8 
Everything is geared to maximizing the student's ability to con-
front his future and/or reclaim his past in relational proximity to 
others. Huebner does not ignore rational empirical sources for this 
task. A scientific rationality has been shown to be one of the legiti-
mate ways of examining curricular activity. Science, like knowledge, is 
neutral. It depends upon its technological applications as to what 
ethical judgment will be made. In this regard Huebner says, "By using 
17
nwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," 
in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan:-1975), P• 239. 
18Ibid., P• 242. 
learning theory to build educational environments we make it possible 
for the teacher to enter into significant dialogue with the student as 
human being, not simply learner. This is the basis for my original 
19 distinction between learning and education." 
For example, programmed reading units can expedite the advance-
ment of children with special difficulties. Statistical analysis of 
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test results can reveal the significance of certain aspects of group or 
individual learning process. Huebner simply argues that the assumption 
underlying the scientific method and technological applications are not 
always apt. The self-critical introspective person, in the process of 
reflection, can create knowledge. Such personal knowledge exists 
although neither science nor technology can verify it. 
The Moral Aspects of Language 
Huebner is manifestly concerned about the moral aspects of our 
communication in school places. The institution does need certain 
structures that require measurement in terms of scores, group norms, 
cost effective scheduling of personnel. But if this is the primary 
thrust of language usage, how can one find out whether detached, compli-
ant, "achieving" learners have gained the power to intuitively value 
their education--as persons. The society gears us to think about mas-
tery and competence as rungs on a ladder that somehow leads us to the 
19 Dwayne Huebner, "Implications of Psychological Thought for the 
Curriculum," in Influences in Curricular Change: Papers from~ Confer-
ence Sponsored by the ASCD Commission on Current Curricular Develop-
ments, New York:-New York, December 1966, eds. Glenys G. Unruh and 
Robert Leeper (Washington, n.c.: Association for Supervision and Curric-
ulum Development, 1968), p. 35. 
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vague goal of success. But there are other kinds of talk that should be 
taking place. 
First it is necessary for educators and administrators to try to 
draw students, parents, and community leaders into conversation. It is 
through this kind of communication that the aesthetic and ethical ratio-
nales, earlier discussed, will emerge as primary value systems. Huebner 
asks that we disabuse ourselves of the illusion that certainty in educa-
tional practice is assured by our objective, systematic methods of test-
ing, measurement, and management. A focus on the aesthetic and ethical 
concern of the school will allow alternative views of success to be 
legitimated. Through the art of conversation one might come to appre-
ciate how openness that leads to a certain vulnerability, is, in fact, 
the source of great strength. Greene and Pinar speak a great deal how 
our structure of knowledge and methods of inquiry ought to allow for 
more personalist expressions of doubt, paradox, and conflict. The norm 
of consensus, political or otherwise, may not allow for a true articula-
tion of beliefs or desire for action. 
Huebner draws on Paul Tillich and Paul Ricouer, a noted French 
philosopher, to put these questions of strength and fallibility, doubt 
and certainty into perspective for the school situation. Technical com-
petency, skills and traditions need preservation; we are obligated to 
increase their accessibility for a contemporary nation must have the 
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widest range of talent from which to draw to insure creativity and via-
bility. "But having them does not entail imposing them."20 
Huebner illustrates a related problem stemming from a misunder-
standing about how certain assumed values make us competent. 
Conformity, loss of aspiration, and hiding feelings are not a sign of 
personal strength. They are a sign of inadequate social structures. 
The reason that teachers do not know what to do when they recognize 
these weaknesses, mistakes and embarrassment on tapes of their teach-
ing is that they do not work in a social context that recognizes that 
doubt and fallibility as essential--to maintain one's humaneness and 
essential as a source of continued growth and development.21 
Huebner's great contribution is helping us reevaluate what are 
the strengths and weaknesses in the value systems we implement through 
our educative environments. We know that we invoke a political ratio-
nality when we decide what aspects of our heritage are to be represented 
in our classrooms. The choice of content leads to decisions how to ere-
ate that educative place which reflects the technical values of utility 
and efficiency. But that technical role ought not to be seen as the 
fundamental concern of education, though it may be the educator's main 
concern for training. "He forgets that the basic quality of education 
is its moral character, that the function of a fabricated environment is 
to enable men to be more human, and that even fabricated conditions can 
20Dwayne Huebner, "Humanism and Competency: A Critical and Dia-
lectical Interpretation," paper presented at the Meeting on Humanism/ 
Competence, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, October 
1974, P• 9. 
21
nwayne Huebner, "Developing Teacher Competencies," paper pre-
sented at the Meeting of Western Canada Educational Administrators, 
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, October 1979, P• 5. 
be subservient to man, symbolic of his spirit, and tuned to his tran-
li i .. 22 scending qua t es. 
Assisting the reader to focus on alternative interpretations of 
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environment, Huebner has still been criticized by White for not provid-
ing adequate practical suggestions. It is a question of what one means 
by "practice." White is bothered by the beautiful descriptive talk 
about the moment of "vision'' when the "'evolving, emergent educatee 
meshes with the historically developing society in a hermeneutical 
classroom activity.'"23 
Although White the practitioner is bothered by the flights of 
Huebner the theorist, it does not mean that there is is not "applicabil-
ity" elsewhere. Huebner explicitly has said that skills and techniques 
must be made accessible--only not be imposed. That is, the real world 
of the school is made up of two facets. There are instances where cer-
tain structural requirements of the school must be met--organizational 
groupings and evaluations of students--and there are instances where 
knowledge is presented, but not as the only symbol system for deriving 
meaning in life. Huebner has reminded us of some questions to ask about 
the relationship between the two and that is practical advice. 
As Postman and Weingartner indicated more than a decade ago, "teach-
ing is a subversive activity." It can undermine neat political assump-
tions about the ideals of democracy, the neat assumptions we make about 
22
nwayne Huebner, "Moral Values and the Curriculum," paper pre-
sented at the Meeting on Moral Dilemma of Public Schooling, University 
of Wisonsin, Madison, Wisconsin, May 1965, p. 20. 
23Kirk White, "The Work of Dwayne Huebner: A Summary and a 
Response," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 2:2 (Summer 1980): 86. 
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the infallibility of science to provide unqualified ease and comfort, 
and the assumptions we make about the words we use to describe what we 
do. It can question the power relationships that distinguish the class-
room, or any other client-manager type of organization. It can under-
mine our own self-image as purveyors of means-ends, cause-effect tech-
niques. But then all of this requires a self-honesty about what we want 
to be and do, vis-a-vis our students. Huebner forces the question when 
he asserts that we must hear what we say, and say what we hear. Any 
curricular endeavor is ideally predicated on this issue. 
CHAPTER V 
CONSCIOUSNESS, THE AESTHETIC AND THE CURRICULUM: 
THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF MAXINE GREENE 
Introduction 
The reconceptualists have consistently suggested that curriculum 
be conceived from the perspective of heightened consciousness or criti-
cal awareness. They have argued for the use of phenomenology, critical 
theory, politics, theology, and language analysis. They contend that 
the malaise pervading our knowledge-rich, power-dominant society demands 
a radical response from the schools. One could say that the reconcep-
tualists thus far cited have tried to legitimate the kinds of critical 
inquiry that challenge scientific cause and effect and technologically 
organized knowledge. The curricular orientations of the traditionalists 
and conceptual empiricists have been found wanting as ways of dealing 
with depersonalization and alienation. 
In this context, we are drawn to the works of Maxine Greene. She 
is preoccupied with teaching people to be self-reflective and critically 
aware of the relationship between thought, feeling, and behavior. Im-
plicit in her writings is a feeling that unity among these three dimen-
sions is no longer perceived. Considered by many observers to be an 
existentialist philosopher or theorist, Greene urges us to personalize 
our investigations into various knowledge sources and the value posi-
tions we take. Greene and others argue that this situation has 
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developed from educators who, in Huebner's words, have given primary 
attention to the technical and scientific domains of curriculum. 
Along with other existential thinkers in the twentieth century 
America, she [Greene] takes a stand against the unexamined assump-
tions of a society steeped in positivist thinking and social self-
righteousness •••• And within society, oppressive social institu-
tions perpetuate that single view of reality by discouraging 
consciousness.l 
Kliebard, Macdonald, and Pinar have all identified this positivism in 
the practical means-ends application of technically and scientifically 
based curriculum making. Rational input/output systems have been the 
convenient symbol utilized by administrators in their bureaucratic 
2 guidance of practitioners in their work. It is necessary to redress 
the imbalance; rationality is not enough. 
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The reconceptualists, including Greene, would persuade us to open 
our eyes to what Alfred Schutz calls "multiple realities." Greene, her-
self much influenced by Schutz, has aesthetically related this issue to 
education: 
The curriculum, as I see it, may be regarded as a number of provinces 
of meaning, each associated with the kinds of experiences available 
to young people of different ages, with different biographies, ••• 
Our concern in teaching, it seems to me, is to enable our students to 
interpret these experiences, to acquaint them with and free them to 
reflect on the range of cognitive styles.3 
1Margaret Ann Huber, The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 
1970's: An Historical Study (Ph.D. dissertation, University o~Michigan, 
1979)' p-.-57. 
2
see Herbert M. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in 
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), pp. 51-69. 
3Maxine Greene, "The Artistic-Aesthetic and Curriculum," Curricu-
lum Inquiry 6:4 (Special Issue 1977): 287. 
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Some Critical Concerns of Maxine Greene 
Greene does not consider herself a theorist but rather as one who 
engages in or ''does" philosophy; she specifically wishes to avoid the 
4 
reconceptualist designation. Frankly, given the wide ranging philo-
sophie, literary, aesthetic, critical, and historical dimensions consti-
tuting reconceptualist approaches, her caveat is more academic than 
real. We certainly honor her opinion; nevertheless, her philosophic 
position substantiates the rationale offered by critical, morally, and 
ethically concerned reconceptualists. 
As a philosopher, Greene does not expect each teacher or student 
to eclectically devise some sort of all-encompassing system by which to 
derive meaning from life. Each encounter with texts and companions can 
evoke a unique response in the teacher or student. "The teacher has to 
decide what makes sense for him. The decision is, after all, the object 
of 'doing philosophy': to find aperatures in the wall of what is taken 
for granted; to pierce the webs of obscurity; ••• "5 
Greene asks the student to inquire into the tacitly held value 
systems by which we live through everyday activity. For example, what 
are our attitudes toward our work; how and why do we relate in certain 
ways to family members, companions, colleagues, and strangers? By 
"doing philosophy" one removes questions such as the "value" and the 
4 Maxine Greene, written communication to Paul R. Feinberg, 
December 2, 1980. 
5 Maxine Greene, Teacher as Stranger (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 
1973), P• 263. 
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"purpose of life" from the universal or abstract realm of discourse to 
the concrete person. 
Greene argues that art draws us out of our regimented, objec-
tified existences. Literature, works of art, music, and dance can 
involve one as more than a mere observer or perceiver. Art motivates us 
to return to our homes, our leisure, and our work places more sensitive 
to the problems, the satisfactions, and the aspirations of the people we 
meet. It seeks to make the fragmented perceptions of life more whole. 
A concern with indivisibility--and with the difficulty of encoun-
tering another as a person--is what leads me to turn to literature 
and the arts as a means of making understanding possible, not so much 
as an understanding of the idea of mankind, as some prefer, but for a 
sense of ourselves.6 
One emerges from detached contemplation and self-reflection to 
act in the world. Janet Miller observes a strong social component in 
Greene's doing of philosophy: 
• • • encounters with works of imaginative and art enable us to break 
with the mundane and to come in contact with ourselves, and that the 
more fully engaged we are in the human community, the more "richly 
individual we become" and the more we are able to take action upon 
the world in order to effect change.7 
Greene prefers to classify herself as a philosopher of the arts 
8 
and not as a curricularist, or in particular as a reconceptualist. The 
fact is that the arts do provide certain language usages that expand 
discourse for imaginatively dealing with personal valuing necessary in 
6Maxine Greene, "The Arts in a Global Village," Educational 
Leadership 26:5 (February 1969): 440. 
7 Janet L. Miller, "Critical Reviews: Greene as Artist: The 
Challenge to See Anew," Curriculum Inquiry 9:4 (Winter 1979): 335. 
8Huber, "Renewal of Curriculum Theory," P• 52. 
100 
curriculum study. Through the imagination, art helps articulate the 
struggle between fixity and the status quo and the intellectual and 
social challenges of each new generation: " ••• imagination cannot 
alter or distort reality. It can, however, impart value and signifi-
cance; it can create new integral wholes; it can overcome man's aliena-
tion from his world." 9 
Art can give the opportunity to realize that the "reach can be 
beyond the grasp." Art is a change agent, a catalyst helping us to see 
within and beyond our ordinary everyday sights. Werner Haftmann has put 
Greene's approach into a large perspective, observing a transition from 
aesthetic passivity to dynamic expression: " ••• the traditional 
approach to art was based on the concept that reality was something 'out 
there' to be conquered; in contrast the modern view of reality ••• , 
is one which is created within man. •• 10 
For example the writer is only tangentially interested in "the 
jungle" as one moves into The Heart of Darkness. The reality of such a 
place, however, is uniquely perceived through the self-reflections of 
the reader. The meaning of the Congo transcends geography. 
Imagination does not mean folly. Imaging is a way of looking in 
upon oneself. It was originally the antithesis of imitating what was 
perceived from the sense world. It signified the spark of creativity, 
9Maxine Greene, "Imagination," in Aesthetic Concepts and Educa-
tion, ed. Ralph A. Smith (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 
1970), P• 304. 
10 Werner Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century: A 
Pictorial Survey (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 9, quoted in Ronald 
Padgham, "Contemporary Curriculum Theory and Twentieth-Century Art," 
Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 1:1 (Winter 1979): 155-79. 
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uniqueness. The imagination demonstrates the power of one kind of dis-
course. The conversations of scholars debating the authenticity or 
meaning of historical documents and the implications of empirical data 
signify another way of speaking about reality. Here the focus of know-
ing is objectified, beyond the knower. Greene says, "In contrast to the 
transparencies of discursive literature, the language of imaginative 
literature is like a mirror. The reader does not look through it to 
referents in the external world. He finds pointers to the interior 
silence, the original self ... ll 
The critically aware, socially conscious, contemplative person 
attempts to retrieve the elusive original self. Just as the artist 
makes his subjectivity the essence of a creative work, so the perceiver 
encounters the aesthetic object and refines it in terms of his 
consciousness. 
Consciousness ~ Its Moral Implications 
Greene argues that works of art are reflections of the designer's 
human experience and not simply manifestations of technical expertise. 
Moreover, it is the artist's way to try to come to grips with the exis-
tential dilemmas of life. The artist makes a conscious effort to artie-
ulate his visions and express frustrations within the finite, imperfect 
world he inhabits and creates. Therefore, it is in terms of one's own 
consciousness that aesthetic forms are perceived. The reader needs to 
be open to a variety of clues as he moves through the text. Greene 
11Maxine Greene, "Literature, Existentialism and Education," in 
Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education, ed. David E. Denton (New 
York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1974), pp. 83-84. 
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says, "~ subjectivity is the substance of the literary object; but if 
he is to perceive the identity emerging through the enactments of the 
book, he must subordinate his own personality, as he brackets out his 
everyday 'natural world.''·12 
Greene directs our attention to Kafka's Amerika in order to show 
how the aesthetic mode can induce the process--this subjectivity, this 
phenomenon--of self-consciousness. A young immigrant arrives at these 
shores bewildered and dislocated. He cannot grasp the meaning of social 
conventions or the role models of those about him. Clinging to a box of 
childhood memorabilia, he is incapable yet of focusing, of initiating 
the kinds of responses that would help him to determine his environment 
rather than being determined by it. As a result of certain traumatic 
events, the young man becomes wide-awake; he is aware of the need not 
only to break with the past but to positively act to build a new future. 
Greene draws an analogy to the curriculum in which prescribed 
knowledge is reflected in the structured institutions that the young 
immigrant unpreparedly had to encounter. She says: 
I have suggested that the individual, in our case the student, will 
only be in a position to learn when he is committed to act upon his 
world. If he is content to admire it or simply accept it as given, 
if he is incapable of breaking with egocentrism, he will remain 
alienated from himself and his own possibilities; • 13 
Greene's experience at the university makes her familiar with 
vast numbers of students who are, as she says, "effectively 
12 Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness," in Curriculum 
Theorizing: The Reconceptualist, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutchan, 1974), p. 301. Bracketing means putting into parentheses 
what we normally take for granted about the objective world. 
13Ibid., PP• 312-13. 
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domesticated." Despite the fact that they are reticent about the possi-
bilities for consciousness, a teacher must find those relevant themes 
that will draw the separated individuals together as dialoguing persons. 
But the "subject matter" doesn't matter. 
Whatever it turns out to be, it may be well to locate it in some 
outer horizon for a while, to be examined after inner horizons are 
explored. If inner horizons are not explored •••• there will be 
little possibility of discovering the causes of existing realitl and 
the ways in which, in individual life histories, it came to be. 4 
Before teacher and students encounter one another in this joint 
search for meaning, the teacher has a personal agenda with which to 
deal. Greene believes that new teachers must find ways to nurture self-
consciousness as a way of engaging themselves and others in a self-
initiated process of perspective knowing. 
Too frequently, students arrive at teachers colleges with fantasy 
••• stemming from a childhood notion of what a teacher represents • 
• The process of becoming conscious of self as historical being 
may be very painful; but to teach people in a radical fashion is to 
awaken them to as much of the problematic as possible.lS 
Janet Miller, one of her reviewers, was led to a bracketing-
inducing consciousness as a woman. Miller was astonished, she says, by 
what she had taken for granted and as absolute in comprehending her own 
life. "How reluctant I am at times to let go of the security that 
others' definitions provide. The pain is necessary, however, if I am to 
i i i h ki f ld i d b i i .. 16 part c pate n t e rema ng o a wor const tute y my own v s on. 
14Maxine Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, Curriculum," in 
Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory, 
ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1974), p. 81. 
15Maxine Greene, "Involvement: A Radical Way of Teaching and 
Learning," in Educational Reconstruction, ed. Nobuo Shimahara (Columbus, 
Oh.: Merrill, 1973), p. 238. 
16 Miller, "Critical Reviews," p. 336. 
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Miller has attempted to retrieve those episodes that seem to have 
unwittingly shaped her previous world. She epitomizes the ideal of the 
teacher-as-model, trying to locate inner meaning in herself before pro-
jecting this vision on to another person. She has recalled her past, 
thereby loosening the psychological barriers that restricted her emer-
ging consciousness. This process is one of the key elements in recon-
ceptualization--awareness of one's autobiography. 
Greene believes that this process of becoming self-aware has sig-
nificant humanizing implications. Autobiography is not merely an ego-
gratifying exercise in narration. The truly wide-awake teacher cannot 
be cloistered "into himself." Greene cautions, "We are all aware that 
consciousness does not mean mere innerness or introspection • It 
refers, in fact, to the multiple ways in which the individual comes in 
touch with objects, events, and other human beings."17 Thus a conscious 
person is more likely to be open to others. But being open to the 
inquiries of others and to share one's deepest concerns, aspiration, 
biases, or fears, leaves one quite vulnerable. For some, to be uncov-
ered is to be unguarded. Greene tells us of one defense mechanism 
against vulnerability. "Lecturers seem to presuppose a 'man within man' 
where they describe a good teacher as infinitely controlled and accommo-
dating. • •• His personal [feelings or] biography is overlooked."18 
Consciousness is the process as well as the phenomenon of libera-
tion. The teacher and student ask questions of one another, thus 
17Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, Curriculum," p. 71. 
18 Greene, Teacher as Stranger, P• 269. 
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transcending the factual or procedural approaches in a given discipline. 
subject. Freire referred to such emancipation as praxis. Problems of 
life, of economies, of politics, have a personal dimension else they are 
not truly problems. And any action undertaken to respond to these prob-
!ems is continually reflected upon, lest behavior be action for its own 
sake. Greene offers a prescription. 
Working in a dialogical relation with students, the teacher must try 
to move himself and them to ask the kinds of worthwhile questions 
that lead to disclosure and engage individuals in praxis • • • • 
Somehow, the struggle to master the cognitive structures composing 
curriculum must be made continuous with the quest for meaning 
19 
. . . . 
Aesthetic Inquiry 
Huebner has observed that the aesthetic rationale is highly 
undervalued as a means of expanding the meaning of whatever knowledge we 
are pursuing. Feelings of confidence, exhiliration, jealousy, hatred 
are sometimes only freed in our consciousness through the catalytic 
efforts of a piece of art or literature. Greene puts it still another 
way: 
• in the aesthetic experience the mundane world must be bracketed 
out or in a sense distanced, so that the reader, listener, beholder, 
can enter the aesthetic space in which the work of art appears. 
Captain Ahab's manic search for the white whale cannot be checked in 
any history of the whaling industries.20 
Aesthetic discourse in the curriculum provides the student with 
the opportunity to create metaphors, facilitating inquiry into the 
degree of correspondence between an artifact and day to day existence. 
19 Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, Curriculum," p. 79. 
20 Maxine Greene, Landscapes of Learning (New York: Teachers 
College Press, Columbia University, 1978), p. 164. 
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Melville intends for us to recreate Ahab's preoccupation with the 
white whale in terms of our own consciousness of daily events. One 
critic, however, has found Greene's use of literature to accomplish 
wide-awakeness problematic. Pagano observed, 
She sounds dangerously like our old elementary school teachers. 
Literature "discloses to us modern aspects of our own lived worlds'' 
•••• Surely there ISsomething more valuable contained in the 
aesthetic experience than the opportunity provided for entering into 
vicarious experience for "broadening one's horizons."21 
Greene might say that her work is dedicated to human symbol making. 
Literature enables her to be an active agent in creating personal 
meaning. 
Through curriculum we continually ask questions, disclose mean-
ing, and go beyond the everyday. Greene has not sided with the romantic 
critics, such as Holt, Illich, and Neill, who view the needs and wants 
of the individual as sacrosanct, incapable of realization within the 
restrictive structures of society. She agrees that we can go about our 
"symbolic ordering" within the very tension that is created as a result 
of the on-going conflict between the individual and the civilization. 
As long as one is willing to "try and defy determinism • • • to break 
with the crowd," then compromises within the status quo are inevitable, 
22 
even acceptable. The tension is not reducible. Greene writes: 
Education, because it is takes place at the intersection where the 
demands for social order and the demands for autonomy conflict, must 
proceed through and by means of the tension. Teachers, whose risks 
21JoAnne Pagano, "Review, Landscapes of Learning by Maxine 
Greene," Journal Ei_ Curriculum Theorizing 2:l(Winter 1980): 277. 
22Maxine Greene, "Defying Determinism, •• Teachers College Record 
74:2 (December 1972): 154. 
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and failures are functions of the uncertainty, can only try to enable 
students to understand how the social reality affects them, • • • how 
they can take action to transform.23 
Conclusion: A Prescription for Action 
Heightened consciousness is a major dimension of radical curricu-
lum work. For the reconceptualists it signifies a grasping of "multiple 
24 perspectives and need for choice." Choice implies alternative action. 
But Greene is not interested in abstract notions of right and wrong. 
She advocates new ways of creating opportunities for human justice. 
One of Greene's critics perceives a kind of relativism he says 
mitigates her claim that the teacher is a leader of those who seek just 
alternatives. The perceived absence of guidelines for selecting any one 
philosophical tradition weakens her claim to activism; Rainsberry 
states, "By reducing the problem of value choice to a relativistic 
level, Greene misses one crucial point: value choices are not made in 
isolation, but rather depend on a constant dialogue within a 
i .. 25 commun ty. 
There is a social context, however, to both aesthetic and philo-
sophical work. Emphasis on radical teaching and accompanying radical 
criticism squarely places her within a community aiming for justice. It 
may well be an imperfect community as far as the alienating structure of 
the school is concerned. It may be a community in which there are no 
23 Maxine Greene, "Identities and Contours: An Approach to Educa-
tional History," Educational Researcher 2:4 (April 1973): 9. 
24Huber, "Renewal of Curriculum Theory," P• 52. 
25 Paul Rainsberry, "Review, Teacher as Stranger by Maxine 
Greene," Curriculum Inquiry 6:1 (Fall 1976):-90. 
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guarantees of the transformation of social reality. But it is a com-
munity, nevertheless, where the radical educator is committed--in 
Freire's terms--to think and work, not without, nor for, but with the 
people. Greene writes: " ••• it is a luxury, not a waste for us to go 
off in search of alternative communities. Manipulations have to be 
dealt with inside the institutions that exist •••• Above all, cynicism 
and hopelessness must be overcome through serious work in the midst of 
h .. 26 t e system • • • • 
Greene does not relegate all philosophic clarification of values 
and purposes to the school. While she is dedicated to inquiring into 
the predicament of the individual, this solitary creature does inhabit a 
larger world than the classroom. The individual lives within institu-
tions that must be improved, not hopelessly ignored. 
• • • I have suggested that educational philosophers may have a role 
to play in criticizing and clarifying what is happening [taxes, 
employment, educational expenditures, inflation]. It seems to me 
that our focus ought to be the political arguments taking place when 
educational policy is made.27 
Greene is committed to action intentioned by thought and to 
thought which is realized through action. This dynamic, i.e., critical 
reflection upon which action is based, was Freire's methodology with 
Brazilian peasants; it helps loosen awareness of the relationship be-
tween power, knowledge, and human interests. For Greene, praxis ideally 
26 Maxine Greene, "Paul Goodman Then and Now: On Inquiry into 
Relevance," paper presented at the Meeting of the American Educational 
Research Association, Chicago, April 1974, p. 15. 
27Maxine Greene, "Morals, Ideology, and the Schools: A Foray into 
the Politics of Education," in Philosophy~ Education 1967, Proceedings 
of the 23rd Annual Meeting (Edwardsville, Ill.: Philosophy of Education 
Society, 1967), p. 159. 
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leads to an overcoming of social domination and self-alienation; in such 
acts a community-in-formation emerges. 
It reminds this author of a tale from Jewish folklore. Two men, 
each having lost his way, chanced to meet in a forest. Spying the 
other, each was elated, hoping that his new-found companion would know 
the way out. To no avail. But there was reason to rejoice. Said one 
to the other, "For certain I know that the way I have come will not lead 
us out. But together, friend, we can find the way." Ideally, our cur-
ricular inquiries will prove as fruitful. 
CHAPTER VI 
LIFE HISTORY AS CURRICULUM: 
THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF WILLIAM PINAR 
Introduction 
Pinar's curriculum theory focuses upon the individual in rela-
tion to cultural shifts in the last two decades that have produced new 
sources of alienation: economic destabilization, social and racial 
conflict, and bureaucratization of public life. 
Pinar has been sensitive to this state of affairs from his earl!-
est days as an undergraduate in the 1960's. The war, urban riots, and 
politics of the "new left" affected him deeply. He expressed the need 
to emancipate the so-called intellectually dulled child he found to be 
emotionally repressed, psychosocially immature, and morally under-
1 developed, who had been constrained by the dominant mode of schooling. 
Pinar's goal was to synthesize the knowledge he had derived from these 
new left sources as well as from pyschoanalysis, educational theory, and 
American and English literature. He also readily acknowledges the pro-
found influence of Paul Klohr and Donald Bateman as major intellectual 
mentors. Huebner and Greene, too, helped to develop his perspectives. 
Teaching in a Long Island suburb, Pinar's insights sharpened as 
he watched the process of his students' writing. After designing a 
1 William Pinar, "Self and Others, •• in Toward A Poor Curriculum, 
eds. William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Ia7: Kendall/Hunt, 
1976), P• 9. 
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psychoanalytically based humanities curriculum at Ohio State University 
for his Ph.D., he went to Rochester and attempted to expand his fami-
liarity with meditation, phenomenology, and curriculum. Pinar admitted 
his need for growth in the kind of setting provided by the university. 
His task was to sensitize others to the significant difference between 
training--acquiring information that allows for credentialing--and edu-
cation--allowing the data of training to alter one's total cognitive, 
2 
affective, psychomotor condition. 
Within this social context he extrapolated from the experience of 
new left thinkers of the 1960's generation in the United States to give 
currency to the work of Paulo Freire in Brazil. The latter's theme of 
limit situations and critical consciousness helped articulate what 
people like Pinar had been feeling. Benham points out that Freire, in 
his work with Brazilian peasants, demonstrated an 
• • • effective method of combining cognitive skill-building with 
political and personal consciousness-raising--a synthesis that con-
tained the essence of reconceptualist theory •••• Thus, he had 
shown that the theory need not always precede practice, although 
practice must be grounded in theory.3 
Macdonald and Huebner, and to an extent Greene, have also devel-
oped a cohesive focus based on Freire and the radicalized social and 
political thought of the last two decades. In the same way that Pinar 
2 Information about Pinar's professional growth is from his bio-
graphical statement in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. 
~Villiam Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1975-y:--pp. 357-58, and "Self 
and Others," in Toward A Poor Curriculum, eds. William Pinar and 
Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Ia.: Kendall/Hunt, 1976), PP• 8-15. 
3 Barbara J. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970's: The 
Reconceptualist Movement," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 3:1 (Winter 
1981): 163. 
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had opted for the university to pursue curricular, pedagogical, and 
hence moral concerns of human relationship, reconceptualists have not 
discarded the schools, imperfectly structured as they are. 
Pinar's Major Themes and Methodology 
Huber has pointed out that the "!ocus of his orientation derives 
from a combination of personal and professional backgrounds. "A shift 
from teacher-centered or material-centered curriculum to a person-
centered focus or inner experience in education is a part of what Pinar 
considers a new conceptualization in the curriculum." 4 
This perspective grows out of an understanding of the shift in 
the nature of the culture we now inhabit. The present historical period 
represents the concluding materialistic stage in an industrial age. It 
has been a time marked by consciousness of objects, performance objec-
tives, and behavioral psychology. Now a new era is beginning; it mir-
rors an increased concern with processes and human relationships. 
What we are seeing is a person-centered curriculum theorizing 
that begins with the researcher. Pinar argues that the functioning the-
orists, or practitioners, must first and foremost come to grips with 
their own biases, valuing process, and personal behavior. Prior to 
intervening in the lived worlds of others, one must squarely face how 
individual expression of a theory is rooted in one's own life history. 
Such a self-critical awareness is brought on through the process of 
"wide awakeness," or, according to Greene, by bracketing. 
4 Margaret Ann Huber, The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 
1970's: An Historical Study (Ph.D. dissertation, University o~Michigan, 
1979), p-. 72. 
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Education may ensue only in the wake of this type of penetrating 
self-analysis. And, following Pinar, one sees curriculum actually 
occuring between the unique self-conscious person and the subject matter 
studied. Such an approach can neither be suggested nor stimulated until 
the theorist takes the first steps to deal with his or her own aliena-
tion. Pinar says, "The self-estranged researcher is unlikely to do 
research of another character. If he is dissociated from his experience 
unaware of how, when and why he learned what he learns •••• then 
necessarily he must project his naivete onto whatever he studies."5 
Ross Mooney, writing from a reconceptualist vantage point, con-
siders there to have been an undue bias toward the empirical, linear, 
objective dimension of Western thought; therefore, most research is from 
what he calls a consumer's point of view. The theorists simply take in 
data and restate the data without really producing anything new. It is 
composed of "impersonal truths which exist ~ their ~ account indepen-
dent of ~ ••• ~~be concerned with what .!!_ 'good,' only with what 
is 'true.' • !~to depend~ logic and testable demonstration, 
.!!£!. ~ feelings and imagination." 6 
Mooney does talk in aesthetic, personalist terms of the antithe-
sis to this approach as the optimal condition of research. Like Pinar's 
contention: the curriculum at large, and research in particular, ought 
5 William Pinar, "Life History and Curriculum Theorizing: A Case 
Study," Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 3:1 (Summer 
1978): 92-118. 
6Ross L. Mooney, "The Researcher Himself," in Curriculum Theoriz-
ing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutChan, 1975), pp. 177-78 (emphasis in original). 
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to be seen as a person-centered phenomenon• "Research is an operation 
by which I am trying to become a better self-teacher so that my ex-
perience can say more things to me, give me more to think about and 
1 ,7 fee • 
All of this discourse about person-centered curriculum, research 
and teaching can be subsumed under the category of ~ history and 
biography. In this regard Pinar's views are reminiscent of Huebner's 
position that education be considered the concern for the way the biog-
raphy of the person confronts the developing history of the community. 
The individual must make active choices. For example, the community 
requires schools to ''produce"; the school acts as an assembly line. 
Will the theorist intuit these values in designing performance based 
frameworks, or does a basic uneasiness about such apparently mechanistic 
approaches alert him to search for people-centered alternatives? 
Moreover, does one's biographical consciousness rooted in remi-
niscences of personal school-based catastrophes or exhilarations guide 
investigation of options for writing curriculum? Finally, each school 
person must ultimately face the inquiring student's puzzlement or 
attack: "What do you really believe is right?" Here is the moral 
dimension of curriculum work! Pinar's close associate, Madeleine 
Grumet, says, 
We propose to employ theory of autobiography and autobiographic 
writings to help teachers examine the ways in which they have moved 
within conventional forms in the expression of their own authentic 
statements •••• Thus we would work to speak with teachers about 
7 Ibid. , p. 200. 
schooling, not as a static system of signs, but as a language that 
they simultaneously live, maintain, and transform.8 
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This requires one to recall a past phenomenologically and psycho-
analytically and then to project a future while situating these impres-
9 
sions and expressions in a certain cultural and political context. In 
short, while all of these remarks seem explicitly geared to the instruc-
tor, they ultimately ought to be integrated into conversations between 
student and teacher. The student needs a model of clarity, self-
honesty, and creativity. This will be found within the reconceptualiz-
ing teacher. 
10 Curriculum Criticizing and the Postcritical 
One problem with curriculum today can be understood by discussing 
the research issues of "quality" versus "quantity" in terms of particu-
11 lar understanding and general understanding, respectively. Pinar is 
concerned with the problem of qualitative research. He suggests that we 
understand curriculum in a general or particular way. Do we focus, as 
8Madeleine Grumet, "Toward a Poor Curriculum," in Toward A Poor 
Curriculum, eds. William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Ia~:---­
Kendall/Hunt, 1976), P• 79. 
9
william Pinar, "Search for a Method," in Curriculum Theorizing: 
The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 
1975), P• 424. 
10 This is Pinar's term to describe those who have gone beyond 
traditional or conceptual empirical theorizing to create an "affirmative 
new order." "Postcritical Reconceptualists," in Curriculum Theorizing: 
The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 
1975), P• 209. 
11 William Pinar, "'Whole, Bright, Deep with Understanding': 
Issues in Qualitative Research and Autobiographical Method," paper pre-
sented at the Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 
Boston, 1980, p. 1. In press, British Journal of Curriculum Studies. 
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the traditionalists do, on goals, objectives, designs that call for cer-
tain learning activities in the Tyler or Taba mode, or do we focus pri-
marily on the person--that unique, functioning student who has certain 
relationships with the teacher and other students. Pinar and the other 
reconceptualists tell us that to the degree we focus on the particular, 
our research is qualitative. 
There is an imbalance in the curriculum, weighted to the "gen-
eral" category, concerned with guiding principles or frameworks for 
categorizing and quantifying. While some external control is obviously 
necessary, the problems arise in not being able to differentiate between 
the times when the ethical or aesthetic response is needed and the times 
when the logical, rational response is needed. For example, how does 
one react to or analyze a particular work of art: from a logical, 
historical point of view or art appreciation. As Pinar adds, 
The more exclusively one relies upon rules of conduct--such as objec-
• tives for one's class to achieve--the more frozen becomes the situ-
ation •••• In a discipline's effort to achieve objective knowledge 
it has absolutized the relative, atemporalized, and historical, and 
rationalized the political status quo.12 
The argument against inappropriate or excess reliance on "general 
understanding" in quantitative research can apply also to theorizing. 
Cremin and Kliebard have pointed out how the conventional view of cur-
riculum theory is rooted in the technical, managerial origins of the 
field. Theory was a guide to practice, a way of "staking out the field" 
with observable markers to inform the practitioner of directions to 
choose, of optimal behaviors, materials, and content. 
12Ibid., PP• 2-3. 
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Pinar suggests "caring" is a relevant part of the curriculum pro-
cess. It serves as an antidote for the unhealthy effects of the objec-
tification of curriculum. He addresses this issue in responding to Nel 
Noddings' "Caring."13 Pinar observes that caring is an emotionally 
based state of receptivity to another creature, that evolves from giving 
special attention to inner realms of meaning often dulled by attention 
to persons as "things." Society exerts a major influence in the latter 
direction. Pinar, drawing from Sartre and Freire, explains the institu-
tion's functions as those of caretaking, feeding, taming, or domesticat-
ing. Teacher and schools do not facilitate inquiry nor engage in this 
process except in the most routine matter-of-fact way. Rather, they 
encourage the following: 
Hypertrophy or Atrophy of Fantasy Life • • • • Dependence and 
Arrested Development of Autonomy • • • • Thwarting of Affiliative 
Needs • • • • Estrangement from Self and Its Effect upon the Process 
of Individuation • • • • Alienation from Personal Reality due to 
Impersonality of Schooling Groups •••• 14 
Pinar addresses himself to modes of consciousness, to the realm 
of within-ness as a way of combatting these forms of illness. As a 
point of departure, he offers some alternative notions about theory that 
go beyond the instrumentalism of earliest curricular thought. 
13
william Pinar, "Caring: Gender Considerations. A Response to 
Nel Noddings' 'Caring'," paper presented at the Meeting of the John 
Dewey Society, Dallas, Texas, 1980. 
14
william Pinar, "Sanity, Madness and the School," in Curriculum 
Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: 
McCutchan, 1975), PP• 362-80. 
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Toward ~ Expanded Notion ~ Theorizing 
The reconceptualists recognize that a person's imagination is a 
treasure trove of resources for emotional growth. It stimulates cogni-
tive and affective creativity for dealing with one's traumas and enrich-
ing one's satisfactions. These more personalist, subjective, lighter 
possibilities for dealing with curriculum and/or theory were character-
ized by Macdonald as "playful" and "freefloating. •• 15 
Pinar traces the recent developments of this newer mode of con-
ceptualizing from the 1930's when Boyde Bode commissioned his student, 
Harold Alberty, to try to cultivate a more humanistic curriculum field. 
Klahr succeeded in reconceiving a more self-critical theory, one con-
cerned less with efficient management guidelines and more with transfer-
mative visions. In 1947, at the University of Chicago, Herrick and 
Tyler spoke of theory which would critically uncover human relationships 
between issues and supporting frameworks as well as projecting future 
ways of dealing with problems that emanate from the relationships. 
Applied to today, one might ask, How does one facilitate "personal 
growth" in the bureaucratic morass of sprawling school systems, or why 
are the arts or the aesthetic the first area to be eliminated when funds 
are curtailed? 
These questions are asked by those who are very much a part of 
the community. The self-reflecting perso~ knows that one's personal 
feelings and unconscious desires do not emanate from a vacuum. Each 
15James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," in Curriculum Theoriz-
ing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 
1975):-p. 6. 
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human being is in part determined by the political, economic, religious 
dimensions of a particular environment. The goal is to understand the 
structure of all the elements in the cultural milieu in conjunction with 
the biographic dimension of the concrete, particular person. Pinar is 
almost fixated on the life history of the person in the realm of both 
life and history of the individual and the community. There is a real 
"I" in the process, which is sometimes lost. Particularly among intel-
lectuals there is a tendency to immediately abstract from the concrete 
situation and begin analysis.. One's effort is always to return to "the 
h 1 .. 16 things t emse ves. 
The theory he is driving at does not overly emphasize either the 
individual person or the society: Both are important. The theory is 
rooted in the life history of the individual, his self-knowledge and 
idiosyncractic characteristics, but this person lives within the struc-
tural world of politics and social intercourse. It is with one's 
similarly-searching contemporaries that the link is made between the 
temporal, linear world of duration and continuity and the realm of infi-
nite possibility, or what others term ''transcendence." In a personal 
vein Pinar shares an impression. "By working to improve the ontological 
quality of my own life, I am at the same time working for improvement of 
the ontological and hence political quality of my contemporaries' 
lives."17 
16 William Pinar, "The Abstract and Concrete in Curriculum 
Theorizing," in Curriculum and Instruction, eds. Henry Giroux, Anthony 
Penna, and William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, in press). 
17
wnliam Pinar, "Political-Spiritual Dimensions," in Toward A 
Poor Curriculum, eds. William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Ia.: 
Kendall/Hunt, 1976), p. 106. 
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Methodology 
Our educational experience is thwarted by a continual reminder of 
our finitude. We are limited creatures whose span of existence may be 
cut short without warning. The harder we try to wrest some measure of 
outer security through physical manipulation or intellectual pursuits, 
the more likely there is to be disappointment. The world is a given 
with its possibilities and liabilities. Pinar's approach to education 
simply accepts this matter-of-fact description of reality, including the 
fallibility of rational persons and our inevitable biological deaths. 
Reconceptualization does attempt to situate the theorist in the 
middle of this lived-world that is neither adversary nor ally in any 
absolutist sense. One questions whether institutionalized schooling 
provides the student with enough chance to reflect, fantasize, and 
invent responses to the dilemmas posed above. The ability to manipulate 
the scientific method or to comprehend an historical critique and master 
related historical facts does not assure the student of the kind of 
intellectual and emotional growth that the curriculum ought to provide. 
Pinar strongly contends that once we in the school free ourselves from 
reliance on equating knowledge only with stimulus and response or 
management-by-objectives, our deepest Selves will emerge. He does not 
tell us whether we then go around in a state of perpetual awareness or 
consciousness, as if on a continual high. He simply says there are mes-
sages that well up from within. 
There is trustable knowledge that we can gain of our motives, our 
priorities--shall we read?; what shall we do with our leisure?; do spir-
itual matters have me?; or, am I afraid of either asserting acclaim or 
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registering complaint? Our newly discovered views are, of course, sub-
ject to misreading, but that possibility attained in the honest "brack-
eting" marks the fullest degree of one's humanity, errors and all. "It 
may be likely that we can achieve only a more-or-less correct identifi-
cation, but identification must be attempted. By focusing one's atten-
tiveness inward, the long slow process of access to the lebenswelt 
begins, offering the hope of finally transcending it."18 Intuition is 
that deep kind of knowing that informs one of the reasons for being 
afraid--of a new grade in school, a pending geographic move, or going 
out one's first date. Huebner, through his critique of language, has 
helped to sensitize us to nuances within language, and the more sen-
sitive one becomes to language usage, the more sensitive one's intuition 
becomes. 
Pinar's recourse to etymologies is helpful again. He alleges 
that true understanding far exceeds the codes, graphs, or memorized geo-
graphic locales. Understanding--in the sense of the original meaning of 
theory as contemplation--is not, for example, an abstract notion of 
goodness, harm, or even peace. Understanding emerges through a person 
fully in touch with reality, conceived originally by the term physis. 
"Physis is [sic] understood by the Greeks derived from lived experience, 
not from the abstracted generalization associated with natural studies 
like physics." 19 
18
william Pinar, "The Analysis of Educational Experience," in 
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar 
(Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), p. 394. 
19 Pinar, "Whole, Bright," p. 20. 
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Lived experience is that accumulated knowledge that one can self-
critically retrieve in order to make a value judgment. Pinar and 
Greene in particular feel that life-experience can be "tapped" most 
readily by a confrontation with a text. There is a special relationship 
that inheres in the coming together of artifact, instructor, and envi-
ronment. Through the following approach we learn not what that rela-
tionship ~, but what it can be. 
First one reads a text. Later one inquires into the language 
through note taking. The meaning in the text evolves in the reader's 
perception like the responses to a Rorschach inkblot, conjuring up 
20 images of familiar and unfamiliar sensations. Whereas Greene stresses 
the consciousness-raising function of literature in our educational 
lives, Pinar addresses the situation historically: "Autobiographic 
description and analysis offers the curriculum field a point of view it 
simply has not had. In the literature we have no concrete descriptions 
of an individual's experience of texts, teachers, students."21 
Autobiography challenges the view that human development is 
increasingly vertical, that in terms of human meaning, greater is better 
than less. Autobiography is an associative technique that is firmly 
wedded to the given educational experience of the person and initi~lly 
derives from it. 
Phenomenology and existentialism are keys to the inquiry method 
20
william Pinar, "The Voyage Out: Curriculum as the Relation 
Between the Knower and the Known," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 2:1 
(Winter 1980): 77-79. 
21Ibid., p. 79. 
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provided by autobiographical reference. Grumet tells us succinctly, "As 
phenomenology repudiated psychologism and empiricism, as existentialism 
repudiated idealism, currere repudiates behaviorism and technocracy." 22 
The method of currere helps us to elucidate personal perspectives that 
grow out of our experience with a literary piece. 
As an example of currere in operation, let us follow Pinar's 
analysis of Kafka's The Trial, focusing on the person of Joseph K. 
Kafka's man Joseph is unreflective, sees only meaning in surface orders 
of things, and depends on technical rationality alone. In fact, the 
more bogged down he becomes in personal misadventures, the less adept 
his psycho-social orientation is for lifting him. Joesph K. is 
arrested, his psychic-social growth stilted. Pinar allows the text to 
be a catalytic agent. 
One first reads the text carefully, engaging in textual analysis. 
Second, one places the piece in a literary and intellectual historical 
context. The personal responses of the reader then follow. That latter 
move in itself is designated the educational significance and prepares 
the ground for the fourth and most important stage, the reader's per-
23 
sonal context. 
This context requires one to address personal recollections and 
the relationship between self and others in a given field of study; 
also, one notes the various configurations of those impressions that 
22Madeleine Grumet, "Existential and Phenomenological Founda-
tions," in Toward A Poor Curriculum, eds. William Pinar and Madeleine 
Grumet (Dubuque, Ia.: Kendall/Hunt, 1976), p. 45. 
23 Pinar, "Search for a Method," pp. 419-20. 
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inform the subject how he has come to know, argue, and discourse. Here 
Pinar is referring to one's personal intellectual development, social 
environment, colleagues, and family. 
Pinar has adapted the method of currere to his own life. The 
24 
approach is both painful and rewarding. He discovers sources of psy-
chosocial alienation as well as physical self-neglect. These disrupting 
awarenesses ultimately contain the seeds of new growth. His candor and 
self-honesty make him even more trustworthy in his advocacy of currere 
in the school setting. 
Implications 
Frankly, those intent on reconceptualization have not operationa-
lized their concerns. Will there be suitable time and space for theo-
rist to engage in metaphor-making, and environment construction based on 
non-controlling use of language and material? One observer makes a sim-
ilar point. 
But the efforts of reconceptualizing the field of curriculum inquiry 
have not produced, as yet, a significant body of literature that is 
practical in a pragmatic or didactic sense of the term. There is not 
enough as of yet that actually shows us how you do something like 
phenomenological analysis or how you work for curriculum change in a 
critical theory sense.2S 
Pinar related that to the best of his knowledge there is no 
school presently implementing a reconceptualized curriculum. He implied 
24William Pinar, "Life-History and Educational Experience, •• Journal of 
Curriculum Theorizing 3:1 (Winter 1981): 279. 
25Max Van Manen, "Reconceptualist Curriculum Thought: A Review of 
Recent Literature," Curriculum Inquiry 8:4 (Winter 1978): 372. 
125 
that it is still in the building-clarifying stage. 26 
Curricularists who are sympathetically inclined to reconceptuali-
zation are frustrated even while they are stimulated by its methodology. 
There are those who attend curriculum symposia that can excite the !mag-
!nation, thus opening new possibilities for students and teachers to 
grow beyond the opportunities provided by the traditional models. Con-
sciousness and transcendence as "content" for the type of curriculum 
theorizing is an enchanting prospect, but 
While it is very exciting to speculate about the possibilities of 
developing higher consciousness through curriculum, the teachers and 
curriculum specialists in the small group kept returning to the 
practical. In a word, back home awaited pupils to teach and teachers 
to prepare, and the higher speculations contained in the conference 
papers neglected such everyday realities.27 
Such skepticism is helpful. It alerts us to the unfinished bus!-
ness "back home"; and this type of theorizing does not suggest prepack-
aged learning units. But in such uncertainty there is a direct benefit. 
We have a need to master a whole new vocabulary of personal meanings. 
We come aware of how little we yet know about ourselves in the process 
of studying and teaching. If classrooms, however, will continue to be 
only arenas for implementing technically mechanically designed systems, 
this bit of autobiographic awareness is not germane beyond creating an 
innocuously nice atmosphere. But if we are engaged in study with our 
26
william Pinar, telephone communication to Paul R. Feinberg, 
March 10, 1981. 
27 Robert L. Osborn, "An All-American Small Group in Search of an 
Electric Kool-Aid Acid Theory of Curriculum, or a High Is Not For Home," 
in Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory, 
ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1974~pp. 134-35. 
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students, rather than teaching subjects to them, such psychological and 
philosophical inquiry is crucial. 
CHAPTER VII 
MARTIN BUBER: RESTORING WHOLENESS THROUGH DIALOGUE 
Introduction: Life ~ Lived in Meeting 
Buber was concerned with the problem of maintaining authentic 
relationships. The resolution of the problem was not a matter of philo-
sophie speculation; rather it was to be found in a demonstration of per-
sonal responsibility. The authentic creature, Buber claimed, is able to 
make a response through total attentiveness to another person. He spoke 
of being present before, or turning towards, another creature. 
There are obstacles that hinder expressions of response-ability, 
or turning towards another. The difficulty must be understood in the 
context of the proliferation of all types of empirical and logical 
studies of man. The scientific inquiry process is based upon a subject/ 
object distinction. One may, in fact, analyze a person, a place, a 
thing, or a process in terms of many constituent parts. While such an 
investigation may bring concrete, quantifiable results, it masks a more 
fundamental concern--that which Buber calls the wholeness of man. He 
implicitly means grasping 
man's special place in the cosmos, his connection with 
destiny, his relation to the world of things, his understanding of 
his fellow man, his existence as a being that knows it must die, his 
attitude in all the ordinary and extraordinary encounters with the 
mystery with which his life is shot through, and so on--not one of 
the problems is seriously touched on.l 
1 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, 
Afterword trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 120. 
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The philosophical disciplines are of little help, too, in solving 
this problem. Buber argues that the disciplines are weak to the task 
from two points of view: they may consider man as only "another part" of 
the universe and neglect his whole nature related to all other life; on 
the other hand, through its unique focus a particular discipline may 
neglect the necessary interconnectedness of all ways of knowing from 
other fields of study. In the process of coming at either of these two 
alternative outcomes, the difficulty of authentic interhuman relation-
ship becomes crystalized. Buber states, "• •• for in every one of 
those disciplines the possibility of its achieving anything in though 
rests precisely on its objectification, on what may be termed its 
"dehumanization."2 
Buber is here arguing against the way the disciplines and empiri-
cal science have seeminly preempted all other ways of knowing. For 
Buber, life is lived in and through authentic relationship, and not 
intellectual forms alone. But the basis for choosing such a life today 
rests on too narrow a foundation. He urges persons to work towards a 
new integration of vital cognitive and affective powers within the realm 
of the spirit. While the mind is critical in helping to render the 
physical environment meaningful and habitable, it is by no means self-
sufficient. For Buber, the intellect does not provide a significant 
explanation for the problem of man. He assigns this integrating role to 
the spirit. "Spirit, then, is not just one human faculty among others. 
It is man's totality that has become consciousness, the totality which 
2 Ibid., P• 122. 
129 
comprises and integrates all his capacities, powers, generalities, and 
.. 3 
urges. 
One who is wholly self-conscious in this way is actually capable 
of turning towards another creature in a non-manipulative fashion. 
Through the act of dialogue a person speaks the word Thou. 
It must be emphasized that the search for the unifying dimensions 
of reality can only take place in the presence of others. A narcis-
sistic retreat into one's deepest thoughts or escape into the larger 
collective of groups does not address the real problem. Moreover, meta-
physics, though aiding the process of analysis, still leaves one with an 
abstract truth. If the wholeness of human beings is at stake, communi-
cation must reflect this concern. Buber cites a personal event that 
influenced the rest of his life. He calls this "a conversion." 
I had a visit from an unknown young man, without being there in 
spirit •••• I conversed attentively and openly with him--only I 
omitted to guess the questions which he did not put. Later, not long 
after, I learned from one o~ his friends--he himself was no longer 
alive--the essential content of these questions; • • • What do we 
expect when we are in despair and yet go to a man? Surely a presence 
by means of which we are told that nevertheless there is meaning.4 
Buber is extremely candid in this self-realization about the need 
to make~ decision~ be more intensely with others. Again, to empha-
size, it is inner knowledge mediated by an urge to know about the world 
including its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Buber starts 
with no logical theorems or empirically verifiable formulae. Knowledge 
is found in the "meeting" of persons, that is, being together. As he 
3 Martin Buber, Israel and the World (New York: Schocken, 1963), 
P• 175. 
4 Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 13-14. 
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says, "all actual life is encounter."5 There are no preformed responses 
from authorities or written works to tell us how to derive the necessary 
knowledge to prepare for future relationships. People sometimes came to 
Buber to ask him for an explanation of his approach. He offers some 
evidence, however, of a very personal sort. 
Instead, he turns the question back and asks his interlocuter to 
search his own life to see whether he can recall any experience in 
which a facet of nature arrested and engrossed him by the power of 
its uniqueness. Then and only then can Buber and his questioner 
talk, and necessarily in philosophical terms of what transpired and 
of its significance for human existence.6 
The World ~Large: Two Possibilities 
One lives in a state of flux according to two basic orientations. 
Buber describes these as dispositions or attitudes, defining the two-
7 fold possibility of an act of relationship. I-Thou is that condition 
when one partner addresses another with a desire for mutuality, when 
the focus is not on the particulars or the details in the other's make-
up, but rather on his or her wholeness. The other basic expression, 
I-It, is never articulated with this sense of wholeness, but rather is a 
form of communication that grows out of an inclination to use, to expe-
rience, or to manipulate another individual. This expression is the 
antithesis of that which is whole. I-It is the address of a subject to 
an object, as a thing. Buber suggests that in the choice of attitudes 
5 Martin Buber, I and Thou, with a Prologue and Notes by Walter 
Kaufman, trans. Walter-Kaufman (New York: Scribner's, 1970), p. 62. 
6 Malcolm Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 4. 
7 Buber, .!. and Thou, P• 53. 
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we distinguish our basic temperament, the spirit of our being. He says, 
"Whoever speaks one of the basic words enters into the word and stands 
in it ... a 
One's relation to the world is not limited to the sphere of human 
interchange. There are in fact three spheres: life is lived with 
9 
nature, with people, and with spiritual beings. Within each of these 
areas, Buber suggests one can speak what he calls the primary word, Thou 
or It. As an example, he cites how a tree comes into his focus as an 
object, with all of its particulars; yet simultaneously, by "will and 
grace ••• I am drawn into a relation and the tree ceases to be an It. 
The power of exclusiveness has seized me."10 
The power of exclusiveness allows one to set off all extraneous 
details of the object, to elevate that which was an It to a Thou. He 
speaks of this as a basic movement of turning, of being unconditionally 
present and attentive. Through another recollection he verifies what 
can be actual, real, immediate, in the life of a human being vis-a-vis 
an animal. On his grandparents' estate young Buber encountered an old 
grey horse, in a stirring moment of realization. "If I am to explain it 
now, beginning from the still very fresh memory of my hand, I must say 
that what I experienced in touch with the animal was the Other, the 
8 Ibid., P• 54. 
9 Ibid., P• 57. 
10Ibid., P• 58. 
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immense otherness of the Other, which, however did not remain strange 
like the otherness of the ox and ram • •• 11 
Common sense, however, dictates that a horse, a tree, and a per-
son are not the same in regard to an act of meeting. Buber is not 
oblivious to the problem of the gradations of mutuality that inhere in 
the various relationship within the three spheres of life, noted 
12 
above. But he insists, in regard to the encounter with the tree, that 
there is a profound experience of joining together. 
The living wholeness and unity of a tree that denies itself to the 
eye, no matter how keen, of anyone who merely investigates, while it 
is manifest to those who say You, is present when they are present 
• • • • Our habits of thought make it difficult for us to see that 
in such cases something is awakened by our attitude and flashes 
toward us from that which has being.13 
Buber is present before the tree; he is present before his horse, 
and certainly he attempts to be present in the immediate realm of 
relationship with another human being. But he suggests that from the 
gradations of mutuality one does not infer there is a scale of better to 
goodness. He says, "To this end, rather, our whole knowledge about the 
world must cooperate, a knowledge that is ever again renewed through the 
I-Thou relation, but is not born by it."14 
Buber would argue that life with nature, humans, or spiritual 
beings is not a matter of either/or, Thou or It. While rational thought 
11 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 23. 
12
see Philosophical Interrogations (response to Malcolm Diamond), 
Sidney and Beatrice Rome, eds. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1964), p. 37. Interrogation by Maurice s. Friedman. 
13 Buber, "Afterword,"..!. and Thou, P• 173. 
14 Philosophical Interrogations, P• 37. 
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tries to categorize and analyze, he argues against dichotomizing. There 
is continual tension, as we have seen from Buber's idea of wholeness of 
life. Life is filled with necessary moments where an I-It attitude is 
more likely to prevail and other possibilities where wholeness, spoken 
through I-Thou, will emerge. The relational event--being present--
reflects a possibility for more of the same--though it can never be 
planned--or its antithesis when consciousness and objectification takes 
over. One moves back and forth between the apparent satisfaction and 
security of the It world and what he calls "pure present." He advises 
us, "And in all seriousness of truth listen: Without It a human being 
cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human." 15 
What is crucial to see is that the two attitudes are not unique 
to certain persons or situations. In other words, there are not two 
types of individuals but two poles within each of us. I-Thou and I-It 
are not exhaustive alternatives. 
I by no means hold human ''inner life" in general, and within it human 
thinking in particular, to be exclusively composed of occurrences of 
the one and the other kinds •••• In the one moment he is over 
against another as such, sees him present and relates to him thus. 
In the other moment he sees everything collected round him and from 
time to time singles out, observes, explores, applies, uses. Both 
these moments are included in the dynamic of lived life.16 
Buber argues that one accept the reality of this dialectic--the 
movement back and forth of Thou and It--as the only way of surviving in 
the world. While organizations may only know the person as a specimen 
15 Buber, .!. ~ Thou, P• 85. 
16Martin Buber, "Reply to My Critics," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, eds. Paul Arthur Schlipp and Maurice Friedman (LaSalle, 
Ill.: Open Court, 1967), p. 691. 
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or cog, and our feelings may be directed erotically onto an object of 
desire, there is the equally strong capacity to step out of what seems 
to be an "unlimited sway of causality." The institutions do not breed 
evil, any more than matters of the flesh are evil compared with the 
soul. Evil, says Buber, inheres in the absence of recognizing that 
there is a difference in the two states of being, and consequently not 
trying to alter the balance through actualizing one's living potential 
for I-Thou attitude. The process requires a choice within the realm of 
interpersonal connections or the larger community, "and if there were a 
devil he would not be the one who decided against God but he that in all 
eternity did not decide ... 17 
Dialogue: Limitations and Possibilities 
Buber, does not provide a blueprint for decision-making. He 
allows a general basis for choice: alternatives are drawn from one's own 
sensing of the attitudes demonstrated in the everyday act of living. 
Dialogue encompasses the possibility that human beings act in a 
reciprocal manner with one another and the rest of nature. The major 
obstacle is one's inability to distinguish true being from appearance, 
essence from form. But an awareness of the obstacles brings about the 
bright flash of realization of what can occur, the awareness that there 
is a difference between the "is" and the "ought." Maurice Friedman, 
Buber's biographer and synthesizer, addresses the issue as a dialectic 
of essence versus image. 
17 Buber, .!.. and Thou, P• 101. 
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The essence man looks at the other as one to whom he gives himself. 
His glance is spontaneous and unaffected. He is not influenced by 
the desire to make himself understood, but he has no thought for the 
conception of himself that he might awaken in the beholder. The 
image man, in contrast, is primarily concerned with what the other 
thinks of him. There is, in addition, a third realm of "genuine 
appearance" in which a young person imitates a heroic model •••• 18 
Buber observes gradations in the way one lives and relates within 
the world; and he makes certain judgments as to what is more or less 
authentic. Nevertheless, the person himself is the final arbiter of 
insights and prodding to act differently. Buber watches others care-
fully, which may be ultimately the clearest way of knowing oneself. He 
tells us that there are those who go through life observing, looking on, 
19 
or becoming aware. He refers here to those people who analyze others 
for details but miss character, those who let an object freely "happen 
to [them]," as in the perception of an art object, and finally those who 
elicit our response, who neither objectify nor desire objectification. 
One might say we engage in degrees of relating to another, ranging from 
mere detailing and record keeping to direct address. 
The limitations of daily life hamper the realization of the last 
possibility. Buber refers to these limitations at one point as the cri-
ses of the modern world. He remarks how the human soul is paralyzed 
from the deceptive tactics people engage in to mask debilitating, alien-
ating lonesomeness. Bustling activity does not hide a fundamental emp-
tiness, a realization that the most vaulted expectations for human 
improvement are not realizable under the present circumstances. In the 
18 Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955):-pp:-85-86. 
19 Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 8-10. 
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realms of technology, economy, and politics, one can detect the failure 
20 
of the human soul. Machines no longer serve man but have appended man 
to them; the means of production and equitable distribution of resources 
are not based on cooperation but manipulation; the desire to influence 
others has meant self-aggrandizement of the powerful at the expense of 
all others. 
Buber's social commentary grows out of a perception of the two 
great illnesses of our time: the urge for unmitigated individualism and 
the drive toward collectivism. Both conditions abstract, depersonalize, 
and contribute to the alienation of each creature--from his essential 
self and from others towards whom he ought to be present. ''The individ-
ual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation 
with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far 
as it is built up of living units of relation. The fundamental fact of 
human existence is man with man." 21 
The more one goes toward the extreme of either individualism or 
collectivity, the less possibility there is for essential person-hood. 
One can be alone, living in solitude either as a hermit or as part of 
the larger social network of family, business, school. Kierkegaard 
embraces this solitude, renouncing the world of men and women, as the 
only way of resisting evil and meeting God. Buber inveighs against such 
a view, arguing that only in "meeting" others can one counter loneli-
ness, can one find "himself" or "herself"--his or her essential self, 
20Ibid., p. 158. 
21Ibid., P• 203. 
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not mere appearance. The Single One, for Buber, lives with an auto-
biographical awareness that includes the possibility of relational 
events with other creatures. Always implicit is the infinite possibil-
ity to transform It into Thou. There is a spiritual presence, God, in 
the midst of individuals who encounter one another. While Kierkegaard, 
in his zeal for God, admits the cessation of common ties with other men 
and women, Buber argues otherwise: 
The Single One is the man for whom the reality of relation with God 
as an exclusive relation includes and encompasses the possibility of 
relation with all otherness, and for whom the whole body politic, the 
reservoir of otherness, offers just enough otherness for him to pass 
his life with it.22 
Beginning ~ Dialogue 
Buber accepts the ordinary world, recognizing its limitations as 
a reservoir for I-It, but proclaims the opportunity for I-Thou. This 
attitude of I-Thou, however, becomes lost as the person becomes more and 
more aware of and even attuned to self-isolation. Retreating from 
unqualified perceptions of others into the realms of indirect formal 
address, one increases "distance." The conceptualization of this phe-
nomenon, "distance" and "relation," helps describe the interplay between 
the two-fold way of knowing the world, I-It and I-Thou. 
Buber admits that we periodically turn away from moments of "pure 
present" in the world, from the sparks of realization that emanate from 
"meeting" in order to comprehend the world--its parts or the sum of its 
parts. The setting of the world at a distance, however, expresses a 
critical antecedent to the act of relating. One steps back and 
22Ibid., p. 65. 
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appreciates that other creatures exist independently round about him. 
One grasps the world in its particularity. The act of distancing in a 
sense is a neutral move, for it can become a condition for either !-Thou 
or l-It. As he says, the first movement (distancing) relies on percep-
tions of mutually existent creatures in an even and fundamental way. 
But the second movement [relating] puts them into mutual relation 
with me which happens from time to time and by no means in an even 
way. • •• Here and now for the first time does the other become a 
self for me, and the making independent of his being which was 
carried out in the first movement of distancing is shown in a new 
highly pregnant sense as a presupposition--a presupposition of the 
'becoming a self for me', ••• 23 
The l-It is a primal word that cannot be avoided. But within it 
are two degrees of objectifying: one causes us to perceive others as 
objects, the other leads us to manipulate and exploit them. 
Objective perceptions of others take place in the social realm. 
Yet the mere fact of being within a group, even one joined out of a 
sense of sympathetic solidarity, does not assure an existential, per-
sonal relationship will be forthcoming. For example, Buber was once 
part of a group demonstration. Though joined in common cause, he had 
only a superficial relationship with the people on his right and left. 
Suddenly his eyes met those of a man sitting at a distance, observing 
the event. In that spontaneous moment of meeting, he derived a greater 
effect of wholeness and oneness than was provided by his group marching 
24 in solidarity. 
23Martin Buber, "Distance and Relation," trans. Ronald Gregor 
Smith, in Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, ed. with Introduction by 
Maurice Friedman, trans. Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1965), P• 71. 
24Ibid., P• 74. 
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For Buber the fundamental act of human living is the realm of the 
25 between, of the interhuman, which focuses upon the duality of "being" 
26 
and "seeming, •• the latter referring to a feeling of being. Somehow it 
is in this sphere of the between that the real significance of dialogue 
is noted. And in a larger sense, the reconciliation of these polarities 
contribute to an interpretation of the problem of man, the essential 
dilemma to which Buber's philosophic anthropology addresses itself. 
There is little doubt for Buber that neither the quality of 
beingness or seemingness, spontaneity, openness, and the desire to be 
present before another--is exclusively essential to one type of person. 
We can only speak in terms of which one predominates in each individual. 
Each person has the capacity, the tendency, to base a relationship with 
another on appearances or images rather than to live through a deep and 
authentic wholeness. There is no content involved, no product that can 
be analyzed to determine some measure of success in the battle to be 
whole and to meet another as a whole being. Conversation--which is not 
mere talk or what he calls speechifying--is one way to establish a meet-
27 ing with the other person. 
The decision is not how to make the world but rather how to be 
with others in it. Ideally, the educator exemplifies the importance of 
being with another. One is less present before another when there is 
more concern about imposing oneself or one's values or in merely 
25s B b B M d M 203 ee u er, etween __!!!!. ~ __!!!!., p. • 
26 Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 76. 
27Ihid., P• 78. 
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conveying information than when one is intent upon helping another to 
" f ld "28 un o • He believes thoroughly that within each person is the 
potentiality of articulating this dimension of the primal word, I-Thou. 
In a conversation with Buber, Carl Rogers told of his own notion 
of acceptance. Buber replied, 
Confirming means first of all, accepting the whole potentiality of 
the other and making even a decisive difference in his potentiality, 
and of course we can be mistaken again and again in this, but it's 
just a chance between human beings. I can recognize in him, know in 
him, more or less, the person he has been •••• created to become • 
• • • I confirm him, in myself, and then in him, in relation to this 
potentiality that is meant by him, and it can now be developed, it 
can evolve, it can answer the reality of life.29 
Rogers said he agreed with this view. 
Buber's example of husband and wife suggests a similar openness 
that somehow links a past and future in the moment of presentness. 
Moreover, the act of gaining confirmation conveys a tremendous source of 
confidence that one can work towards personal redemption, namely, 
wholeness. 
Ultimately, according to Buber, the occasion for establishing a 
relationship with another person presupposes the possibility of having 
an I-Thou relationship with God. The relationship with God does not 
require one to deny the world of sense and matter. Of course, one 
detaches from "experiencing and utilizing" things and turns inward as a 
step towards purification. But such a movement cannot be carried out at 
the expense of human relationship. It is egotistical to retreat into 
28Ibid., P• 84. 
29Martin Buber, "Dialogue Between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers," 
moderated by Maurice Friedman, in Buber, The Knowledge~ Man, P• 182. 
the "enjoyment of the configuration of one's own soul--that is the 
30 
spirit's lapse into mere spirituality." And mere spirituality does 
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not speak to the wholeness that is central in his approach. Reason is 
also involved. Reason is not incidental, but occupies an important 
realm in man's relationship with others, too. 
BUBER: ON EDUCATION 
Buber rebelled against education-by-indoctrination, forced-
feeding of clever maxims. Buber's on-going dialogue with Hassidism 
helped to chart his way. Here is one of the tales: 
Rabbi Moshe Hayyim Efraim, the Baal Shem's grandson told: "I heard 
this from my grandfather: Once a fiddler played so sweetly that all 
who heard him began to dance, and whoever came near enough to hear 
joined in the dance. Then a deaf man who knew nothing of music hap-
pened along, and to him all he saw seemed the action of madmen--
senseless and in bad taste."31 
Unfortunately, in the current vernacular we hear much of role-
models. But role seems by definition to convey outward behavior which 
is to be emulated. With his story, Buber is expressing his own frustra-
tion with those who can only perceive outward manifestation of certain 
actions. There is more to action than behavior. Trust, confidence, 
affection--relationship may grow through perceived gestures and move-
ments. Or, in other words, one searches for receptivity to wholeness, 
both within oneself and locating it in another. 
Education, Buber posited, must be viewed as only another mani-
festation of the basic relation of man to man. The primary human 
30 Buber, .!. and Thou, P• 152. 
31Martin Buber, Tales of the Hassidim: The Early Masters, trans. 
Olga Marx (New York: Schocken:-1947), P• 53. 
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arrangement, however, is based on power; might coerces right. There are 
severe forms of exploitation: economic, social, and political. But 
Buber has hopes that by speaking the primary word, I-Thou, a new ethos 
and a new commitment will arise to challenge the old relationships. He 
suggests an approach by saying, 
not your It, your Thou is what is essential, though not survey-
able. It is infinite in its possibilities, which nonetheless remain 
peculiar to it, possibilities given to you not for utilization but 
for opening up and redemption, all of them to each of you. • • • 
Education arises, no longer subservient to the political relation, 
willing to melt down and to transform the political human realm, 
decisive without haste, ready to serve without fanaticism, prepared 
to wait and yet beginning • • 32 
Here is Buber's authentic commitment to the possibility of 
change. It is a steadfast hope, expressed through the Hebrew word, 
Emunah--faith. Education will accomplish this task to the extent a per-
son chooses to turn towards, rather than manipulate or experience, 
another. 
Some Underlying Ideals · 
Two major Jewish ideals are manifest in Buber's educational dis-
33 
course: Hassidut and Halutziut. Translated, the former means a reli-
gious way of living that does not separate the pieces of matter from the 
moments of spirit. It points to that kind of person who is aware of the 
gap between distancing and relating, and manifests a sense of a 
32 Martin Buber, A Believing Humanism, with an Introduction and 
explanatory notes by Maurice Friedman, planned and ed. Ruth Nanda 
Anshen, trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 
P• 100. 
33
see Ernst Simon, "Martin Buber the Educator," in The Philosophy 
of Martin Buber, eds. Paul Arthur Schlipp and Maurice Friedman (LaSalle, 
Ill.: Open Court, 1967), pp. 544-48. 
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"notyetness." The Halutz is the pioneer, the farmer in Israel, who has 
reclaimed the land, in whose absence the home-less Jewish people would 
still be without a center. Nevertheless, "National ideology, the spirit 
of nationalism, is fruitful just so long as it does not make the nation 
an end in itself •••• [When the nation does become an end in itself,] 
it annuls its own right to live, it grows sterile."34 
The Hassid touches the world-as-it-is and reaches beyond his 
grasp. The Halutz, similarly, in an earthy fashion accepts the material 
and focuses on its transformation. From the example of the Hassid and 
the Halutz, one learns how to live in the world comprised of neither 
pure "meeting" nor pure "distance." But it is the Hassid who teaches 
the difference between the two aspects of life. 
Admittedly, the ideal of the Hassid--which Buber feels has dissi-
pated because of the decline of authentic orthodoxy--and the Halutz, 
starts with the world of here-and-now. It is the bubbling, pulsating, 
limiting life known to finite creatures. It is material existence that 
allows for actualization of man's potential to grow into a more moral 
creature. Speaking the primary word I-Thou marks a beginning. Though 
Buber talks as if these are separate individual types, one could imagine 
that Hassid and Halutz represent varying dynamic aspects within each 
person's character. 
Buber informally synthesizes the Hassid and the Halutz. The 
Halutz realizes and follows the teachings of the Hassid. The words of 
the Hassid are translated daily into everyday actions--human renewal in 
34 Martin Buber, Israel and the World (New York: Schocken, 1963), 
p. 221. 
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work, with family and leisure--that have a new spiritual dimension. 
Buber argues that neither the land alone for the Halutz nor pure spiri-
tuality for the Hassid is sufficient. Yet, neither is denied an impor-
tant part in creating a religious existence. Similarly, Buber would not 
deny the importance of the concrete aspects of education--texts, build-
ings, materials, organizational procedures. Nevertheless, he returns to 
the emphasis on speaking the primary word of relationship, 1-Thou. 
And who will take the lead in this task of speaking primary 
35 
words? Buber is unclear. Will it be a leadership by an elite? All 
can aspire to become a "great character"; none are prevented from the 
possibility of becoming one, but not everyone will reach this status. 
The exceptional "great character," bears an inner unity, as a model and 
guide, and not as a repository of maxims. 
That is, not only what the great character does, and how he does it, 
but what approaches him, what occurs to him, that to which he reacts, 
has an inner unity • • • the unity of destiny cannot be exactly 
demonstrated; it is a metaphysical postulate, or better still, a 
religious hope.36 
This is meaningful as long as we accept Buber's approach as an 
ideal to be realized by some, not all. Nevertheless, though not all 
will be perceived as "great characters,'' the effort needs to be made by 
all. Inspiring younger generations with a vision that brings finite 
material and infinite spiritual universes together is the charge laid 
upon this generation of educators. 
This generation must be taught to despise the inflexible self-
assurance which says: "I am well prepared. Nothing can change me 
35 Simon, "Martin Buber the Educator," pp. 550-51. 
36Ibid., p. 550. 
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fundamentally and transform the world before my eyes. • • • This 
generation must be made receptive for the Unforeseen which upsets all 
logical arrangements.37 
In short, the young must be taught by their teachers to be wiser, more 
humane, more receptive to, and able to cope with, change than those who 
teach them. 
The Teacher 
The teacher is a model, a "madreech," or a guide along the way. 
The teacher engenders confidence and self-confidence by the way he or 
she is "present." All other characteristics flow from these designa-
tions. The teacher draws out the student's capabilities. He or she 
attempts to "lift" persons up through education, and not to compel them 
to react from propaganda. Buber, himself, was a masterful teacher, 
keenly concerned in deed, not simply a pronounced creed. Hodes' testi-
many is significant: "He looked for faces that were struggling for form 
and shape. Then he helped them achieve identity. And those whom he 
taught in this way, through the power of his person, not by preaching 
but through answering concrete questions, became his pupils during his 
life and after his life."38 
The teacher nurtures and responds to two major instincts: the 
ego's desire to originate and the self's need for communion within a 
larger whole. The teacher is alert to the related tendencies toward 
spontaneity and constraint. The instructor is not a disinterested party 
37 Buber, Israel and the World, p. 163. 
38 Aubrey Hodes, Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait (New York: 
Viking, 1971), PP• 128-29. 
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to the educational enterprise. Hence, he senses the pupils' frustration 
with complete independence or freedom to experience whatever they want 
and with compulsion that is the demand to fulfill only another person's 
expectation. 
The teacher can act this way because he knows what it is to expe-
rience "the other side" by virtue of having been in any given situation 
the student now faces. The teacher appreciates the fact that the stu-
dent can gain confidence in the pedagogue, trust and esteem him greatly; 
there is, however, no way for the pupil to be present in the experiences 
of the teacher. 
The writer recalls a story from an anonymous source: A devoted 
student sought further wisdom beyond what his saintly teacher could pro-
vide. The latter sent him to a distant village to study for six months 
with a revered sage. Upon returning the young student was inundated by 
his peers with inquiries about the newly gained wisdom. What meaning 
lay behind these holy words; what significance was there to the sacred 
symbols of faith? No response was forthcoming. Finally one cynic from 
the rear of the room called out, "So what did you learn?" "I learned," 
said the lad, "how the tzadik [righteous one] ties his shoes." Buber 
would say that it is always in being oriented "towards" another that any 
values are taught. Buber "• •• perceives the personality as a harmony 
of voices which together form the totality of being human. One of the 
leading voices in this harmony is the faculty of creativity and origina-
tion. The basic need is to do, not to have ... 39 
39Ruth Goodman, ''Dialogue and Hassidism: Elements in Buber' s 
Philosophy of Education," Religious Education 73:1 (January-February 
1978): 75. 
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And so it is with being in the presence of a great one or teacher 
who facilitates and engenders one's inclination "to be." The ordinary 
is suffused with the transcendent. In ordinary parlance we would say, 
"It's just good being around him or her." Moreover, communication is 
evaluated as much by what is not said as by what is said • 
• • • the master remains the model for the teacher. For if the edu-
cator of our day has to act consciously, he must nevertheless do it 
'as though he did not.' That raising of the finger, that questioning 
glance, are his genuine doing. Through him the selection of the 
effective world reaches the pupil. He fails the recipient when he 
presents this selection to him with a gesture of interference. • • • 
Interference divides this soul in his care into an obedient part and 
rebellious part. But a hidden influence proceeding from his 
integrity has an integrating force.40 
Buber does not give us a blueprint, explicating his prescription: 
that when one acts consciously, one does so~ though he did not. He 
tells us that the educator awakens the pain of loneliness and separate-
ness. But that, too, is a real part of life. One who cannot address 
pain as well as pleasure is as inauthentic as one who fails to realize 
that the primary attitude towards another may include both I-Thou and 
l-It. Awareness of both aspects constitutes part of the process of 
becoming genuine. It takes courage to face the reality that also 
includes the possibility of being present. The teacher faces a real 
challenge. Buber says, "But, you say, he [your student] lacks the 
courage. How does one educate for courage? Through nourishing trust. 
How does one nourish trust? Through one's own trustworthiness." 41 
40 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 90. 
41 Philosophical Interrogations, p. 63. 
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The teacher has another task which is to appreciate two major 
instincts in the person before him. There is the instinct of origina-
tion, that which prompts a person to shape and control material; it 
grows in solitude, in the absence of mutuality. Contrary to or comple-
mentary with origination is the instinct for communion. This affilia-
tive yearning longs "for the world to become present to us as a person 
which chooses and recognizes us as we do it, which is confirmed in 
us as we in it."42 Buber speaks of the confidence one derives from the 
realizations of this instinct. It is a quiet confirmation that persons 
can be with one another without the inclination to "use" or "enjoy" 
another individual through exploitation. 
Both instincts--origination and communion--represent a creative 
force, a spontaneity that is characteristic of life. Buber sees it 
moving one outward and inward, simultaneously. The instincts are in 
continual tension. 
The student carries on his knowledge inquiry in a state of free-
dom throughout the day to day activities that might include field trips, 
independent research, and examinations. But freedom is not the essen-
tial element in Buber's approach. Buber views the student as a chrysa-
lis ready for transformation. But he makes clear that this urge for 
independence--the instinct for origination--provides 
••• a footbridge, not a dwelling place. • • • Freedom in education 
is the possibility of communion; it cannot be dispensed with and it 
cannot be made use of in itself; without it nothing succeeds, but 
42 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 88. 
neither does anything succeed by means of it: it is the run before 
the jump, the tuning of the violin •••• 43 
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The teacher continually reevaluates how to act toward the student 
who demonstrates the urge for origination and the inclination towards 
communism. There are no formulae. It is not simply a matter of being 
in charge. One critic has said, "For he [Buber] places educational 
authority on a ground which is not merely consistent with freedom but 
also the necessary condition. • • • Moreover, he appears to find the 
secret in a peculiar and paradoxical blend of self-suppression and self-
44 
assertion in the teacher." This is to say, Buber feels that the truly 
wise teacher, assuming authority based on knowledge and experience in 
the classroom, can best understand the student's personal needs. The 
teacher experiences these needs and "pulls back," allowing the pupil to 
realize his own potential. The teacher provides opportunities but can-
not guarantee outcomes. 
The educator today must engage in a similar risk and give up some 
authority and desire to control the student. Buber warns that control 
can occur in disguised ways. It may come about with a showering of af-
fection on a student but only as a way of "making him or her over" as if 
he or she were an object. The student still is perceived as simply a 
ward of the teacher, who [the teacher] only images an openness, a desire 
for unity, an unqualified show of affection. The educator must neither 
coerce by power nor constrain by showering an overabundance of 
43Ibid., p. 91. 
44 Friedman, Buber: Life of Dialogue, p. 129, quoting Sir Fred 
Clarke, Freedom in the Educative-society: Educational Issues of Today, 
ed. W. R. Niblett:(London: University of London Press, 1946),-p. 67f. 
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affection. He or she guides, evokes, elicits, uncovers, with one goal 
in mind: that his or her presence--turning towards the other--will 
enable a similar attitude in the student. The point is to be able to 
see "the subjective justification of the opposite point of view."45 The 
realization of this condition points towards a not-yet-full mutuality: 
There is an elemental experience which shatters at least the assur-
ance of the erotic as well as the cratetic [sic] man, but sometimes 
does more, forcing its way at white-heat into the heart of the 
instinct and remoulding it. A reversal of the single instinct takes 
place, which does not eliminate it but reverses its system of 
direction. • • • I call it experiencing the other side.46 
But there is a qualification. Inclusion is not, ironically, 
all-inclusive. In an educational milieu, the teacher~ go all the way 
with an ascetic, unerotic, holistic disposition to new knowledge and its 
critique. But not the student. Turning again to Buber, we see, "The 
educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil only at 
one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across 
and experience from over there, the educative relation would be burst 
47 
asunder, or change into friendship." 
There is nothing wrong with friendship! Buber only makes the 
point that reciprocity, at least, is not always possible. Buber states 
that the student is incapable of fully gaining access into the world of 
the teacher. The other side is still beyond. 
45
zvi Kurzweil, "Buber on Education," Judaism 11:1 (Winter 
1962): 53. 
46 Buber, Between Man and ~, p. 96. 
47
rbid., PP• 100-101. 
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Of course, the teacher does all that is possible to evoke and 
engender communion, a relationship that refines the primal urge of 
origination. But the goal of an !-Thou is not presumed. It is not 
bilateral and would not occur. That is what he found to be real, and he 
stood by his actual experience. According to one critic, "He did not 
argue from theory to life. Rather he tried to derive plausible intel-
lectual structures for what life revealed when approached in 
"48 openness. 
In connection with the discussion of the teacher, one must con-
sider the education of character. The education of character is part of 
philosophical anthropology, the means of addressing the problem of man, 
or healing through wholeness, as Buber has already discussed this. Edu-
eating character has a universal importance. While the concrete sub-
jects of a curriculum are important, the character that emerges as a 
student commences, transcends all else. Character allows for future 
growth, redefinitions, synthesis. One scholar has observed: 
Thus, personality is a completion, a given. • • • The teacher may 
cultivate and enhance it, but the major energies in education must be 
directed at something more essential: at character education ••• 
character is task. It is a leap to what lies ahead. It is the link 
between a particular individual personality and the consequences of 
his actions and attitudes.49 
Buber contributes an illustration of character education. As a 
novice teacher approached his geography class, he was greeted by a bit 
of indifference, some rowdiness, and the anticipated weightiness of 
48Eugene Borowitz, "Education Is Not I-Thou," Religious Education 
66:5 (September-October 1971): 330. 
49 Joshua Weinstein, Buber and Humanistic Education (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1975), pp. 45-46. 
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ordinary subject matter. Following a simple question by the teacher, 
however, one student responded by telling a story. Buber was enthusi-
astic about the student's transformation. 
Quite unmistakably he had only in this moment made up his mind to 
talk about it. In the meantime his face has changed. It is no 
longer quite as chaotic as before. And the class has fallen silent. 
They all listen. The class, too, is no longer a chaos. 50omething has happened. The young teacher has started from above. 
Education of character presupposes a mutual confidence, ~ ne-
cessarily explicit agreement. This confidence emanates as relationship 
and grows out of the urge of origination. The desire for communion is 
revealed through the knowing expression of the teacher. The teacher, 
too, can learn from the student, although the former may be manifestly 
more learned. Buber allows this to pass also as a dialogical relation-
ship, though complete reciprocity may not exist. 
Subject Matter 
Buber was not a curriculum specialist. The classical explanation 
of curriculum as a "course run" would find no favorable response with 
him. He did, however, appreciate the need for structure, having taught 
and administered schools for youth and adults. Knowledge might be orga-
nized in some systematic fashion as "subjects," but the decisions as to 
what should be taught, were not as important as with whom and in which 
way knowledge was shared. Subject matter for him was a given, to which 
the teacher--infused with certain ideals and dreams--related indirectly. 
The teacher proceeds to teach students, not subject ''material," though 
it is obviously part of the process. 
50 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 113. 
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Buber does not reject skills, tradition, and ideals by any means, but 
he sees them as aspects of existence which can challenge man to 
develop, not just intellectually, but wholly and thus in terms of his 
uniqueness as man •••• [S]ubject matter for Buber is the concrete-
ness of life selectively made available by the teacher and which the 
student not only encounters but also uses as a medium through which 
he encounters or meets the teacher himself.51 
There is, however, a single instance in which Buber digresses 
from this general disposition toward content and sounds remarkably like 
a classical curricularist. In one publication Buber traces the scope 
52 
and sequence, at three levels, of a composition course. Here he envi-
sions communication that begins with storytelling, moves to note taking 
or record keeping, finally comes to a rendering of thought in lucid 
exact terms. It seems ironic for Buber to have presented a "system" in 
light of his adversion to systematic approaches. But, life is sometimes 
paradoxical! 
He advocated that more had to be done than skimming information 
from sources or memorizing formulae and theorems. The finest texts, the 
most colorful, ingeniously documented resources are not self-sufficient 
to the educational goal he envisioned. Herein lies an insight into 
another dimension of this complex problem of appropriate subject matter 
of education. As an example, let us examine the activity of reading and 
the interpretation of a text. 
51 Lionel Potter Etscovitz, Education as Dialogue: The Educa-
tional Significance of Martin Buber, (Ed.D. dissertation, Boston Univer-
sity, 1969), referring to Robert M. Hutchins, "Education and the 
Socratic Dialogue," in The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communica-
tion, eds. Floyde w. MatSOn and Ashley Montagu (New York:-Free Press, 
1967), PP• 320-21. 
52 Buber, "Style and Instruction," in Believing Humanism, 
PP• 103-5. 
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Since both interpreter and author are men, interpretation must 
include an understanding of the preinterpretation of the interpreter 
and the world view of the writer. Summing up, we may say that the 
dialogical principle applied to reading means that, in addition to 
all the objective philogical machinery, one must bring to the inter-
pretive task an understanding of man, including that of the specific 
You who wrote, together with a will to relate to the writer just as 
though he stood here before me.53 
We are speaking here of biography and self-reflection as a sig-
54 
nificant element. The curriculum, the content of the educational pro-
cess is incomplete--whatever its nature--unless the person, as teacher, 
allows his life history to be shared with his students. The teacher may 
be the master of the text and the subject area; the theorist may guide 
the instructor with a means/ends rationale that is technically adequate 
but allows for no possibility of relationship as Buber has discussed it. 
The teacher who adopts such a technological rationale for dealing with 
his students is perceived as anything but the great character • 
• • • they [the students] have seen the un-persons we have become by 
virtue of our learning. • Worse, how many a man who teaches 
about society, politics, human behavior or personal values has ruled 
out of bounds the questions that a troubled world surrounds us with. 
By contrast, whenever we encounter a man whose discipline, no matter 
how technical, has somehow become the medium of his self-expression, 
we are deeply moved.55 
Buber admits his fallibility, his limitations. His personal 
recollections enable us to see a man who has tried to make dialogue a 
living process. Although he may succeed or fail, his strength is shown 
by his attempts in full view. 
53 Dilling, "Martin Buber on Meaning," p. li4. 
54 See Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 124. 
55 Borowitz, "Education," P• 329. 
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• • • I have occasionally described my standpoint to my friends as 
the "narrow ridge." I wanted by this to express that I did not rest 
on the broad upland of a system that includes a series of sure state-
ments about the absolute, but on a narrow rocky ridge between the 
gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible knowledge but the 
certainty of meeting what remains undisclosed.56 
The narrow ridge is a metaphorical landmark, directly related to 
another geographical figure of speech: the line of demarcation. It is 
continually there, day in and day out, as we try to reconcile the para-
doxical situation before us: the primal urge of origination and commun-
ion, distancing and relation; the line of demarcation is the boundary 
between the limitlessness of the search and the limitations indigenous 
to the inquirer • 
• the emphasis is given to the situation in which a certain man 
is posited at a certain time and place, with predetermined, though 
not foreseeable possibilities and limitations of realization of cer-
tain values--commandments. This situation is sent by God and happens 
to man. He should accept it not passively, but actively, just by 
finding his "Line of Demarcation ... 57 
Somewhere between the certainties and uncertainties of living 
Buber trusts that we shall find a place to live, to teach, to know, 
through the desire for the shared dreams and the reciprocal actions. 
This is part of his life of dialogue. 
Perhaps the actions of two children on a playground best sum-
marize Buber's ideas. The two children were jostling and bouncing one 
another with sudden ups and downs on a see-saw. After a while, either 
from fatigue or boredom with this type of play they settled down to a 
less exuberant type of play. They geared themselves to try to stay on 
56 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 184. 
57
simon, "Martin Buber the Educator," P• 573. 
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the see-saw as long as possible by maintaining a symmetry of motion and 
balance. There was a true demonstration of purpose. In order to suc-
ceed at their revised game, each had to simultaneously anticipate the 
moves of the other and be ready for the unexpected--if their shared play 
were to continue. Certainly each was keenly aware of the other's physi-
cal capability. But beyond this, one noted a joining of wills, of 
spirit, of purpose. Even if these children were not conscious of this, 
it seemed part of the underlying meaning of the event. Two single, iso-
lated individuals lived the possibility of momentarily becoming one, 
even while remaining self-conscious creatures in their own right. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE MEANING OF CURRICULUM: A SYMPOSIUM 
(The Investigator; Moderator: Martin Buber, Hebrew University, Jerusa-
lem; Participants: James Macdonald, University of North Carolina, 
Greensboro; Dwayne Huebner, Teachers College, Columbia University; 
Maxine Greene, Teachers College, Columbia University; and William Pinar, 
University of Rochester, New York.) 
THE INVESTIGATOR: 
It is a pleasure to welcome you to this specially convened sym-
posium under the auspices of the Department of Curriculum and Instruc-
tion, the School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago. The theme 
is "The Meaning of Curriculum: Issues and Questions." The participants 
will be asked to address their attention to two major questions about 
curriculum: identifying the values that motivate our work and identify-
ing the nature of the student-teacher relationship. The discussion will 
proceed with a statement of the common concerns that have initially 
brought these scholars together. In the second part of the symposium 
the participants will refine the distinctions between them. In this 
regard they will be asked to argue their position in the context of 
varying approaches to a high school level course based on Hassidic 
literature. And now, without further ado, may I present Dr. Martin 
Buber. 
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MARTIN BUBER: 
Thank you all for agreeing to share your perspectives on the 
meaning of curriculum. In our academic work we are all conscious that 
scholarly inquiry can lead to abstraction and objectification. In the 
most human of all the disciplines--education--we have encountered an 
increasing tendency towards "facticity"; that education has largely come 
to mean the acquisition of large blocks of information that can be 
systematically quantified and analyzed. At this moment we are conscious 
of how this situation has a strong bearing on depersonalized human 
relationships within and outside of the school. People are so fre-
quently valued in terms of how much knowledge they can assimilate for 
rational application to problems; while technology has solved so many 
problems by utilizing the scientific method, other skills are necessary 
for building interpersonal relationships. In your own curricular work 
you have attempted to show how many educators, with their technological 
orientations, have ignored the personal, the non-material, and the 
spiritual realms of knowledge acquisition. It seems to me that one of 
the ongoing tasks of education, through~ of relationship, is to 
enable students to become aware of values, rationales, or intuitions 
that incline one towards certain behavior. 
J~~S MACDONALD: 
These motivations you allude to can be termed human interests, 
which can be thought of as well as moral categories. Curricular work 
may emerge, for example, out of an inclination to control thought and 
action, to produce consensus, modify, or wholly allow free choice. 
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WILLIAM PINAR: 
My own work in phenomenological analysis of personal life history 
clearly reveals the anguish of self-alienation as the sickness of our 
students and ourselves. We can nowhere even begin to heal the breaches 
in our relationships to one another until we grasp the sources of this 
personal depression: The current malaise in our schools grows from the 
belief that those in power manipulate those who do not hold power. 
DWAYNE HUEBNER: 
Dr. Buber, you have identified the I-It as one of the two major 
types of relationship or expressions between people. However subtle, it 
is an attitude that grows from one's perception of another human being 
as a "thing"; my own work in analyzing language has made me realize how 
little attention we give to aesthetic and ethical modes of valuing both 
in theory and application. Indeed, much curricular activity reflects a 
systems approach whereby goals and objectives and evaluation schemes are 
preplanned according to certain data about the needs of the society and 
the student. We may call this curricularizing education, but in reality 
it is training in the technological sense of input, output. Little 
attention is given to the realm of intuition; curriculum ought also to 
anticipate the fears of the one who must organize and assimilate all the 
new data. The student tends to be manipulated and managed and so later 
uses the same pattern to get ahead. I recently overheard students 
emerging from an art history examination ask one another, "How did you 
d ?" o. Doing, making, assembling, manipulation of facts--all for a grade. 
Perhaps we need to redefine the humanities. 
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MAXINE GREENE: 
The sorrow of all this, Dr. Huebner, is that we are really 
unconscious of how much of what we think of as education becomes in 
actuality nothing more than training. A major issue before us in this 
symposium and before teachers and students is how to grapple with the 
conflicting values that affect theoretical work. Are teachers ready to 
provide models of critically aware thinkers and feelers? Throughout 
much of our common endeavors we here have referred to the ideal educated 
student as the "wide-awake one" who knows how to make connections. The 
connections of which I speak link our personal experiences--life history 
is a more useful term of which Dr. Pinar is fond--to the content being 
studied. In general, a more intensive focus on one's "within" will help 
engender necessary curricular renewal strategies. 
For example, I teach in a very large institution. By definition 
the university is one all-encompassing entity, the parts of which are 
all supposed to be intricately related to the whole; but we know what 
happens in mass gatherings of any kind: The individual, that is, the 
separate persons within, is ignored. I am a part of the machinery of 
this mass institution with its process of evaluating and credentializ-
ing. But I am not ready to succumb to the implicit, often impersonaliz-
ing, bureaucratic demands of such a place. The controlling function of 
the university is at odds with the self-critical, liberating dimensions 
of literary study I advocate. Perhaps I am being too psychoanalytic, 
but I feel that each of us in the university harbors both inclinations. 
I hope the values of "mega-versity" will not dominate. 
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BUBER: 
From our respective backgrounds we have come to similar conclu-
sions about the abstract manipulatory nature of schooling today. The 
focus of much curriculum work, as you've observed, is concepts, facts, 
and historical analysis. Today, scientific research provides us with 
more primary data and critical sources than any previous generation. 
However, from the earliest grades youngsters are imbued with a primary 
love and need for information. Customs of quaint communities, the ideas 
of the famous or infamous historical persons, or the behavior of contem-
porary people are analyzed and reported on. The abstract nature of this 
learning process is revealed in the personal distancing, the detachment 
of the student from the object of inquiry. THere is another way of 
putting the matter: the objectifications of knowledge. Knowledge is 
valued on the basis of our ability to quantify, to separate into smaller 
parts, which is then used. The code is simple: the more knowledge, the 
more credentials, the more material benefits, the more personal profes-
sional status. There is a concomitant manipulation of one human being 
by another within this pathetic situation. Teachers are hard pressed to 
show results of their efforts while students are anxious to "get ahead"; 
all this means that the act of knowing anything about the past or pres-
ent--in the arts, humanities, or even the sciences--in little or no way 
tends to touch the personal world of the student. 
As a response Dr. Greene would have all curricularists become 
more conscious of the manipulatory aspects of such a system and then 
locate the inner resources we all have for a wide-awake moral critique 
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of the status quo. I think this emphasis is misplaced. Such an empha-
sis could undoubtedly be construed as a renewal of spirituality, as a 
way of nulling the grosser dimensions of materialism, objectifications, 
and thing-a-fication of life. No, the response to our malaise is found 
not in the highly personal private realm of consciousness but in what I 
have called the "inbetween," the relationship between persons. 
MACDONALD: 
You are suggesting a different locus of educational emphasis. 
The problem, as I see it, is that in the absence of clearly delineated 
self-knowledge, wide-awakeness as Dr. Greene has pointed to, the possi-
bility of entering non-manipulatory relationships will have little 
chance of becoming actual. But one of the critical dimensions of dialo-
gue, as I understand it, is having a primary understanding of oneself 
and of your neighbor. 
BUBER: 
I think we are becoming trapped by the same abstractions that we 
have criticized in others. We can best delineate our differences by 
suggesting a specific course of study. Since most of you have used 
literature as a major focus in your own attempts to reconceptualize the 
curriculum, I, too, shall use literature. The stories of the Hassidim 
are as good a place to start as any, though of course I would recognize 
the Bible as the greatest source book ever for stories. 
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PINAR: 
You have repeatedly stressed the role of the master, the rebbe. 
He provides the exemplary model for living. The actual experience of 
the rebbe becomes an archetype for certain types of leadership in the 
realm of intense interpersonal relationships. If I can say so, it seems 
like one models the rebbe in an effort to focus attention on one's own 
inner world. This can lead to uncovering those intuitions and actual 
recollections which are connected with earlier personal experiences 
inside and outside of school. The attempt to locate the genuine self 
may be nurtured by a continual bouncing back and forth between the reac-
tion to the folk literature at hand and a phenomenologic, psychoanalytic 
grasp of one's own life history. I have already argued against those 
who assert that this is a type of introspectionism that has no place in 
curriculum. The act of bringing elements of our history to the surface 
refines the act of self-understanding so necessary to the teacher who 
yearns for an authentic non-manipulative relationship with the student. 
G~E~: 
I agree that the Hassidic literature of which you are so fond, 
Dr. Buber, provides us with a certain framework for this personalist, 
impressionistic probing. One begins with the inspired teacher, who him-
self has broken with the fixed patterns of manipulatory interpersonal 
relationships in order to discover the spiritual sources for self-
purification; and this process of becoming aware leads to facilitating 
the improvement of others. This momentary break with the world appears 
to be similar to what others of us have phenomenologically called 
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bracketing out the taken-for-grantedness of life. Only then can one 
discover the true origins of perception about the world. These folk 
tales and legends are textual beacons guiding the teacher through the 
darkness of self-ignorance that may lead to unconscious explorations of 
others. The literature helps us to evolve a new curriculum perspective 
for avoiding enforcement or imposition of ideologies, codes of action. 
BUBER: 
I am afraid that this degree of self-probing--existentially, phe-
nomenoligically, almost psychoanalytically, conceived--has potentially 
very harmful consequences. Indeed, it is not to deny that in each per-
son there is a uniquely flowering soul, our ego, capable of freely 
reaching out to shape and recreate the world, but this certain identity 
or individuality, as others might say, is not recovered by peeling away 
the levels of this worldly experience as one peels away the layers of an 
onion. Hassidic literature shows that one's real needs, fears, hopes, 
are recovered in visible act of dialogue between persons inhabiting and 
relating to one another in the midst of the physical world. This is 
unlike certain mystics who claim that only after intense self-scrutiny 
can one begin to dialogue with the world. The Hassid argues that dialo-
gue with the world is the prerequisite for authentic self-knowing. One 
simple conversation can reveal a great deal about many hidden elements 
in one's character. 
Rabbi Moshe Loeb of Sason once sat among the farmers of a small 
community and overheard the following exchange: 
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"Do you love me?" one asked the other. The neighbor answered: "Of 
course I do; do I not befriend you in every way; have I not spoken 
with care; yes, I love you." But the first regarded him sadly. 
"How," he asked, "can you say you truly love me when you do not know 
what hurts me? He who truly loves another knows the ground of the 
other person's being, what his friend is wanting and what he himself 
is and is not contributing towards that need." 
HUEBNER: 
I am glad that you selected this story. It is an excellent 
example of the concerns that ought to motivate curriculars. Student and 
teacher join into a relationship, the nature of which provides a new 
perspective on how to get along with persons. Frequently, however, the 
teacher-student relationship seems only to be an incidental part of the 
curricular process. My colleagues agree, moreover, that too often the 
student is perceived as a fixed being with no personal biography needing 
to be accounted for by the teacher. The instructor's major task seems 
to be in implementing the design and engineering transfer of information 
to the neophyte. The reconceptualizers of curriculum urge that in an 
era enamored of technological patterning and conditioning that education 
must nurture the authentic temporal self of creatures--those who are, in 
Heidegger's words, "beings-in-the-world." I do agree with Dr. Buber 
that this amorphous, unique self becomes known through the so-called 
natural meeting. 
In the tale Dr. Buber narrated, the world-views of the Rebbe and 
the student are distinctly manifested. Their respective hopes can be 
intuited through the brief exchange. Introspection is not denied. But 
the testing ground of any newly acquired self-knowledge is in the 
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physical act of joining with another, of turning towards another person 
in conversation. 
PINAR: 
On this note, I recognize that Dr. Huebner has keyed off one of 
the major emphases in Professor Buber's interpretation of the Hassidic 
motif. The qualification that I wish to add at this point should not be 
construed, however, as an indication that Dr. Buber is "for" knowledge-
through-relationship, and the other reconceptualizing curricularists and 
I are "for" knowledge through self-scrutiny, alone. A point of fact: 
many of my colleagues literally fled the university in the sixties in 
search of solitude, through an individualism that wouldn't be tainted by 
the corrupting social influences of this type of mass community. But I 
remained to study and teach in this setting, for I keenly subscribe to 
a need for building bridges between those with similar and diverse 
points of view--social, political, curricular. I say all of this in 
view of the fact that my search for a curricular method is admittedly 
rooted in Jungian psychoanalysis, the radical psychiatry of Cooper and 
Laing, and selected areas of literary and educational theory. I presume 
that Dr. Buber finds the emphases growing from these types of inquiries 
to be potentially narcissistically overwhelming. But I see no signifi-
cant difference between the Hassid's life of joy and personal fulfill-
ment predicated upon knowing his strengths, weaknesses, and inclinations 
and our own advocacy of an intensive adherence to one's "within" as a 
way of rescuing school experiences for the aware, alert, young person. 
It's all a matter of the point at which one starts the inquiry process. 
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Is it possible, Dr. Buber, that you have not given sufficient attention 
to the first part of Hillel's dictum: "If I am not for myself--who will 
be for me?" 
BUBER: 
Certainly the Hassidic motif is highly personal and impression-
istic. It is patently clear that there is no we without an I. But the 
concern that has agonized me is that many educators have inappropriately 
tried to compensate for the stress on external valuations--for example, 
by identifying and rating people primarily according to some number 
system. The new stress seems to be an innerness, the search for the 
"real me," the "true self," the "person within." I am fearful that this 
preoccupation with the self, to the exclusion of seeking communion with 
others, has become an end in itself. It seems ironic that the imperson-
alizing aspects of technology have evoked this kind of reaction, whereby 
one who is frustrated, pained, psychically distraught, seeks solace in 
egoistic centering. 
Rev Shneur Zalman was once confronted by his jailer with the fol-
lowing inquiry, "How can we grasp that an all-knowing God would say to 
Adam, 'Where are you?'" It is not that God doesn't know, but the ques-
tion points to our own self-ignorance. But lest we ponder the issue as 
some kind of metaphysical or psychological inquiry, we should recognize 
that we are, existentially, in a certain place only in regard to where 
other persons are located. How does one neighbor meet and greet a com-
panion. Joseph was found wandering in the field. To the stranger's 
inquiry as to where he was traveling, Joseph responded: ""I'm gone to 
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find my brothers." So they were to be reunited. The act of re-turning 
towards his siblings was the way for Joseph to deal with his ambiva-
lences about his relationship to his brothers. 
MACDONALD: 
Elsewhere I have suggested that of the knowledge inquiry models 
we have, it is the dialogical one out of which curriculum most fully 
emerges. The curriculum, official notices and manuals notwithstanding, 
is created in the interchange between the students with a set of lived-
in world experiences, the resources brought by the adult monitor, and 
the adult, as a fully functioning person. The course curriculum for 
"Jewish Arab Conflicts 1900-1948" emerges from documents, shared ten-
sions and anticipations. Of course, however, the values that the stu-
dent takes out as his own ultimately develop through an intricate pro-
cess of self-reflection. It guides one to action based on speculation 
and back to speculation leading to action. The dialogue is deeply 
rooted in one's own consciousness. 
BUBER: 
I am aware, Dr. Macdonald, of your own studies of Paolo Freire 
and the success that he had in implementing a literary program with 
Brazilian farmers. He attempted to sensitize them to the notions of the 
controlling, oppressive values that affected their lives. But your 
advocacy of Freire's approach would dilute the immediate contacts pro-
vided by the dialogical relationship as I have tried to exemplify it. 
One is obviously called upon to use all the senses in recognizing, 
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turning towards and addressing another creature. Comparatively speak-
ing, I have urged that we become more clear about our own intentions, 
not from free speculation, meditation, or cogitation alone, but out of 
deep human association. Dictatorships abound, controlling our thought 
and movement. But our awareness of this stifling of the spirit comes 
not through freedom alone but communion. In other words we need one 
another in order to benefit from the state of becoming free of external 
and internal constraints. Life in itself is a kind of game, the rules 
for which can. be learned neither in physical solitude nor via ideologi-
cal argumentation. 
The Hassidim tell how Rabbi Nahum found some disciples of his 
playing checkers on Chanukah in the House of Study. He overheard them 
disputing about various aspects of the game. One student claimed that 
he had a right to move backward whether or not his piece was a king. 
The companion knew that this was patently absurd and proposed that they 
ask a neutral third party. At that moment the master appeared. "The 
rules you argue about are not essential." They were taken aback. "As 
far as the game itself is concerned, you can consult any authority on 
this type of play. It's cut and dried. What is crucial is what becomes 
of the two of you together as you engage in the game. Specifically, you 
~only move one piece, in one direction, until you've reached your 
partner's back row. Then you have more options. The end of the com-
petition results in one player being declared more skillful than the 
other. But the way you play together is infinitely more crucial than 
who is the winner. The real moves are made in the motivation, the 
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attitude, the concern that one person has for the other despite the ego 
allurements, and frustrations born of the competitive world in which we 
all survive." 
Dr. Macdonald, it is in the immediate face-to-face challenges we 
hurl at one another that we learn most about ourselves. There is no one 
person nor dialectic that can ultimately determine what another person 
learns of himself or herself in the act of studying any discipline. The 
rules of checkers enable us to play with one another. But we create new 
rules--for living--through our play. It is we, you and I, whose play--
that is, life activity--teaches us what we need to know. 
THE INVESTIGATOR: 
There is a consensus that the unexamined life is not worth liv-
ing. In an impersonalizing technologically manipulating environment--in 
which the school is still a focal point--there is the search for the 
authentic self. Unfortunately, the ''search for the authentic self" in 
each of us almost sounds like jargon. But the psychological popular-
izers make us cynical only about language; the pain of not knowing which 
signal we should be attuned to is real. It does not abate. Part of the 
problem is in the assembly line mentality where the specialists work on 
us and we, in turn, work on others. Those who would reconceptualize the 
curriculum would guide us to think and act more holistically while 
recognizing the sources of our values. These theorists have laid the 
primary stress upon existential, phenomenological, and philosophical 
analysis of personal states of being; these being a way to educate and 
become educated more humanely. 
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Dr. Buber's central teaching in this context is the dialogic 
essence of the human personality. Deep probing of the psyche, as a way 
of eliciting the valued decisions we all make, is too much akin to the 
type of spiritual flights of introspective quiescence that ultimately 
doom full human encounter. It is the communal character of one's expe-
rience in the educational act of knowledge acquisition that Buber 
unstintingly has upheld. With respect to Professor Buber and our other 
panelists, neither position in its entirety will conclusively address 
the problems of curriculum work we initially highlighted. For each 
human !-Thou relationship in which we share, we forge a stronger link to 
the !-Thou presence in which we sense an absolute value. For each act 
of grueling self-analysis we undertake, theorists argue we are that much 
closer to the uniting of mind, body, soul--all of which participate in 
the act of knowing the world through the subject matter at hand. There 
is a benefit that accrues to the student who is alert to the argumenta-
tion between both positions. A new perspective is created, stronger 
than the separate contribution provided either by Buber or Reconceptual-
izing theorists. 
At this point we enter the second realm of discussion: the 
teacher as a model, as a functioning partner in the quest for dialogical 
relationship. 
PINAR: 
Dr. Buber, each of us at our respective universities is vitally 
concerned with more than cloistered ivory tower research. It is crucial 
to be with other human beings through joint inquiry into one field of 
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knowledge or another. Institutions of higher learning can provide 
excellent opportunities for wisdom to be shared amongst the generations. 
Our respective commitments to the classroom obviously reveal how 
seriously we take our privileges and responsibility towards those who 
form the life blood of the university, that is, the students. There is 
a kind of consensus among those who reconceptualize curriculum theory, 
that it no longer is adequate to be a repository of knowledge, teaching 
subjects. The teacher must first thoroughly be committed to teaching 
persons. This is the only real way through which we can address the 
psychic dissolution which one brings to such a high pressured 
environment. 
MACDONALD: 
Hopefully, the teacher can help the student via his or her own 
experience of living through the tensions of simultaneously wanting to 
separate from, and be a part of, the group. And Dr. Buber has clearly 
shown us that an inclination towards either of these extremes can become 
an evil. As I see it, the teacher of education attempts to maintain 
critical awareness of his own impulses and actions so that he does not 
succumb to the temptation easily available to the teacher, of moving to 
one extreme or the other. 
BUBER: 
The teacher acts to bridge his chasm by virtue of experience, 
perspective, an in-depth sensing of how one can turn towards, and be 
present before, another human being. The teacher must be an exemplar of 
mutuality as the key antidote to that inclination we all have to use, 
manipulate, to treat others as things. 
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One finds the following tale from Hindu literature: The gods and 
demons were once engaged in a contest. "To whom shall we offer our 
sacrifices? They [demons] placed all their offerings in their own 
mouths. • • • Parajapti, the primal spirit, [then] bestowed himself 
upon the gods." 
The ideal essence of each person is rooted in the act of turning 
away from egoistic solitude, and towards another creature. We have 
identified this movement as communion. The teacher is the awakener of 
this possibility for sharing. 
GME~: 
I perceive a paradox. How can the teacher be the ideal exemplar 
of mutuality, of sharing, when in fact there is not parity? You have 
said that in an educational relationship the teacher can know the soul 
of the student but the student neither can nor should be able to know 
the world of the teacher. Only when the educational relationship 
evolves to friendship can this full mutuality ever exist. I do not 
understand. 
HUEB~R: 
Professor Buber, I believe that your distinction between 
relationship that is educational and friendship seriously detracts from 
the dialogical priorities you have originally set. If we curricularists 
are to learn from you, Dr. Buber, our first task is to comprehend the 
apparent contradiction evident in these two categories of meeting. 
BUBER: 
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In an educational venture there are certain objective aspects 
that cannot be compromised. The teacher by his or her status, orien-
tation, and dispositions sees beyond the horizon in a way not allowed to 
the student. You cannot change nor do I think you want to change the 
nature of the communication that exists between these two parties in an 
educational venture. For an illustration: you do not expect the doctor 
to come to the patient for healing. There is an objective condition be-
tween them that cannot be altered. All I can add is that the great 
source of influence that the teacher holds vis-a-vis the student is 
humbling! A doctor is forever learning medicine since he is not privy 
to absolute knowledge about the unfathomable mysteries of the human 
·body. By definition the healer knows what he can and cannot accomplish 
with the acquired and endowed skills at hand. 
The Hassidim held their Zaddick in the highest esteem as one who 
uniquely understood himself and his fellow creatures. Yet the more wis-
dom he had, resulting from being able to unite material and spiritual 
realms in his life, the more he held back from imposing himself. There 
were, of course, perversions of this model, but the model is, neverthe-
less, firm and decent. Because of the high calling of the human being, 
each of us struggles upward and onward to be the measure of all things. 
The teacher thus, as a part of the whole of the species, assumes a 
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strategic high point among the disciples. But the higher the stature, 
the greater the humility. Through the literature we learn! 
Rabbi Abraham said, "We say in our prayers, 'Every stone shall 
bow before you.' When man reaches the highest rung, when he reaches his 
full stature, only then does he become truly humble in his own eyes and 
knows what it is to bow before you." 
The instructor may well represent a much higher rung than the 
student in the scope of knowing; but before his own conscience and the 
presence of God, the teacher realizes his own limitations and ceases any 
inclination to control or arbitrarily decide what is best. This, of 
course, is an ideal, but I feel that it is vital in our day to formulate 
ideals and to strive to attain them. 
MACDONALD: 
There is a tremendous responsibility placed upon your teacher. 
Professor Buber, I guess I am cynical after all of these years; many 
assume the mantle of leadership as they aspire towards articulating what 
you would call "absolute value." The teacher might act arbitrarily; in 
the process of selecting the effective world--i.e., the subjects, etc.--
he might be imposing and propagandizing his own will. 
BUBER: 
Professor Macdonald, you are not the first educator who has been 
skeptical about ascribing this disposition to the teacher. Theoreti-
cians and instructional leaders have, in the process of intellectualiz-
ing and psychoanalyzing the act of teaching, recognized their positions 
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to be vulnerable. You, yourself, have suggested a dual dialectic be-
tween outer and inner worlds by which the teacher continually checks his 
own valuations of ideas and people. If he is clear thinking, he will be 
able to see the correspondence between what he says and does in the com-
munity and what truth he actually nurtures in his soul. Yes, Dr. Mac-
donald, it is a commendable system for bringing a fresh honesty, an 
openness to the classroom. But you question my attitude to the teacher 
out of the same skepticism you apparently hold over your own position. 
You see, it should be clear by now that I oppose systems of any 
sort; especially those that emerge from intricate intellectual and 
psychic networks. I do not believe we contradict our estimation of the 
act of dialogue as the highest work of the human being when we simulta-
neously focus upon the teacher's great calling and superior presence 
before the student. The authentic person who would teach fully grasps 
the absolute nature of the dialogical relationship and would do nothing 
to compromise the integrity of the student. And the moments of dialogue 
need not even involve words. 
There is a tale of a young Hassid who, having exhausted his 
teacher's great store of knowledge, was sent to another village. There 
he found a famous rebbe, a teacher in the fullest sense of the word. He 
spent six months in the presence of this master. Upon return to his 
home village, all his peers and mentor inundated him with questions: 
What had he discovered? His answer: I learned how the rebbe ties his 
shoes! 
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From this story one gathers that it is in the day-to-day conduct 
--exemplified almost tongue-in-cheek by the act of shoe tying--that the 
most profound values are perceived and acted upon. 
PINAR: 
I appreciate your wider view--
BUBER: 
I prefer to think of this as deeper and wider. 
PINAR: 
--of the educational experience. You do, however, seem to be a 
purist, Professor Buber. You bemoan the fact that there are no longer 
any great visions infusing the act of teaching with meaning, yes, you 
have said elsewhere "eternal meaning." You have accused contemporary 
pedagogues of being enamored of either the funnel or pump ideology: the 
student as only a passive receptacle of the wisdom of the ages, of the 
total source of all wisdom that simply needs to be "pumped out." But 
you invalidate the methods of some of the reconceptualizing theorists as 
much too intellectual and psychological for achieving a high level of 
honesty and communion in the educational setting. I'll admit that I am 
jealous for the approach I am continually testing and refining, namely, 
"currere." It is a way of overcoming liabilities inherent in a 
relationship where one partner, by virtue of age or experience or cre-
dentials, is not on the same level as another. 
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GREENE: 
Dr. Pinar sounds like a university professor holding on for dear 
life. I am a bit surprised. 
PINAR: 
Deep down I believe there are great truths in the Hassidic 
treasury about human beings come to share knowledge about their world. 
Unfortunately, however, the high spiritual calling of some of the most 
esteemed leaders was compromised by flights of ego leading to manipula-
tion and not reconciliation. I suppose I would like to depend on some-
thing more than the "immediacy of relation" to recognize these eternal 
values which you feel are so far missing in the perception of our 
teachers and students. 
BUBER: 
I appreciate your candor, Dr. Pinar. I hope that in these frank 
exchanges we have all taken something new into ourselves as a result of 
having turned honestly and lovingly towards one another. Your own work, 
and that of you others here, deeply interests me. Beyond the scope of 
your research and the breadth of writing about the problems of living in 
an l-It world are your personal commitments to help nurture more humane 
alternatives. 
What I find missing, however, is any kind of stimulating vision 
to help focus our fullest energies. And I believe that occurs because 
we have basically been doing our work and living our lives as if there 
were a dichotomy to be preserved between the religious and secular 
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spheres of life. This is not a theological tract, but I'll venture to 
say that western man's inclination to compartmentalize the spiritual and 
material dimensions of existence has contributed to our anomie. 
I have elsewhere argued that all education worthy of the name is 
education of character. The goal of entering into relationship with 
another is "character." It is the need, perceived and nurtured, to 
accept responsibility for a word, a gesture, a continuous series of be-
havior. The Great Character, though not necessarily a moral genius, 
takes the whole world into account when he responds to a question or 
addresses another. And the whole world means that through human dialo-
gue one addresses the Eternal Thou. The teacher, because he knows the 
world of the student and his own world, is best suited for initiating 
this bridging of the gap between material and spiritual world within 
each student. Humanistic and religious values are interdependent; the 
educator who takes both perspectives into his active orientation towards 
students is complete and mirrors an image of the Great Character. It is 
a unifying image that would make the humanistic endeavors of the recon-
ceptualists more thoroughly penetrating. 
THE INVESTIGATOR: 
I believe that Professor Buber has, in his writings, and here, 
today, more sharply articulated the position of the teacher in the edu-
cational relationship. In comparison with the reconceptualizing educa-
tion, he explicitly verbalizes the great importance and responsibility 
of the teacher as leader. Thus he is more vulnerable to criticism since 
his stand for dialogue in an educational relationship and mutuality seem 
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incongruous. The reconceptualists are all actively part of the teaching 
corps and have legitimately reacted not out of theoretical concern but 
out of a fear of what they have seen in educational institutions: those 
who take advantage of others under the guise of "leadership." 
Because Buber does not offer us a step-by-step procedure for 
teaching a course of literature or provide a handbook for rating teacher 
behavior, he is sometimes difficult to assimilate. Moreover, these cur-
ricularists and philosophers before this day only generally addressed 
the kinds of interhuman dilemmas that Buber focuses on in detail. 
The purpose of this symposium has been to alert both groups of 
thinkers (theorists and Buber) to the concerns they have explicated in 
their respective endeavors. This investigator believes that the dis-
course of university curricularists who are drawn towards the act of 
reconceptualizing can be enriched from greater familiarity with Martin 
Buber. The synthesis has not yet been made, but the seeds are sown. 
Our teachers relate a story of a person born without a soul. 
This man pleads with God for a soul. One night, in a dream, he entered 
Paradise and saw an emporium that sold a variety of wares. He entered 
and requested a soul. A heavenly creature placed a seed in his hand. 
The man cried, "I asked for a soul." "But," the angel said, "here we 
sell seeds, not souls. It is up to you to nurture that seed so it 
blossoms into a soul." 
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POSTSCRIPT 
A symposium format was selected to effect a synthesis of the re-
conceptualists and Buber in a "personal" way. The writer has attempted 
to reflect the imaginative, innovative, playful mood that pervades the 
works of the reconceptualizing theorists. 
Buber was not a curricular theorist, though his views on educa-
tional relationships strongly complement those of the four curricular-
ists studied in this dissertation. Therefore, a new dimension of under-
standing is added by noting additional points of dissimilarity among 
some issues. While there are only relative differences, a spirit of 
controversy pervades this symposium, thus expanding the earlier discus-
sion of the four reconceptualists and Buber. 
Specific curriculum issues were selected upon which some or all 
of the symposium members could respond. The five panelists have made 
their obervations in regard to specific topical questions with which 
educators will deal between now and the turn of the century. 
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